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testimonies and interviews with the participants, peer educators and spectators. The 
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This practice-based PhD explores how the implementation of biofeedback in audio-visual 
performances can challenge the traditional divisions between the roles of the artist, the 
audience and the artwork. This was achieved by designing a system to accommodate 
these performances and iterating the system across three performances. At the centre of 
the system is the use of biometric devices to collect real-time data from audience 
participants. Their brainwaves and heart rates were interfaced with audio-visual outputs 
which were made both visible and audible to them, thereby influencing the original data 
and creating a biofeedback loop. The first of the four experiments took place in a 
controlled studio environment without an audience and served to establish which 
technologies were most suited to this end. The technologies were tested for their 
prospective reliability and accessibility in a live performance environment, with the ultimate 
aim of enabling the greatest level of interaction between the roles of artist, audience and 
artwork. The following three experiments took place between 2015-18 and were funded by 
commissioning bodies to be hosted in galleries and exhibition spaces with an audience 
present. Each of these latter three performances continued to iterate the system’s design, 
implementing changes in response to the obstacles and opportunities presented at each 
stage of the process. 
The research question took as its starting point the principles of practice as 
research and the fields of social practice and cybernetics. Broadly defined, social practice 
is a field of art whose theory and practice foregrounds participation and an awareness of 
context and process in the production of artworks. Cybernetics is a field of science and 
philosophy which studies how systems self-regulate within, and adapt to, their 
environments through mechanisms of feedback and circularity, exploring principles of 
situatedness, embodiment, interaction and control. By drawing on the respective theories 
and practices of these fields, this thesis will document how they each informed the 
experiments in addressing the research question. Little research exists on the points of 
contact between social practice and cybernetics. Considered together, they mutually 
inform one another and present a number of illuminating points of departure when 
considering the embedded hierarchies and relationships between the roles of artist, 









a) Research Question 
 
How can the implementation of biofeedback in audio-visual performances challenge the 
traditional divisions between the roles of the artist, the audience and the artwork? 
 
b) Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis documents my practice across six chapters which detail the theory and 
practice of the experiment-performances, identifying the key practitioners, thinkers, 
artworks and literature which informed the process. The ‘Literature Review’ outlines the 
purview of the project, providing the historical and philosophical context in which it is 
located, with subsections dedicated to the respective threads of cybernetics and social 
practice. Throughout the project in general, the study of social practice and cybernetics 
served as a means of analysing the experiment-performances in relation to the research 
question. Additionally, doing so also functioned as an end in itself as I identified how they 
intersected and complemented one another in ways which had not been explored 
previously. Alongside each subsection on cybernetics and social practice are sections 
detailing relevant pre-existing fields and discussions. These serve to further contextualise 
the project and provide links between its two principal fields and critically engage with the 
key theories and literature written on the subjects of social practice, cybernetics, and the 
interrelationship between the roles of the artist, artwork and audience, providing examples 
of projects which inform and forecast further developments in these areas. The fourth 
chapter, ‘Methodology’, provides a record of the technical and logistical routes by which 
the practice-element of the project developed and grew, specifically focussing on how the 
software and hardware were tested, iterated, and implemented. Following this, the fifth 
chapter comprises four subsections, each of which is dedicated to providing an overview 
and analysis of each of the four experiment-performances. This is followed by the 
‘Conclusion’, which surveys the successes, failures and opportunities for development, 
and makes more explicit suggestions for future projects which might address questions 






c) Research Context 
 
To explain what led me to this research question, I will briefly survey my own practice to 
date from being a youth worker in the community arts sector and studying architecture to 
working as a visual jockey (VJ) in real-time performance contexts. 
In 1999, I was one of a group of youth workers commissioned by the UK 
Government’s Department for Education to assist in the aftermath of the Oldham Riots—a 
series of racially motivated attacks which took place in the town of Oldham, Greater 
Manchester—which involved running a programme of community arts projects to help the 
town’s younger residents. This experience introduced me to the theory and practices 
which fall under the broader umbrella of social practice. In turn, I studied architecture 
during the period in which social practice had begun to dominate much artistic production 
during the 1990s and 2000s. In this time, art was increasingly treated by governments as 
an instrument of social change, with community arts projects becoming a source of 
feedback and a site for evaluating the wellbeing of certain communities and 
demographics. 
During my time at the Manchester School of Architecture I discovered the work of 
the Architectural Machine Group, a multidisciplinary research group founded by Nicholas 
Negroponte that eventually became the MIT Media Lab (Pertigkiozoglou, 2017). The 
group’s emphasis on bringing together art, design, social sciences and philosophy to ask 
questions about the role of the citizen in the age of new computer technologies appealed 
to both my social concerns and design sensibilities. It was through Negroponte’s work and 
his collaborations with cyberneticist Gordon Pask that I was introduced to cybernetics—an 
entire field engaged in these topics. Together they experimented with ways of interfacing 
humans and machines in interactive environments, producing tools and methodologies 
that would allow ‘conversation’ between humans and intelligent learning technologies. As 
Theodore Spyropoulos explains, Pask and Negroponte built ‘dynamic and engaged 
environment[s] in which the co-evolution of the architect and his machines would produce 
new paradigms of design (Spyropoulos, 2008, p. 144)’. 
Whereas my design and community arts work focused on questions of 
participation, process, and the user-producer dynamic, it was VJ-ing which galvanised my 
interest in live performance and a performance-oriented focus on how the relationships 
between the artist, audience and artwork could be modulated to produce more interesting 
dynamics and reduce passivity by distributing authorship. Regularly playing in nightclubs, 
festivals and galleries using live-performance technologies contributed to my 
understanding of these roles and how the two fields of cybernetics and social practice 
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could be combined to produce performances which explored their interaction. It is notable 
that, in the early days of VJing, for the very heterogeneity of technologies and skills it 
required, VJing was categorised under a variety of different genres of production; it was 
not confined to any single conventional role of artist, producer, designer, coder. This had 
an influence on my awareness and interest in the blurring between the roles of the artist, 
audience and artwork and the conditions under which this takes place. 
Between these interests, I was led to discover the concept of biofeedback, 
especially as it was pioneered by David Rosenboom and Richard Teitelbaum (whose 
influence on my work I detail below). In its own right, whilst biofeedback does not 
necessarily unite social practice and cybernetics, its quality of blurring the limits between 
body and environment and performer and performance disposes it to challenging the 
divisions between the roles of artist, audience and artwork. Seeing social practice and 
cybernetics in relation with one another allowed me to imagine how the implementation of 
biofeedback could make this blurring apparent. 
 
 
d) Practice as Research 
 
This project draws from the model of research methods and critical approaches 
developed by Robin Nelson in the book ​Practice as Research in the Arts: Principles, 
Protocols, Pedagogies, Resistances​ (2013). In it Nelson proposes an approach of 
cross-referencing testimonies, data, and evidence in the manner of a dialogical, 
multimodal process (see diagram 2.2). This was how the project was approached, 
whereby the data collected from the participants was combined with the personal 
testimonies of other audience members to shape and influence the ongoing iteration of the 
system, ultimately culminating in this write-up and the analysis of the 






Figure 27: Nelson, R. (2013). Multi-mode epistemological model for practice as research, in 




Praxis, as a hybrid of ‘theory integrated within practice’, sits at the center of a triangle, the 
corners of which comprise: 
 
● Practitioner Knowledge 
 
This involves tacit knowledge, embodied knowledge and (phenomenological) 
experience. The concept of practitioner knowledge is premised on the notion that 
practitioners, enculturated by their training and experience, have ‘embodied within 
them’ the ‘know-how’ to make work. 
 
● Critical Reflection 
 
This involves practitioner ‘action research’, explicit knowledge, and the idea of 
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being located in a tradition. The concept of critical reflection describes a conscious 
strategy to reflect upon established practice as well as to bring out ‘tacit 
knowledge’. 
 
● Conceptual Framework(s) 
 
This involves traditional theoretical knowledge and cognitive-academic knowledge. 
Creative practice becomes innovative by being informed by theoretical 
perspectives, either new in themselves, or perhaps newly explored in a given 
medium. 
 
Nelson’s diagram offers the opportunity of seeing the process of art production as itself 
knowledge producing. In other words, the separation of theory and practice is not clean. 
Forms of practice can themselves be thought of as theories in their own right, and in turn, 
the artwork itself can be thought of as research in its own right. This project is 
practice-based as the creative artefacts form the basis of the contribution to knowledge. 
However, ‘the process’ and its ‘evidence’ are also intended to be read as knowledge 
producing and not just ‘means’ to an end or merely as a form of documentation. The art 
object, its constitutive methods and the mediums used all interact in feedback loops. This 
document exists alongside these experiments not only as an explanation of the method, 
but as a way to contextualize and place the practical work within the contemporary 
discourse on the interrelation between the roles of artist, audience and artwork. 
Throughout, I will detail the various ways in which the different forms of knowledge 
correspond to the dimensions of the project and how each experiment-performance 
exhibited them and to what extent. 
 
 
e) Research Aims and Objectives 
 
Building on my youth work experience, architecture degree and VJing background, the 
four experiment-performances attempted to address different aspects of the research 
question. 
The first experiment-performance, which I will simply call ​System​, involved setting 
up the framework which I would then use in the following three experiment-performances. 
The goal was to create an open-ended system which included possibilities for interaction 
between the audience and the audio-visual outputs. This was achieved through the use of 
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biofeedback, and at this stage in the process the predominant focus was on establishing 
the advantages and disadvantages of each possible biometric device and therein which 
was most suited to the purposes of the overall project. At this early stage, given the lack of 
both an audience and a completed piece of work, the role explored in the most depth was 
that of the artist. As the system was explicitly designed to encourage the co-creation of the 
artwork with the audience, the role of the artist was being prepared to be distributed and 
dispersed across the participants attending the future performances. 
The second experiment was the first 'performance' of the system insofar as it took 
place with an audience present. Entitled ​Neu-collective Consciousness​, the emphasis was 
on involving other groups and individuals in the process as a collective activity.  This 
1
meant both negotiating the commissioning brief, managing the expectations of the 
organisation who commissioned us, and testing the system in an uncontrolled 
environment in real-time. As such, here, the roles of the audience and the artwork came to 
the fore. The spatial arrangement was such that the audience were included on the 
‘stage’, and members of the public were invited to wear the biometric devices which 
translated their data into graphic representations on screens hanging in the middle of the 
room. However, there was still a limit to how integrated the audience, artwork and artist 
were as these same screens divided the spectators in the audience from those of the 
participating audience members wearing the devices. Following its completion, we took 
the opportunity to integrate the audience’s opinions and feedback into the system, 
modifying its design and presentation to improve the level of interactivity between the 
roles in the following performances. 
In the third experiment, ​Zugzwang​, the emphasis was placed on further reducing 
the limits between the artist(s) and audience, but this accompanied a reconsolidation of 
the artwork as an ‘object’. By removing the screen and replacing it with a pyramid hanging 
in the centre of the space, the border separating the artist and audience was lifted, but it 
reintroduced a more definitive and demarcated object as the central focus of the 
performance. Alongside this, instead of keeping the data taken from the participants 
separate, I combined it together to form mean averages. These average readings were 
then visualised and sonified together to produce singular real-time representations, 
thereby further homogenising the outcome and yet further interconnecting the participants 
who took part in the performance. 
The issues experienced in the third experiment-performance were approached in 
1 Please refer to the corresponding section on each experiment later in the document for 
elaborations on the respective significance of each title. 
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the fourth and final one by drawing upon more conventional social practice methods. 
Verrfast​ attempted to redress the lack of knowledge participants had in previous instances 
of using the system by introducing experts in the field of neuroscience and psychology to 
explain how the data was being collected by the biometric devices. This involved hosting a 
series of discussions and educational workshops in the lead up to the 
performance-proper. As such, this part of the process became part of the outputs of the 
experiment-performance rather than simply its pretext. Whilst this constituted a widening 
of the role of the artwork-as-object to become more process-oriented, it also involved a 
return to the more traditional paradigm of the artist-as-expert. This was due to the fact that 
we tried to explain in greater depth to the participants how the system worked in order to 
get the most out of it and allow for the greatest level of interaction between the audience 
and the artwork. 
In summary, the objectives which accounted for this process as a whole were as 
follows: 
 
1. Design a system capable of connecting audience biometric data with audiovisual 
material 
2. Implement a feedback loop between the data and the performance software 
3. Iterate the design across multiple experiment-performances 




f) Key Terms 
 
Before attempting to show how the divisions between the roles of artist, audience and 
artwork can be challenged it is important to define how I will use each term in relation to 
one another and the subroles which emerged. In each case, the roles of the artist, 
audience and artwork rest upon at least one essential characteristic. For example, when I 
use the word artist, I am always referring to the condition of being a creator, facilitator, 
producer or practitioner. Additionally, the roles also designate other non-essential 
characteristics. For example, when I use the word artwork, I am referring to either the 
system, the artefact, the performance or the process as a whole. In all cases of using the 
terms artist, audience or artwork, I refer to at least one essential characteristic and, 
depending on the context, at least one other variable characteristic. 
I will show how this applies in each specific case. 
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Though the status of the artist is subject to debate, I attempt here to detail some of 
its characteristics which are prerequisites and some of those which are incidental, 
depending on the context and specifics. An artist must fulfill at least one or more of the 
following roles of ‘creator’, ‘facilitator’, ‘producer’ or ‘practitioner’ in relation to the work of 
art. The nonessential but nonetheless operative subroles which came up during this 
project include but are not limited to: ‘author’, ‘designer’, ‘performer’ and ‘entertainer’. 
Whilst it is of course possible to be an author, designer, performer or entertainer without 
necessarily being an artist, the role of the artist does necessarily designate the role of 
creator, facilitator, producer or practitioner. In this respect, the role of the artist is 
contingent upon formal, practical and aesthetic criteria, the details of which I will explore 
and critique with reference to other practitioners and my own experiment-performances. 
I define the role of the audience by its status as the sensor or perceiver. Its 
subroles relevant to this project include but are not limited to: spectator, observer, listener 
and consumer. Similar but distinct from the role of the artist, it is not necessary to be, all at 
once, a spectator, observer, listener or consumer to fulfill the role of being an audience, 
nor does being any of these necessarily mean you are an audience member, but it is 
impossible to be a member of an audience without sensing or perceiving some object or 
event. Something that is distinct to the role of the audience compared to the roles of artist 
and artwork, where the existence of one implies the existence of the other (there is no 
artist without an artwork and vice versa), is the fact that it can exist independently of artists 
and artworks. For instance, one can be audience to a lecture without the lecture being 
considered an artwork. However, to this last point, as I will explore in the Literature 
Review, this also depends on how one defines the limits and criteria of artworks, as in 
some cases which I will detail lectures might indeed be considered artworks. 
What is interesting between the first two roles are the categories which exist 
between them. As was the case in my experiment-performances, there are roles which 
explicitly trouble the distinctions between artist and audience. A central aspect of the 
exercise undertaken by this project is in observing the points at which the roles of 
participant, peer practitioner, coauthor, cocreator, and co-producer exceed the role of 
audience, entering into the territory of artist. For our purposes, at this stage it is sufficient 
to state that, contained within the role of the audience, there were two distinct subroles 
which warrant being defined. In each case of an audience member wearing a biometric 
device, they are referred to as ‘participants’ as doing so meant they partook in the 
production of the work and were able to influence it to a significant degree through their 
interactions with the system. In the case of audience members simply being present and 
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observing the performances, they are referred to as ‘spectators’ for the fact that they 
observed the experiment-performances but did not influence them to a significant enough 
degree to constitute describing them as ‘participants’ (which connotes a more active 
involvement). The reason for describing them as ‘spectators’ and not simply ‘observers’ 
was to distinguish their role from that which is fulfilled by the more passive observation of 
a ‘system’ or an ‘experiment’, neither of which necessarily connote the durational, actively 
engaging qualities of a performance. 
As with the role of the artist, the role of the artwork rests upon both prerequisite 
qualities and, in turn, possible contingent characteristics or ‘subroles’. I define the role of 
the artwork by its status as the object created / produced / facilitated / practiced by the 
artist and sensed / perceived by the audience. It is important not to confuse ‘object’ as an 
artefact, process or concept with simply an artefact alone (for instance, an image, 
sculpture or painting). A process is still an object insofar as it is perceived or sensed as 
the object of the artist’s and audience’s attention. This distinction is what allows the 
expanded definition of the role of the artwork to include processes and concepts, and it is 
this definition which is employed here. The subroles of an artwork are as diverse as 
instances of art, but broadly speaking include paintings, sculptures, plays, novels, videos, 
etc. There are two subroles which feature in this project that warrant clarification in 
advance as they comprise distinct but eventually combined parts of the overall work. First, 
there is the artwork as 'system' which refers to the hardware and software used to 
produce the biofeedback loop. Second, there is the 'performance' which refers to when the 
system is used in the context of an audience, the space in which these performances took 
place, and the participants whose biometric data was fed into the system to produce the 
biofeedback loop. The term ‘experiment’ is also used throughout to describe the fact that 
the system design was iterated from the initial test (the first 'experiment') and the 
subsequent live performances (the 'experiment-performances'). Without an audience and 
the subsequent interaction between the artist and the participants, the three following 
experiments would have remained experiments alone and not experiment-performances. 
Depending on the stage of the process, when I discuss ‘the role of artwork’, I refer to any 
one or more of these objects (as either the artefact of the technology, the process of the 
performances or the overarching concept of a biofeedback performance). 
These definitions should not be taken as the final word but rather an introduction to 
some of the questions and factors involved in defining the roles and the divisions between 
them. One of the advantages presented by the project is the fact that it draws upon 
different intellectual frameworks to make its case. For instance, where cybernetics 
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discusses ‘observers’, ‘users’ and ‘systems’, social practice discusses ‘artists’, 
‘participants’ and ‘artworks’. Each of these terms intersect and overlap depending on the 
person using them and the context in which they’re used. My interest was in harnessing 
these and other fields of knowledge to try to identify these ambiguities and explore how 
they contribute to the research question. In doing so, the project entered into the tradition 
of artists who have challenged and developed the role of the artwork as it relates to the 









This chapter is divided into four sections: ‘Historical Context’, ‘Philosophical Context’, 
‘Cybernetic Aesthetics’, and ‘Social Practice’. The two former sections situate the project 
within its sociopolitical history and the context of ideas that informed the works which 
precede it. The two latter sections overview artworks produced during the 20th and 21st 
centuries which had the most influence on this project. In the spirit of Nelson’s model of 
PaR, the literature review serves the function of establishing both the know-that and 
know-what of the project by locating the conceptual frameworks in which it is situated 
whilst also identifying ‘what works’ with reference to previous projects and artworks in the 
tradition it inherits. 
 
 
2. Historical Context 
 
a) Cybernetic History 
 
The respective developments of cybernetics and social practice as disciplinary frames are 
able to be contextualised in a variety of historical events and key moments. However, I will 
limit myself to describing only those events which are most relevant to the project and 
which shed light on their previously unacknowledged points of reciprocity. 
The history of cybernetics is complex, but for our purposes it is sufficient to limit 
our scope to three parts: the rise of what is known as ‘first-order’ cybernetics in the 
1940s-60s, its inheritance and modulation by ‘second-order’ cybernetics in the 1960s-70s, 
and its contemporary practice from the 1970s to the present day being carried out by a 
number of old and new institutions which have adopted the name ‘cybernetics’ to describe 
what by now are a diverse array of theories and practices. 
First order cybernetics begins in earnest with the work of Norbert Wiener. Wiener 
coined the term in his book 1948 book ​Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the 
Animal and the Machine​ (2013), building on the word ​kybernētēs​,​ ​first used in Plato’s ​The 
Alcibiades​ to refer to the governance of people (2001). As contemporary cyberneticians 
Stuart Umpleby and Louis Kauffman explain, Wiener’s book was inspired by a series of 
lectures sponsored by the Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation from 1946 to 1953, eventually 
referred to as simply the conferences on cybernetics following its publication and 
subsequent influence (2017, p. 3). 
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The conferences had as their purview the subject of how natural, social and 
technological systems are grounded in circularity. As opposed to the traditional paradigms 
of modern science which emphasises linearity, rationalism and logical positivism, 
cybernetics takes as its starting point the principles of circularity in the form of feedback, 
regulation, and reciprocity, positing that systems of knowledge are in fact situated and 
contingent. Indeed, as contemporary cybernetician and philosopher of science Andrew 
Pickering observes, among the early implementations of cybernetic thinking was Wiener’s 
design of a military system which would track the movement of airplanes, allowing artillery 
guns to shoot ahead of them, thereby anticipating their position by the time the bullets 
reached them (2014). Whilst born out of a military context of control, it did not remain so; 
first-order cybernetics ultimately was engaged in disrupting the modern paradigm of 
linearity, not to entirely rid it of its place in modern thought, but to reveal what it had 
forgotten. As Umpleby and Kauffman identify, 
 
Given the vital role that circularity plays in biological and social systems, it is surprising that 
so much of science focuses on linear causal relations. Probably this happens because 
scientists seek certainty in their knowledge (2017, p. 4). 
 
First-order cybernetics invited openness and uncertainty back into the fold of scientific 
discourse, recognising the patent inaccuracy such restrictive impositions would inevitably 
cause. 
As first-order morphed into second-order cybernetics, what began as a 
military-funded science of control and circularity grew to embrace an explicitly social 
framework. This ‘social basis’ of cybernetics is articulated by physicist and philosopher 
Andrew Pickering in his book ​The Cybernetic Brain ​(2010, 389), one of the key texts I will 
draw upon throughout this discussion. Pickering describes how often the work of 
cyberneticians in the 1960s took place outside the academy or formal institutional contexts 
and rather was homed by a more amorphous and broader sphere of 1960s counterculture. 
Throughout its history, he explains, we encounter 
 
the marks of a continual social marginality of cybernetics: its hobbyist origins outside any 
institutional frame, its early flourishing in tenuous and ad hoc organizations like dining 
clubs and conference series, its continual welling-up outside established institutions and its 
lack of dependable support from them. […]More generally, the counterculture, while it 
lasted, offered a much more supportive environment to cybernetics than did the organs of 
the state (2010, p. 389). 
 
From living rooms and garages to brief stints in progressive university departments, 1960s 
cybernetics took place on the fringes of the academy, mirroring the extent to which its 
theory and practice ventured perspectives from outside the established frames of scientific 
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thought. Practitioners like Walter Grey attempted to model consciousness by building 
mechanical tortoises, whilst Stafford Beer attempted to envision the management of 
factories by integrating them with the ecosystem of ponds (Pickering, 37-90; pp. 215-308). 
Stafford Beer’s Viable Systems Model (VSM), a model of an adaptive, self-regulating 
system which could be applied to any organisation or structure, was attempted to be 
implemented to Salvador Allende’s socialist government in the 1970s (Glanville 2008, p. 
21). 
Stafford Beer anticipated the benefits of interfacing these different typologies of 
knowledge to enhance participation within complex systems. Beer recognised that the 
body could be used as a model for other social and political systems, bringing together 
biofeedback aesthetics and neurocybernetics. Andrew Pickering details this in the text 
Science of the Unknowable​ (2006) in relation to Beer’s Viable Systems Model (VSM): 
 
Beer’s idea was therefore to read biological organisms as exemplary of viable systems in 
general—we should transplant their key features to the structure of the firm. In particular, 
as I hinted a minute ago, Beer chose the human nervous system as his model. If his 
original idea was that the firm needed to contain an artificial brain (made of magnetic 
Daphnia ​or leeches), the idea of the VSM was that the firm should ​become a brain, ​a 
cyborg brain with human brains lodged within it (p. 15). 
 
The crux of this vision was the principle of ‘reciprocally vetoing homeostatic interactions’ 
(p. 16), whereby the VSM came to be considered ‘a kind of ​techno-social diagram ​of an 
adaptive democracy’ (p. 22). In this respect, the body provided a way of imagining how 
one could account for black boxes by integrating feedback loops into each level of 
organisation in the manner of a recursive function: 
 
Each component […]of any viable system was supposed to be itself a viable system. Thus, 
under higher magnification, each system[…] was supposed to consist of its own five 
element system, and so on, both up and down the scale. Since the body has mind and 
consciousness, this implied, for Beer, that different levels of consciousness could be traced 
down to the individual cells of the body, and upwards beyond the body, to a kind of group 
consciousness that arose in syntegration (p. 27)[.] 
 
Rather than being organised by an unquestioned command line, the internal components 
of the body each consist of their own recursive processing which feed out into other 
networked processes. In turn, these contain their own internal recursive forms of 
organisation. If second-order cybernetics was housed by any broader historical 
framework, it was the confluence of countercultural movements that proliferated 1960s 
artistic, social and political thought. 
Cybernetics has branched out since its expansion in the ‘60s and ‘70s. Nicholas 
Negroponte’s Architectural Machine Group produced a set of research projects which 
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brought together theories and practices of art, design, social sciences, science and 
philosophy to ask questions about the role of the citizen among new media and computer 
technologies. The Architectural Machine Group is where cybernetics was first formalised 
within the academy as a legitimate framework of theory and practice. Negroponte worked 
with Gordon Pask on networks and systems theory, sharing the view that the complexity 
of the world, with all its feedback loops and circular systems, must be preserved when 
studying it (2011). One of the foremost examples of contemporary U.K.-based work on 
cybernetics was the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit which operated out of the 
University of Warwick in the 1990s-2000s. Headed by Nick Land and Sadie Plant, the 
outfit’s most famous outputs include the theory of accelerationism (capitalism must be 
replaced by its rapid advancement rather than halted) and a wide array of 
cross-disciplinary post-structuralist critiques of rave music, biomechanics and 1990s drug 
culture (Fisher, 1998). Cybernetics also continues through the American Society for 
Cybernetics (asc-cybernetics.org) and the International Academy for Systems and 
Cybernetic Sciences (iascys.org) which hosts annual conferences and curates articles and 
books for publication. 
Across this 80 year history, it is cybernetics’ experimentalism and commitment to 
performance which have remained consistent, as has its occupancy at the margins of the 
academy and formal institutions. Not only its theories and practices, but precisely this 
marginality appealed to me and shaped the project by offering a sense of validation to 
many of the methods employed in carrying out the work which often took the shape of 
something in between work, life and play—the interstices of ongoing experiments. 
 
 
b) Social Practice History 
 
Social practice offers a framework for thinking through collective authorship in the 
production of art outside the formal settings of the academy or artist’s studio. The principle 
of participation is fundamental to social practice. Social practice oversees a shift away 
from the goal of the artist as producing ‘high art’, whereby art is considered an elite or 
special cultural object created for its own sake, towards thinking through how the 
co-creation of artworks can be used as an instrument for social change. As such, the 
history of social practice intersects with various changes in how sociopolitical life was 
organised, including the role of the arts in society and the relationship between the 
individual and the collective. Some of these changes took the shape of how art’s ability to 
create social change was measured. Because of the collaborative and participatory nature 
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of social practice as it emerged from community arts programmes, there were budgetary 
requirements which necessitated the involvement of outside roles, often but not 
exclusively in the shape of the state. As such, numerical and quantitative metrics were 
introduced to funding criteria. However, this form of appraisal inevitably changed the 
internal composition of the roles involved in the production of the artworks as I will detail 
below. 
Social practice tracks the dispersion of the role of the artist across a wider number 
of participants and commissioning bodies, thereby designating new responsibilities under 
its remit. As a community arts worker, I had first hand experience of helping with the 
government-sponsored response to the Oldham Riots. It was in this forum that I first 
encountered the shifting role of art in society, and the difficulties this presented in terms of 
the decisions concerning how funding was allocated and the benefits were measured. A 
report was commissioned by the government, the Metropolitan Borough of Oldham and 
the local police authority in the aftermath of the riots to try to establish their causes and 
propose solutions. The Ritchie report, named after the chairman of the review, David 
Ritchie, outlined a series of measures to address ethnic tensions, segregation and 
proposals for greater integration among the wider community: 
 
In looking for solutions, the Panel’s guiding principle is that every recommendation, and 
every development in future for youth provision, must have at its core whether or not it will 
promote integration (Ritchie, p. 48). 
 
What is interesting about the Ritchie Report and its detailing of the response to the 
Oldham Riots is this focus on ‘integration’ and how it was costed and measured. 
Integration obviously encompassed a wide set of concepts and metrics: ranging from 
ethnic and social forms of integration along demographic lines, to simply referring to 
opportunities for conversations between residents who might previously existed in 
isolation of one another, segregated by historical divisions. In view of achieving this 
somewhat amorphous goal, the report sought to harness the unique qualities of artistic 
projects to form opportunities for interaction between participants: 
 
The Panel were very impressed with Unity in the Community, a project promoted by 
Greater Manchester Police, Oldham Athletic Football Club, the Council’s Sports 
Development Team and marketing company M2M. The project will help young people 
aged 9-11 over a full academic year to understand the different communities in Oldham. 
They will work through three themes: sport, which will involve professional coaching in 
football, team matches and a tournament ending in March 2002; academic achievement 
using poets working in primary schools, and the aim being production of a children’s poetry 
book; and arts, involving children collaborating to produce large pieces of artwork. We are 
excited by this work, and any project which brings together young people from all cultural 
groups to learn and have fun together is a positive step for Oldham. There is funding for 




This brief passage from the report evidences the concerns which structure social practice 
as it grew out of community arts. During this shift, art also came to be used as a source of 
feedback in its own right—a barometer of the communities in which the projects took 
place, measuring the social wellbeing, interests and persuasions of those who took part. 
In this respect, on the one hand, art is instrumentalised a means for social change, but on 
the other hand its funding is contingent upon being able to measure and cost its 
effectiveness in doing so. The application of the quantified measurements to qualitative 
experiences posed various difficulties in attempting to adhere art into the practices of 
means-testing government policy. In this respect, the adoption of art as a means of 
producing different forms of interaction had the effect of dispersing the roles of artist, 
audience and artwork to become more collective, foregrounding the processes of 
participation over the aesthetics of any object produced. However, in turn, the logic of 
commissioning which grew out of this, whereby funding streams are contingent upon 
costing the value of the work in quantified terms, had a significant impact on the nature of 
the roles themselves—both in terms of their autonomy and integrity (by introducing 
preconceived requirements) and in terms of the goals of art itself (away from producing 
aesthetic experiences towards producing participation for its own sake). 
This process of relating artistic production to measurable social benefits follows 
from a wider ideological shift beginning in the 1970s. Michel Foucault explains in ​The Birth 
of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1978-79​ (2008) how this process 
emerges out of a theory of economics which sought to introduce activities traditionally not 
conceived as economic ‘into the field of economic analysis’ (p. 217). This was achieved by 
inventing the concept of ‘human capital’ as a means of remapping qualitative aspects of 
social life into quantifiable forms of value (p. 224). As such, Foucault explains, 
 
on the basis of this theoretical and historical analysis we can thus pick out the principles of 
a policy of growth which will no longer be simply indexed to the problem of the material 
investment of physical capital, on the one hand, and of the number of workers, [on the 
other], but a policy of growth focused precisely on one of the things that the West can 
modify most easily, and that is the form of investment in human capital. And in fact we are 
seeing the economic policies of all the developed countries, but also their social policies, 
as well as their cultural and educational policies, being orientated in these terms (p. 232). 
 
In other words, this ‘analysis of non-economic behavior through a grid of economic 
intelligibility’ directly feeds into how art production (a social, amorphous and qualitative 
process) is conceived of in terms of quantifiable and measurable outputs (p. 248). 
Emerging out of the socially-focussed community arts movement, social practice inherited 
this line of thinking. 
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In many respects, the trajectory of social practice in relation to art in general is an 
inverse mirror of the relationship between cybernetics and the history and philosophy of 
modern science. Where cybernetics sought to supplement the ontology of rationalism and 
empiricism which characterises the modern paradigm, focussing instead on a ‘nonmodern’ 
circular logic and recognition of the expanded field of observation, social practice is 
symptomatic of the shepherding of modern quantitative analysis into a nonmodern field of 
qualitative, experiential form. Arguably, this was not only the result of the type of funding 
requirements detailed above, but was also augmented and extended by the sheer amount 
of data which would soon become available in such situations due to the proliferation of 
digital media and online communication platforms. 
Due to changes to the roles of art and artists in society, both of which extended to 
include the role of the audience in the production of the work, the systems surrounding 
artistic production also changed. The task of measuring and evaluating the work became 
increasingly numerical, producing a set of issues concerning whether qualitative 
experiences can be assigned quantitative metrics. In turn, if so, this raised the question of 
how the application of such quantitative metrics would change the nature of the work for 
better or worse, further reformatting the relationship between the roles of artist, audience 
and artwork in the process. 
 
 
3. Philosophical Context 
 
a) Nonmodern Ontology 
 
As before, this section on the philosophical context of the project will be divided into three 
subsections. The former introduces the ontological concerns which underpin the research 
question and join the theories of cybernetics and social practice. The latter two cover their 
respective philosophies directly. It should be acknowledged that this is just one way of 
framing the philosophical history of the work undertaken for this PhD, and the choices of 
what to include are informed by decisions about what makes the research and the 
contribution to knowledge most clear. 
Both cybernetic philosophy and social practice philosophy intervene in traditional 
philosophical paradigms which create divisions between nature and culture and science 
and aesthetics. To the extent cybernetics and social practice challenge the borders 
between the roles of artist and audience and art-as-object versus art-as-process, they can 
be thought of as symptomatic of what Pickering calls ‘nonmodern ontology’. Ontology 
describes the first principles of being. Where epistemology focuses on the content of ideas 
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and objects, ontology is concerned with the relationships between them—where the limits 
of an object begins and ends, and where the links become part of the object itself or 
remain an interface. My interest in social practice and cybernetics as frameworks to 
analyse the experiment-performances stems from their shared concern for such 
relationships. At their core, social practice and cybernetics diverge from the ontological 
presuppositions preserved by philosophers since René Descartes wherein the world is 
cleanly bifurcated between ‘mind’ and ‘body’, the immaterial and the material, and the 
observer and the observed. 
To arrive at a ‘nonmodern ontology’ we must first establish what is meant by a 
modern ontology. In We Have Never Been Modern (1991), Bruno Latour argues that 
‘modernity is coextensive with a certain dualism of people and things’, and in turn, ‘that 
key features of the modern West can be traced back to dichotomous patterns of thought 
which are now institutionalized in our schools and universities.’ Using the example of the 
debate between the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and the natural 
scientist Robert Boyle (1627-91), Latour observes how 
 
Boyle and his countless successors go on and on both constructing Nature artificially and 
stating that they are discovering it; Hobbes and the newly defined citizens go on and on 
constructing the Leviathan by dint of calculation and social force, but they recruit more and 
more objects in order to make it last. Are they lying? Deceiving themselves? Deceiving us? 
No, for they add a third constitutional guarantee: there shall exist a complete separation 
between the natural world (constructed, nevertheless, by man) and the social world 
(sustained, nevertheless, by things) (1991, p. 31). 
 
‘Against this backdrop’, Pickering contends that ‘cybernetics thus stages for us a 
nonmodern ontology in which people and things are not so different after all’ (2010, p. 18). 
Rather than progressing linearly, the relationship between the natural, the mechanical, the 
cultural and the political exist in dynamism, their borders repeatedly redrawn. It is 
precisely the very constitution of these borders which cybernetics interrogates through its 
study of circularity and feedback. Social practice, in turn, explores how they function in the 
production of art with respect to the roles of artist, audience and artwork. By using 
biofeedback technologies in audiovisual performances, this project sought to continue the 
challenging of these limits, bringing together what are otherwise deemed separate fields of 
knowledge. Using neuro headsets and heart rate monitors to interface the participants and 
their environment, I attempted to blur the borders between the human subject, technical 
objects, and the spaces which host them. As such, the project is positioned to identify the 
interrelation between fields, e.g. between neurology and philosophy and between science 
and aesthetics. 
Against these historic tendencies, many of these new conceptual forms were being 
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worked through by philosophers under the rubric of ‘phenomenology’. Phenomenology 
began in earnest with the work of Edmund Husserl, specifically his text ​Logical 
Investigations ​published in two-volumes in 1900. Broadly defined, phenomenology takes 
as its focus the study of consciousness, defining itself against the classical Cartesian 
mind-body split. Instead, phenomenology understands consciousness as situated, the 
mind instantiated in a network of social and material relations. In turn, the body is retrieved 
from being treated as merely a technology of mind to becoming seen as coextensive with 
it (Merleau-Ponty 2002, pp. 77-234). My project attempted to harness biofeedback as a 
way of challenging the bifurcation between mind and body and between the body and 
technology, and therein between the roles of artist, audience and artwork. 
Heidegger is instrumental in steering phenomenology from being understood as a 
branch of philosophy to a way of practising it. In his magnum opus​ Being and Time ​(1927), 
he describes it in the following terms: 
 
The term ‘phenomenology’ is quite different in its meaning from expressions such as 
‘theology’ and the like. Those terms designate the objects of their respective sciences 
according to the subject-matter which they comprise at the time. ‘Phenomenology’ neither 
designates the object of its research, nor characterizes the subject-matter thus comprised. 
The word merely informs us of the “how” with which what is to be treated in this science 
gets exhibited and handled (2001, pp. 58-9). 
 
In effect, Heidegger challenges Descartes’ maxim—​cogito ergo sum ​(‘I think, therefore I 
am’), suggesting that what is missed by such a starting point is the very concept of being 
itself, or ‘the ​meaning of the Being of the ​'​sum​'.’ In response, Heidegger ventures a 
distinction between being as a quality of objects and being ‘as becoming’, or what Simon 
Critchley describes as ‘being-in-the-world’ (2009). The word Heidegger uses for this is 
Dasein​, a term which invests a greater sense of emergence, openness and the interaction 
between processes in flux (Heidegger 2001, p. 46). Rather than subjects and objects 
existing in static, linear relation to one another, they grow, morph and change in feedback, 
‘becoming’ one or the other depending on the given context. In the second 
experiment-performance, by using a transparent screen for the visual projections, the 
audience were able to see one another literally through the artwork, blurring the limits 
between them as both 'perceiving' subject and 'perceived' objects of the work. 
This fundamental distinction underlies what Pickering means by a ‘nonmodern 
ontology’ and is what phenomenology describes and cyberneticians attempted to act out 
through experiments, as detailed below. This emphasis on practice and method—the 
‘how’—makes cybernetics appear as its logical extension, especially given the focus on 
the blend of both philosophy and science. In turn, the focus on process over object and on 
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blurring previous dualisms between subjects, objects, people and things, aligns 
phenomenology with the purview of social practice. 
In the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the question of art and aesthetics takes 
centre stage in responding to these theoretical propositions. In ​Phenomenology of 
Perception ​(1945), Merleau-Ponty elaborated on the investigations of Heidegger and 
Husserl in an examination of the situatedness of perception: 
 
In so far, then, as there is consciousness of something, it is because the subject is 
absolutely nothing and the ‘sensations’, the ‘material’ of knowledge are not phases or 
inhabitants of consciousness, they are part of the constituted world (1962, p. 276). 
 
Once again we encounter the notion of being as ‘being-in-the-world’ rather than being as a 
static quality. The focus here is on the interaction between sense and matter and their 
commingling through the act of perception. In turn, this extends to the body for, as 
Merleau-Ponty has it, ‘to be a body, is to be tied to a certain world, as we have seen; our 
body is not primarily in space: it is of it’ (p. 171). The concept of aesthetics anchors both 
the sense of embodiment and social situatedness, which Merleau-Ponty identifies, writing 
that ‘it is in this sense that our body is comparable to a work of art. It is a nexus of living 
meanings, not the law for a certain number of covariant terms’ (p. 175). In other words, 
rather than absolute or fixed, bodies—like artworks—are co-authored and exist in flux. 
Both are part of emergent processes and subject to ongoing interaction with other bodies 
and their environment, redefining their roles in the process. For example, as I will detail 
later, the decision to project the graphic signatures onto translucent screens such that the 
audience could see each other through them, blurring the distinction between the subjects 
and objects of the work, was informed by and attempted to enact these concepts. The 
work was designed such that each participant and spectator were not just ‘in’ the 
performance space, but rather one ‘of’ its constitutive parts. 
Cybernetics and social practice channel this history of nonmodern ontology. 'As 
well as' (not 'instead of') this, they posit the centrality of interaction and participation to 
supplement the modern paradigms of linearity and clearly defined limits between ‘things’. 
Therein, the roles within a given system are always contingent upon their respective 
contexts. It was this very contingency and interfacing of roles which the system I designed 






b) Cybernetic Philosophy 
 
To make explicit the links between cybernetics and this nonmodern ontology of 
situatedness and embodiment, let us consider some of the main theories which were 
explicitly developed by its practitioners. Cybernetics is animated by the attempt to 
supplement a linear model of understanding systems with a circular one, as well as also 
foregrounding the concepts of emergence, integration and situatedness. By reflecting on 
these concepts it becomes possible to imagine how the circular relationships produced by 
biofeedback in live audiovisual performances can cause the roles of artist, audience and 
artwork to become either integrated with (as represented by the Venn diagram), or 




Figure 1: Edmonds, O. and Kaushal, V. (2018). A diagram visualising the difference between the 
integrated and situated relationships between the roles of artist, audience and artwork. Telephone 
conversation with Orlando Edmonds, 15 December. 
 
Whilst Norbert Wiener is accredited with instigating cybernetic philosophy, the 
Macy Conferences on cybernetics (1946-53) with which his work is associated played host 
to a number of important theorists, practitioners and scientists, each of whom contributed 
to the ongoing discussion of these issues. One conference discussion involved Norbert 
Wiener alongside the eminent scientists, physicians and theorists, Ralph Gerard, John 
Von Neumann, Walter Pitts, Julian Bigelow, Warren Sturgis McCulloch, and Frank 
Fremont Smith talking on the subject of, in McCulloch’s words, the ‘distinction between 
analogical and digital’ systems and ‘the question whether information be continuously 
coded or discretely coded’ (Gerard 2016, p. 193). It begins with Von Neumann offering the 
following analogy: 
 
[I]f I toss a coin there is every possible position for the landing of the coin, a certain region 
where the coin stands on edge and one where it does not. That is the thing which makes 
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the coin essentially a digital possibility. The | dynamic probability of the coin standing on 
edge is very small. In other words, we convert; in every analogical system we have a 
certain region that corresponds to a number in one way or another. In the digital systems 
these are made so that they consist of fields of attraction. We try to make the regions 
corresponding to the number, corresponding to the fields of attraction with indeterminate 
regions, as small as possible in between them so that the particle will develop itself in one 
position or another (2016, p. 178). 
 
A coin toss conjures the image of a binary set of options, but in reality this is a 
simplification. In Gerard’s words, ‘there are gradations, as in non-Aristotelian logic, where 
a proposition can have shades of truth and falsehood’ (p. 178). This is the basis of 
first-order cybernetic philosophy: the reality that, as Pitts describes, ‘the physical system in 
general is a [33] complex of variables which can be continuous or discrete and connected 
by various dynamic relations which cause the variables to change as time changes, a 
complex which can be altered and affected by external inputs’ (p. 185). Describing an 
observed system, for instance, as digital or analogue constitutes a reduction of complexity 
insofar as, quoting Bigelow, ‘the statement that “something is digital” implies that you have 
as a referent something else which is continuous’ (p. 187). The decision to describe a 
system as one or another bears an explicit relation to how we imagine its limits. While the 
coin is in the air, it is continuous (or what Heidegger might describe as ‘becoming’), 
whereas if it is stationary and heads / tails, it can be described as ‘being’, ‘digital’, or 
'discrete'. What cybernetics attempts to address is that neither is ‘correct’ as such, but 
simply constitute one possible way of drawing a line around an otherwise indeterminate 
set of possible relations to make the information able to be coded (i.e. to assign discrete, 
categorical values to what previously would have been non-discrete, continuous 
information). Such concerns structured the decisions involved in transferring the biometric 
data between softwares and in translating the biometric data into graphic and sonic 
signatures, particularly in knowing when to reduce the complexity of the information and 
when to retain it, preserving sufficient variety for it to be perceptible to the participant 
wearing the devices. Indeed, as Wiener explains: 
 
the whole habit of our thinking is to use the continuous where that is easiest and to use the 
discrete where the discrete is the easiest. Both of them represent abstractions that do not 
completely fit the situation as we see it. One thing that we cannot do is to take the full 
complexity of the world without simplification of methods. It is simply too complicated for us 
to grasp (p. 193). 
 
First-order cybernetic philosophy foregrounds this abstraction when considering the nature 
of systems. It attempts to supplement the modern scientific paradigm by reintroducing 
circularity into the equation, revealing that linear and discrete systems often rely upon 
reductions of complexity to make them able to be coded but at the risk of forgetting their 
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originary and underlying continuity and situatedness. This applies, of course, as much to 
mechanical computer systems as it does to neuroscientific studies of consciousness and 
the brain (198). By creating a system which interfaced the neurological, ‘continuous’, 
‘analogue’ data of brainwaves with the discretely coded graphic and sonic signatures, but 
then feeding these back into the room of participants, I attempted to expose and explore 
the complexities of these fundamentally distinct but intimately linked paradigms of 
organising knowledge. Where the graphic and sonic signatures amounted to simplified, 
digital objects, the system as a whole constituted merely a part of a wider system of 
interaction nested within other systems. The former amounted to a reduction of this 
complexity of the system’s situatedness, but their presence exposed this very complexity 
by making clear the influence of the unseen, unconscious activity of the participants and 
therein, by extension, the audience and space itself. 
Second-order cybernetic philosophy reflects upon the role of the observer in 
deciding upon these limits, and in turn this paves the way for regarding the social context 
of cybernetics. Second-order cyberneticians ventured a new ‘performative’ vision of a 
world composed of ‘black boxes’ with which we interact. In ​The Cybernetic Brain​, 
Pickering thinks through how the cyberneticians of the 1960s crossed disciplinary 
boundaries to produce models of their theories in such a way that allowed for the 
openness and serendipity of uncertainty that the first-order cyberneticians had articulated 
but not yet put into practice. Pickering argues that this ‘ontological theatre’ presented a 
view of the brain as a performative rather than representational organism: 
 
cyberneticians[…] conceived of the brain as an immediately embodied organ, intrinsically 
tied into bodily performances. And beyond that, they understood the brain’s special role to 
be that of adaptation. The brain is what helps us to get along and come to terms with, and 
survive in, situations and environments we have never encountered before. Undoubtedly, 
knowledge helps us get along and adapt to the unknown, and we will have to come back to 
that, but this simple contrast (still evident in competing approaches to robotics today) is 
what we need for now: the cybernetic brain was not representational but performative, as I 
shall say, and its role in performance was adaptation (2010, p. 6). 
 
As Pickering goes on to elaborate, ‘the sixties and cybernetics shared an interest in the 
performative brain, with the technologies of the decentered self as a point of exchange’ (p. 
82). In this respect, as itself a technology of this ‘nonmodern self’ (p. 83), biofeedback is of 
interest. By ‘reading out “autonomous” bodily parameters such as brain rhythms and 
displaying them to subjects, thus making them potentially subject to purposeful 
intervention’, biofeedback ‘brings us face to face with a form of decentering of the self into 
a technosocial apparatus’ (p. 85). In other words, biofeedback exposes the brain as but 
another blackbox: one which responds and interacts with its environment through the body 
38 
Vikram Kaushal 
and whatever technologies are appended to it. Indeed, the first time the participants in the 
experiment-performances were introduced to the biometric devices, these too appeared 
and functioned as black boxes, their internal workings unknown to them. Even when they 
were explained, they remained relatively mysterious, such was the complexity of the 
technical knowledge required to understand them fully. The participants simply had to 
‘perform’ with them to make them 'work' in the experiment-performances. 
This discourse of black boxes and performance bears an explicit relation to the 
role of the observer in studying such systems. As Ranulph Glanville explains, 
 
what is vital, for the development of second order Cybernetics, is that the Black Box is 
essentially and crucially a construct of the observer. When we use this concept, we bring 
the observer into the process, rather than denying him (2008, p. 5). 
 
For Glanville, it is in second-order cybernetics ‘in which the role of the observer is 
appreciated and acknowledged rather than disguised, as had become traditional in 
western science: and is thus the Cybernetics that considers observing, rather than 
observed systems’ (p. 1). In the system I designed, certain pieces of the software 
remained black boxes insofar as I was unable to ascertain the algorithms which translated 
the biometric data into categorical values at certain points in the process. 
Beer’s theory of the VSM operates on the basis of trying to present points of 
contact between the observers and observed parts of a system, interfacing what might 
otherwise remain as black boxes. The VSM describes a structure of systems capable of 
balancing their autonomy with the capacity to reproduce themselves and remain viable 
(adapt) in a changing environment. In Pickering’s words, ‘the VSM offers a considered 
topology of social locations and relations, information flows and transformations that, to a 
considerable degree, promises a dispersal of autonomy throughout social organizations’ 
and is identified by its ‘adaptive, homeostat-like couplings between the various levels of 
the VSM’ (2010, p. 273). Beer’s theory of cybernetic organisational management informed 
how I used certain pieces of software when designing how particular parts of the system 
interacted. Specifically, rather than organising the nodes of the software’s functions and 
components in a hierarchical formation, I designed the relationships in such a way as to 
allow information to flow in both directions at any given point. Broadly speaking, 
second-order cybernetic philosophy faces outwards to the social world, foregrounding 
interactivity and ‘conversational’ (rather than monological) modes of approach. Beer’s 
thinking, therefore, became even more pertinent when applied to the live performance 
contexts for their involvement of participants and the literally conversational relationships 
which this induced. 
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Cybernetics contributes to this consideration of biofeedback and the roles within 
artistic performance by rethinking how systems are as much situated, integrated and 
circular as they are linear, separable, and discrete. The movement between first-order and 
second-order emphasises this by turning the lens onto the observer, expressing the extent 
to which all attempts to represent a given system always involve a reduction of complexity: 
the context is never wholly contained. 
 
 
c) Social Practice Philosophy 
 
The philosophical basis of social practice is multilayered, but chief among these layers are 
questions of definition. 
Rather than to designate a set of thematic concerns or recurrent stylistic features, 
to discuss the ‘aesthetics’ of social practice is to describe a common set of approaches to 
making artworks and the processes involved, largely focussed around the principle of 
participation. This emphasis on participation has led certain critics and practitioners to call 
the genre of work I describe as social practice as ‘participatory art’ (Bishop, 2014; 
Matarasso, 2018). Rather than there being a correct answer as to which is the containing 
genre, how one chooses to frame their relationship simply positions them in relation to one 
another within slightly different histories and focuses. Having come to social practice by 
way of social work, the term social practice was more intuitive as I was interested in the 
context and value of the work as vehicles for social change. Matarasso positions the 
aesthetics of social practice within a longer history of the term aesthetics itself, tracing it 
back to when it was used to designate an elite category of creative production (in 
distinction to work of popular appeal) (2018). This definition and use of aesthetics, in 
Matarasso’s eyes, bore an explicit relationship to certain philosophical presuppositions of 
the Enlightenment: 
 
the downside of the fine arts as defined by Kant and other Enlightenment philosophers was 
that they mistook the elite culture of their time and place for a universal form of supreme 
value and power; this idea has remained, sometimes unspoken and often unconscious, 
throughout Western culture until the 1960s (2018). 
 
It is within the lineage of artists and movements which have resisted this paradigm of 
thinking about art that social practice is found, and its principles reflect this. 
Nonetheless, the question of how to evaluate social practice for both its social 
outcomes and internal, experiential qualities persists, and there is a diversity of opinion in 
how these concerns are best addressed and what the consequence of this ethos has 
been on the quality of work produced. In ​Use or Ornament ​(1997), Francois Matarasso 
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describes a metricised aesthetics of social practice wherein the value of the artwork is 
quantified by its calculable material ends, e.g. improving participants’ employability 
following their involvement in a given project. In ​Relational Aesthetics ​(1998), Nicolas 
Bourriaud describes an aesthetics of relationality which responds to changes in 
communication through new media technologies and globalisation. Finally, in ​Artificial 
Hells – Participatory Art and The Politics of Spectatorship ​(2014), Claire Bishop reviews 
the history of social practice, focussing on how its emphasis on participation has come to 
dominate evaluations of work within the field. This project is positioned somewhere in 
between these three works and the theories each thinker outlines. Whilst participation and 
interaction were central, as in Matarasso’s ethos, I did not attempt to measure and cost 
each input and output in numeric terms. Bourriaud’s interest in relationality and how the 
internet and new technologies have reformatted the art object to become process-oriented 
dovetailed with my work insofar as the technology I used hailed from both real-life 
friendships and online collaborations with software developers and the maker community. 
Bishop’s retrieval of the ‘aesthetic’ as a category interested in sensory experiences 
derived from formally meaningful objects also describes a key aspect of this project. My 
interest was not in producing purely ‘aesthetic’ objects but in facilitating a hybrid of 
interactive, relational work which was process-based but still retained the value of 
meaningful experience derived from the formal qualities of the experiment-performances. 
If the term ‘aesthetics’ describes the broader framework for analysing the whole of 
the artistic production process and its constitutive parts, then it is the word ‘role’ itself 
which must be thought through in order to establish the limits separating the parts 
themselves. The idea of a role evokes a performance (to ‘play a role’) and therefore 
something temporary. It also suggests a function (the ‘role of 'x' in 'y'’). As such, it is 
situated on a scale between an object and a process and does not rely solely upon the 
‘concept of the thing’ (Merleau-Ponty, p. 63) in the sense of the strict separation which 
Latour identifies in the modern scientific paradigm (1991, p. 31). For our purposes, rather 
than attempting in vain to define the three roles upfront, let us simply note the subdivisions 
of the roles we are interested in. The micro-roles of author, creator, spectator, participant 
and actor are what we must reflect upon in order to grasp what, taken together, they 
amount to: varying degrees of artistic responsibility and the limits of the artwork itself. It is 
not enough to simply ask: ‘what do each of these roles mean?’; rather we must ask ‘what 
do each of these roles involve?’ and ‘where, when and how do they share features?’ 
Social practice describes a mode of artistic production which foregrounds process, 
participation and an emphasis on contextual considerations (ranging from audience to 
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site), but it also rests upon an often unstated presupposition of what the ‘social’ aspect of 
its practice is. Stefano Harney and Fred Moten’s ​The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning 
and Black Study ​(2013), outlines a vision of social practice by repurposing the terms 
‘planning’ and ‘study’. To ‘plan’, by their proposed redefinition, 
 
is to invent the means in a common experiment launched from any kitchen, any back 
porch, any basement, any hall, any park bench, any improvised party, every night. This 
ongoing experiment with the informal, carried out by and on the means of social 
reproduction, as the to come of the forms of life, is what we mean by planning; planning in 
the undercommons is not an activity, not fishing or dancing or teaching or loving, but the 
ceaseless experiment with the futurial presence of the forms of life that make such 
activities possible. It is these means that were eventually stolen by, in having been willingly 
given up to, state socialism whose perversion of planning was a crime second only to the 
deployment of policy in today’s command economy (2013, pp. 74-5). 
 
The often overlooked question of what is distinctly ‘social’ about a given form of art 
production applies as readily to the ‘social basis’ of cybernetics which we outlined earlier. 
And ‘study’, as Moten’s puts it, locates such activity in already existing social life: ‘study is 
what you do with other people’ (2013, p. 110). By introducing the system I developed into 
a live performance environment and inviting the audience to participate in it, the work 
immediately became invested with the dynamism and serendipity which becomes possible 
when people are introduced into the work as unplanned interactions are able to take 
place. 
Whilst social practice cannot be adequately summarised under a unified mantle of 
philosophical principles, hopefully by foregrounding these three aspects—‘aesthetics’, the 
concept of ‘roles’, and the ‘social’—it will be more apparent how the 
experiment-performances attempted to address the research question. 
Between the philosophies underlying and produced by cybernetics and social 
practice, a common interest can be identified in challenging previous limits between 
categories and insisting on the social contexts in which these categories are formed. 
Taken together, they propose a set of counter-narratives to the traditional modern 







4. Aesthetic Context 
 
a) Spatial Paradigms 
 
I will now discuss the aesthetic context of my experiment-performances, detailing the 
artists and artworks which informed my own practice. Before going into depth, I will first 
outline the different paradigms of presenting artworks which each example models and 
modulates. These should not be taken as fixed rules which the artworks strictly adhere to, 
but rather serve as guides of the spatial particularities of certain ways of organising the 
roles of artist, audience and artwork. In each case, throughout, what is noticed beyond 
their spatial organisation is the degree to which the divisions between the roles are 
challenged by varying levels of interaction and participation. The three paradigms denote 
either the presence of an artefact, a stage and performer(s), and a dispersed, 
‘participatory’ model of creating artworks. Within the former two paradigms, there are two 
variants of the spatial organisation of the work in relation to the audience and, in the latter 
case, the artist. As the literature review proceeds through this aesthetic context, each 
considered work develops or subverts the paradigms to varying degrees, occasionally 
forming hybrid structures which combine all three. It is through this hybridity, where the 
roles of artist, audience and artwork are most dispersed, that the divisions between them 
are most challenged. In each spatial paradigm, a combination of audience members 
(either spectators or participants) are present, and, in some cases, alongside the artist. 
The relationships between these are either reactive or interactive, the latter defined by the 
ability for the relationship to be reciprocally influenced by the roles it connects. In certain 
cases, reactive relationships are only unidirectional insofar as they describe a one-way 
response, for example of an audience member to the artwork (the latter of which remains 







1. Artefact a) 1. Artefact b) 
 
 
2. Stage a) 2. Stage b) 
 
 
                          3. Participatory       4. Hybrid 
 











Cybernetic aesthetics can be separated into two categories: 
 
1. works that are made knowingly under the rubric of cybernetic theory 
2. works that model cybernetic principles consciously or unconsciously 
 
Works falling under the latter category are not inherently less ‘cybernetic’; indeed, they 
can often extend cybernetics in serendipitous ways, supplementing oversights in the 
branch of self-identifying cybernetics. The following sections explore both: works which 
were made by self-identifying cyberneticians as explicit attempts at putting theories of 
cybernetics into practice as well as a repertoire of works which employ biofeedback to 
explore similar concepts of human-machine ‘conversations’ in artistic performances. It is 
this latter category of biofeedback aesthetics which assumes the role of supplementing 
and extending self-identified cybernetic art by focussing on the application of a particular 
set of technologies which tangibly model its core principles of circularity and feedback. I 
will detail the key instances in which biofeedback has been specifically used to manifest 
these principles, from its early use in the 1970s to the present day. 
 
 
ii) 1950s - 1970s 
 
In 1953, second order cybernetician Gordon Pask presented ​Musicolour Machine​, a 
machine resembling a musical organ which when played would respond to the music by 
emitting light in varying intensity and colours. However, if the keyboardist’s playing 
became too repetitive, the machine would become bored and stop responding, plunging 
the room into darkness. The machine Pask created wasn't merely an instrument but rather 
approached the role of co-author of the performance. Neither the keyboardist nor the 
machine controlled the situation alone, rather, as Pask commented, ‘the performer trained 






Figure 3: Kerr, H. (1953) Gordon Pask with the ​Musicolour Machine ​(1953). Available at: 
https://we-make-money-not-art.com/molly_wright_steenson_is_a/​ (Accessed 13th October 2019). 
 
 
Figure 4: Kaushal, V. (2015). The spatial 
arrangement of Pask’s ​Musicolour Machine 
(1953) as a variation on paradigm ‘1. Artefact a)’ 
with the participants (green) among the spectators 
(blue). Whilst Pask’s goal was to provide for the 
possibility of true ‘conversational’ interaction 
between the participants and the artefact, the 
reality was that the relationships should be 
considered as ‘reactive’ as the machine didn’t 
have the ability to adapt its own behaviour beyond 
the ways Pask designed it to. 
 
This work and the piece which followed 
modelled the features of one of Pask’s key theories. ‘Conversation theory’ describes the 
mechanisms by which participants in a given situation enter into ‘conversations’ as a 
process of negotiating novel experiences, internalising information as new knowledge and 
committing it to memory by responding in real time. Conversation, in this sense, is not 
linguistic but behavioural, denoting a reciprocal interaction of learning and knowledge 
production between two or more participants. To articulate how this theory could be 
modelled by experiential aesthetic objects or situations, Pask (1971) coined the term 
‘Aesthetically Potent Environments’, with which he referred to ‘environments designed to 
stimulate pleasurable interactions’ (Fernández 2009, p. 54). According to Pask, an artwork 
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which exhibited these features would ‘respond to a man, engage him in conversation and 
adapt its characteristics’ (Pask 1971, p. 76). By his definition, ‘conversation’ occurs within 
any adaptive system made up of mechanical and / or human actors. In turn, Pask wasn't 
interested in the content of the conversation but the process of the conversational 
act—specifically how it could be replicated and extended from human to machine and 
machine to human: 
 
Let us turn the design paradigm in upon itself; let us apply it to the interaction between the 
designer and the system he designs, rather than the interaction between the system and 
the people who inhabit it. […] [T]he designer does much the same job as his 
system, but he operates at a higher level in the organizational hierarchy[…]. Further, the 
design goal is nearly always underspecified and the ‘controller’ is no longer the 
authoritarian apparatus, which this purely technical name brings to mind (Pask G., 1969, p. 
495). 
 
In 1968, Pask presented the ​Colloquy of Mobiles​, an installation made up of 
conversational machines at the ​Cybernetic Serendipity ​exhibition at the ICA, London. The 
work was a collection of what Pask described as ‘male’ and ‘female’ machines with which 
he developed a cybernetic model for interaction between the viewer and the artwork. 
These machines were suspended from the ceiling and ‘communicated’ with one another 
by transmitting rays of light towards adjacent machines which, in turn, affected their 
performative behavior. Made up of sensors, mirrors and torches, the light would strike a 
mirror located inside one of the mobiles, causing the mobile to move and rotate, reflecting 
the light onto other mobiles. The audience was also able to interact with the installation 
using handheld flashlights, creating an even greater variation in the performance of the 
mobiles. Pask wrote: 
 
Man is prone to seek Novelty in his environment & having found a novel situation, to learn 
how to control it[...], […]these propensities are at the root of curiosity and the assimilation 
of knowledge. They impel man to explore, discover & explain [...]. [T]hey lead him into 
social communication, conversation and other modes of partially co-operative interaction 
[...]. My contention is that man enjoys performing these jointly innovative & cohesive 
operations. Together they represent an essentially human and inherently pleasurable 





Figure 5: ICA London (1968). ​The Colloquy of Mobiles​ by Gordon Pask (1968). Available at: 
http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/works/colloquy-of-mobiles/images/8/#reiter​ (Accessed 13th 
October 2019). 
 
Pask noted a distinction between the two works. ​Musicolour​ was less sophisticated—an 
example of a merely ‘reactive’ environment as it didn’t develop new goals for its own 
performance. Meanwhile, through the development of ​Colloquy of Mobiles​, Pask 
understood that the introduction of human participants allowed for a more open-ended 
range of ‘interactive’ performance possibilities. This distinction, between reactive and 
interactive, is integral to this research and in developing an adaptive system capable of 
mediating biometric data and aesthetic outputs. 
During the design of the 
experiment-performances, I attempted to model 
these principles of having characteristics of ‘living’ 
systems which would morph and change rather 
than simply respond in simple, linear ways. 
 
Figure 6: Kaushal, V. (2015). The spatial arrangement 
of Pask’s ​Colloquy of Mobiles​ (1968) as another 






Since the 1970s second order cybernetician Roy Ascott has developed work which 
deals with the relationship between art and computer technologies. Perhaps most 
acclaimed for coining the term 'telematics' to describe the use of computer networks as an 
artistic medium, Ascott contrasts what he terms the ‘[visual] channel of communication’ of 
traditional artworks with new aesthetic ‘modalities’ which induce ‘the intimate involvement 
of the spectator’: 
 
Although in painting and sculpture, the channel of communication remains largely visual, 
other modalities—tactile, postural, aural—are employed, so that a more inclusive term than 
“visual” art must be found, and the one I propose is “behavioral.” The artist, the artifact, and 
the spectator are all involved in a more behavioral context. […]A feedback loop is 
established, so that the evolution of the artwork / experience is governed by the intimate 
involvement of the spectator. As the process is open-ended, the spectator now engages in 
decision making (Ascott R., 2008, p. 110). 
 
Ascott suggests that such intelligent instruments form a ‘living’ ecology that the human 
body can engage with, such that subsequent physiological responses are manifest and 
formalised in the artwork. This ‘cybernetic stance invites both a change in the nature of art 
as object and, once more, a shifting in the power relation between artist and audience, 
somehow entraining the audience in their production and evolution’ (Pickering 2010, p. 
324). Specific examples of Ascott’s work will be explored in the chapter on the 
Experiment-Performances. 
Between Pask and Ascott, we can see how the original preoccupations of 
cybernetics—feedback loops, circularity, interactivity and conversation—were modelled 
through the adoption of new technologies and innovative systems design. From Pask, the 
key takeaway is the importance of modelling his concept of ‘conversation’, i.e. 
distinguishing between simply reactive and truly interactive engagement between the roles 
of audience and artwork. Ascott extends and elaborates upon this sentiment by calling for 
the use of technologies to enable the ‘intimate involvement of the spectator’, suggesting a 
level of engagement in which influence is reciprocally felt and imprinted on each actor 
within the performance of a work. During the planning and design stages, I attempted to 
extend the logic of the question of how the system could be set-up in such a way as to 
change and respond to behaviour by testing different configurations of biofeedback loops 
on myself. 
The other dimension to ‘cybernetic’ aesthetics which is necessary to explore is the 
genealogy of biofeedback. Whilst not explicitly or exclusively practised by self-identifying 
cyberneticians, its process and function is characteristically cybernetic in principle as it 
connects the mind and the body with their environment through the use of technologies 
which extract and represent data from them. 
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It is in the work of Alvin Lucier that this technique begins. Lucier’s ​Music for Solo 
Performer​ (1967) is the first known instance of brainwave data being used in the 
performance of a piece of music, and indeed in any artform. The system consisted of two 
electrodes attached to Lucier’s forehead used to read alpha waves which were then 
translated into audio frequencies and amplified via a mixing desk. These frequencies were 
then routed to loudspeakers placed next to various percussion instruments, causing them 
to vibrate. This seminal use of the biofeedback loop offered new insights into the 
relationship between artist, artwork and audience by harnessing technology to intervene in 
the perceived separation between the performance artist and the performance object. 
During the first public performance, I borrowed from this idea of a top-down hierarchy 
where there is a performer controlling performance instruments by connecting single data 
streams to single participants. Notably, whilst Lucier’s work was innovative in its use of 
biofeedback, its spatial arrangement modelled a traditional artist / stage / spectators 
paradigm (Figure 7). It was only by the second experiment-performance, ​Neu-collective 
Consciousness​, that the data streams were combined, moving beyond Lucier’s structure 




Figure 7: Lucier, A. (1965). Alvin Lucier’s performing ​Music for A Solo Performer​ (1965). Available 
at: ​https://www.theguardian.com/music/musicblog/2014/jun/25/sitting-in-a-room-with-alvin-lucier 






Figure 8: Kaushal, V. (2015). The spatial 
arrangement of Lucier’s ​Music for Solo Performer 
(1965) as a variation on paradigm ‘2. Stage b)’ 
with spectators (blue) and an artist (red). As the 
audience are uninvolved in any substantial 
capacity in the performance, their relationship to 
the artist remains purely reactive and 
unidirectional. 
 
Building on Lucier’s work, Richard 
Teitelbaum also explored biofeedback in his 
performance ​Spacecraft​ (1967) by using 
electroencephalographic (EEG) and electrocardiographic (EKG) recordings to control 
MOOG synthesisers. Each musician’s thoughts and the images they conjured were 
translated through electronic instruments (contact microphones, synthesizers and others) 
into highly amplified sounds fed back from spatially distant loudspeakers—an 
electronically transformed “double” which mirrored the performers’ internal subjective 
states. Teitelbaum updated the original system by introducing a second performer. This 
performance of the same year, entitled ​In-Tune​, assigned different sounds to the signals 
from both performers within the composition to produce a network of microphones and 
EEG electrodes which were used to sonify the performer’s heart rate, breathing and brain 
waves. Teitelbaum, acting as conductor, then manually played with the sounds generated. 
Interestingly, in this respect, a hierarchy was formed within the performance as the 
performers were guided by the conductor. Teitelbaum describes the moment he 
conceived of the installation: 
 
One night I had a dream, or a hypnagogic vision, in which I saw three reclining figures 
spaced along the perimeter of a round, diaphanous “tent”, all bathed in a soft blue light and 
all wired together in a loop so that one person's brain waves controlled strobe lights and 
sounds perceptible to the next, he in turn passing this alpha signals similarly on to a third, 
and the third back to the first to close the loop. This image haunted me, and I decided to try 





Figure 9: Teitelbaum, R. (1976). Diagram of ​In-Tune​ (1976), in ​Biofeedback and the Arts: Results 
of Early Experiments​. Vancouver: Aesthetic Research Centre of Canada, p. 34. 
 
 
Figure 10: Kaushal, V. (2015). The spatial 
arrangement of Teitelbaum’s ​In-Tune 
(1976) as a variation on paradigm ‘2. Stage 
b)’ with participants (green) and an artist 
(red). Between the participants, the 
relationship is unidirectional reactive as 
they simply listen to each other’s sonified 
data. Between the participants and the 
artist, the relationship is reactive but 
bidirectional as the artist modulates the 
sounds as they receive the audience 
readings in real-time. 
 
It is interesting that Teitelbaum was the 
first biofeedback performer to foreground the audience-artist interaction by demonstrating 
how each individual present affected one another. My project builds on this work by 
deploying cybernetic methods to create a system that collects biometric data from the 
audience before rendering that data available for the artist(s) to use in the performance. 
Not dissimilar to ​In-Tune​, I also attempted to evolve the hierarchical distribution of the 
outputs generated within the interrelation of the roles of audience, artwork and artist. What 
is more, Teitelbaum’s diagram of ​In-Tune ​provided me with inspiration for my own spatial 
diagrams of the experiment-performances. By the second public performance, I attempted 
to incorporate this idea of combining the biometric data of participants to see the effect it 




Teitelbaum’s work would go on to inspire the work of David Rosenboom, who 
coined the term ‘biofeedback’. He defined it as follows: 
 
[t]he presentation to an organism, through sensory input channels, of information about the 
state and / or course of change of a biological process in that organism, for the purpose of 
achieving some measure of regulation or performance control over that process, or simply 
for the purpose of internal exploration and enhanced self-awareness. Normally, this 
information will be of a type not otherwise available to that organism. It does not 
presuppose, however, that such an external indicator could not, through disciplined 
practice, be replaced by an internal mechanism of which the subject can achieve 
awareness without the aid of an artificial monitoring system (Rosenboom, 1976). 
 
Defined in this way, biofeedback presents a clear and useful way of putting cybernetic 
principles into practice, especially for its applicability to questions concerning the brain and 
consciousness. 
Rosenboom described his work as an extension of the human nervous system as 
the systems he designed recognised and responded to measurable neural aspects of 
music perception. He synthesised the work of experimental psychologist Leo DiCara and 
Neal Miller, whose research into the nervous system demonstrated that animals had the 
capacity to influence the behaviour of their own bodily functions such as heart rate, blood 
pressure and other metabolic processes which were previously thought to have been 
immune from conscious influence. 
Ecology of the Skin​ (1978) was, in Rosenboom’s words, an ‘environmental - 
demonstration - participation - performance’ event (1990, p. 49) in which he recorded the 
brainwaves and heart rates of performers and audience members also by using EEG and 
EKG recordings. The signals generated were translated into music and light. Ten 
participants held a small box which recorded their individual brain activity. This data was 
used to trigger a single tone specific to each individual, creating a rich percussion of 
varying tones. The volume of the tone produced correlated with the length of time the 
participant was able to sustain the same brain wave (1990, p. 50). Rosenboom saw the 
collaborative nature of the biofeedback loop as an opportunity to better understand 
ourselves mentally and physically, enhancing and extending the connection between the 





Figure 11: Moore, P. (1970). The performance of ​Ecology of the Skin​ by David Rosenboom at 
Automation House, New York (1970). Available at: 
http://4columns.org/dayal-geeta/david-rosenboom​ (Accessed 14th October 2019). 
 
Figure 12: Kaushal, V. (2019). The spatial 
arrangement of Rosenboom’s ​Ecology of the Skin 
(1970) as another variation on paradigm ‘2. Stage b)’ 
with spectators, participants and an artist. Between 
the participants, the artist, and one another the 
relationships are interactive. Between the spectators 
and the artist, the relationship is bidirectional reactive. 
 
Rosenboom’s work greatly informs this research 
as he is responsible for setting out the 
parameters and framework of biofeedback. 
There are many parallels between Rosenboom’s live event portfolio and what I attempted 
to achieve. Rosenboom retains the role of conductor whilst nevertheless distributing 
authorship across other participants, therein building upon the narrower distribution of 
authorship in Teitelbaum’s work which involved fewer performers and participants. My 
project attempted to mediate a similar distribution of authorship, and by the final 
experiment-performance, an even further degree of authorship was relinquished by the 
role of the ‘conductor’ than had been by both Rosenboom’s and Teitelbaum’s works. My 
work also borrowed from the logic of a stage in the round, where in the third 
experiment-performance I introduced the pyramid projector in the middle of the room. 
These examples demonstrate a specific insistence on the performative aspect of 
the technologies. In each case, this was achieved by the creation of a biofeedback loop 
which unites the mind and body and, in turn, both of these with the environment they are 
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in. As such, those involved are made conscious of their embodiment and situatedness 
within an environment, and therein their connection to one another. In this way, none of 
Lucier, Teitelbaum or Rosenboom were in the business of directing biofeedback towards 
some further, outside use, but rather were focussed on the artistic value of the 
performance itself as capable of producing meaningful experiences in its own right. 
 
 
iii) 2000s – Present 
 
During the period of the 1980s to the 1990s, the interest in Cybernetics receded amidst a 
surge of interest in AI and the birth of the home computer which focussed research on 
systems thinking away from its early areas of study. It was not until the 2000s that the 
original strains of thought resurfaced, characterised by a series of attempts to implement 
these tools and concepts to continue reformatting the roles of artist, audience and artwork 
as well as the divisions between disciplines and their subcategories. 
Artist Mariko Mori explored the use of biofeedback loops in her work ​Wave UFO 
(1999-2002). In this instance, three participants’ real-time brain waves were projected onto 
the internal surface of a teardrop-shaped 'spaceship'. The participants are connected to 
electrodes which record their brainwaves, and this biometric data is then translated into 
projected images of varying shapes and colours which change depending on the types of 
brain activity being generated. In this example, the most dominant and active participant’s 
biometric data is used to generate the audio-visual environment. 
 
 
Figure 13: Mori, M. (2001). Participants inside the ​Wave UFO​ (1999-2002) installation. Available at: 







Figure 14: Kaushal, V. (2019). The spatial arrangement of 
Mori’s ​Wave UFO​ (1999-2002) as a variation on paradigm ‘1. 
Artefact b)’ with participants. Between the participants and the 
artefact, the relationship is bidirectional reactive because the 
participants influence the graphic signature, but only to a 
limited degree. 
 
Mori describes the work as an exploration of ‘oneness’ 
through ‘a truly connected audience’ (Kortbek & 
Grønbæk, 2008). Artworks like ​Wave UFO​ mark a shift 
from earlier works like Teitelbaum’s ​In-Tune​ insofar as they no longer have a conductor. 
Instead, the approach is bottom-up: the three participants’ brainwaves freely form the 
entirety of the audio-visual experience without direct influence by an artist-as-conductor. 
Whereas Teitelbaum engaged the audience but maintained overall control, Mori enables 
three participants to directly create the audio-visual experience through a form of 
conversation without an artist present and in control of the audio-visual objects. Spatially, 
Mori’s work builds upon the logic of viewing an artefact by having the artefact itself be a 
rendering of the spectators’ biometric data, thereby 
producing a level of reactivity and making the spectators 
into participants. During the execution of the 
experiment-performances, I extended Mori’s 
commitment to cultivating an environment which is 
sufficiently immersive as to allow for and enhance 
greater participation in the authorship of the work by 
further introducing an audience to the space rather than 
reserving or limiting attendance for those who are 
explicitly participating through the devices. 
 
Figure 15: The spatial arrangement of Lozano-Hemmer’s ​Pulse Index​ (2010) as a variation on 
paradigm ‘1. Artefact b)’ with participants and spectators. Between the participants and the artefact, 
the relationship is bidirectional reactive, whilst the relationship between the spectators and the 
artefact is unidirectional reactive. This is because the participants can influence the artefact, but 
only to a limited extent, whilst the spectators are simply observing it without influencing it. 
 
Rafael Lozano-Hemmer has created a number of works, which have explored the 
use of the body and its biorhythms, the heart in particular. One such work is ​Pulse Index 
(2010): a large-scale installation that records participants’ heart rates and simultaneously 
collects fingerprints. The fingerprints immediately appear on a 10-meter video wall, 
pulsating to the participant’s heartbeat. The piece collects, stores and displays data of any 
participant who has interacted with the installation. Having created a tapestry of archived 
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fingerprints and heart rates, the collected data is made visible to any further participants 
entering the performance space. Spatially, ​Pulse Index ​occupies a traditional ‘artefact’ 
paradigm, with the focus of the audience’s attention being the screen upon which the 
biometric data is visualised. As with Mori’s work, however, the innovation lies in the fact 
that the visualisation is produced by the participation of audience members and, in this 
respect, transforms the artwork to include the space and presence of the audience. 
Because the inputs and outputs of the work are relatively rudimental (a simple registry of 
fingerprints), the qualitative nature of the relationship between the participants and the 




Figure 16: Science Gallery (2010). Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s ​Pulse Index​ (2010). Available at: 
https://opencall.sciencegallery.com/pulse-index​ (Accessed: 13th October 2019). 
 
Pulse Room​ (Lozano-Hemmer, 2006) was a spatial installation, occupying a room with 
evenly-distributed, hanging incandescent light bulbs which used a sensor to record 
audience heart rates. The light bulb closest to the participant pulses to the rhythm of their 
heart rate. When the sensor is released all the lights turn off and the flashing sequence 
advances by one position along in the grid of light bulbs. At any given time, the room 
represents the heartbeat of the 100 most recent participants. Hemmer’s installations are 
spectacular and engaging, however they are not explicitly concerned with the effect of 
biofeedback on the participant as the effect of immersing yourself isn’t fed back into the 
artwork. During the planning of the system, I incorporated Hemmer’s idea of archiving the 
data captured to feed back into its later iterations. Beyond this, Hemmer’s work was also 
the first to inspire me to introduce heart rate into the system as well as brainwaves. 
Moreover, unlike Mori’s work where the audience is synonymous with the participants, 
Hemmer’s work was also the first to imagine how the participants’ biometric data (rather 
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than the artist’s, as in Lucier’s or Teitelbaum’s work) was transformed into a performance 
for an audience. 
More recent examples of cybernetic aesthetics include Ruairi Glynn’s interactive 
installation ​Performative Ecologies​ (2008). In this piece, a cybernetic system is created 
which draws upon Pask's conversation theory by enabling robots to monitor the attention 
of the participants. The robots have cameras which record facial expressions and attribute 
these to an associated level of engagement in the viewer. The robots compete for their 
attention by becoming increasingly ‘expressive’ in order to attract the most attention from 
the viewer. This behaviour isn’t predetermined but is rather generated via the feedback 
loop. Individual participants, both human and robot, operate as performative agents, each 
acting independently but continually negotiating their choreography with each other to 
create a social system through feedback. As the robotic dancers gain experience, they 
share their knowledge with the larger ecology, dancing for each other, exchanging their 
most successful techniques and collaboratively negotiating future performances. 
 
 
Figure 17: Glynn, R. (2010). ​Performative Ecologies​ installation (2010). Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Ruairi-Glynn-Performative-Ecologies-2008_fig4_281365606 
(Accessed 13th October 2019). 
 
Figure 18: Kaushal, V. (2019). The spatial arrangement of 
Glynn’s ​Performative Ecologies​ (2010) as a variation on 
paradigm ‘1. Artefact b)’ with participants and spectators. 
Between the participants and the artefacts, the relationship is 
interactive because the two roles are able to engage with one 
another in the manner of a conversation, where each is 
reciprocally influenced by the other, learning and adapting their 
behaviour. Between the spectators and the artefacts, the 
relationship is unidirectionally reactive as they simply observe the 
performance taking place between the other roles. 
 
Performative Ecologies​ expands on more conventional, linear systems of simple reactive 
installations such as Rafael Lozano-Hemmer’s ​Pulse Room​ (which only has a 
predetermined response to system inputs). Glynn has uniquely developed an adaptive 
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system with the ability to share knowledge to the wider community of robots and human 
participants through ‘conversational feedback loops’. The system has the ability to change 
and develop as a result of their own learned behaviour. Glynn comments: 
 
Each operates autonomously, but as part of the larger ecology, share their knowledge and 
contributes to the performative qualities of the environment as a whole (Performative 
Ecologies 2012). 
 
It is in this respect that Glynn explicitly inherits and pays homage to Gordon Pask insofar 
as his performative ecologies model the principles of Pask’s ​Aesthetically Potent 
Environments​. Moreover, here Glynn emphasises the distinction between merely reactive 
and interactive (in other words, ‘conversational’) aesthetic systems (Glynn, 2016, p. 1). 
Glynn’s work was the first to introduce me to imagining how the principle of learning could 
be incorporated into the system design. However, instead of the system ‘learning’, it was I 
who learnt more about what influenced higher levels of participation and interaction, 
feeding this knowledge back into later iterations of the system. Spatially, the layout of the 
artwork models a hybrid of all three traditional paradigms: there is a level of dispersed, 
‘participatory’ interaction between moving roles, ‘artefacts’ which participate in the 
interaction and are the focus of the spectators’ attention, and, by virtue of these 
interactions, the whole work becomes a performance wherein the entire space in which it 
takes place adapts to become a kind of ‘stage’. 
Most recently, artist George Khut has explored the use of the biofeedback loops in 
medical applications. Khut’s ​Heart Library Project​ (2009) linked heart rate to visual stimuli 
as participants were asked to lie down on a table in a dark room holding a heart rate 
sensor while looking up at a projected image of an orb, the color of which changed 
depending on the frequency of their heart rate. In this way, participants learned to mediate 
their psychophysical condition through awareness and engagement with the biofeedback 
loop. 
Khut’s subsequent work, ​Distillery: Waveforming​ (2012), explored the link between 
heart rate and pain control, specifically how controlling the rhythm of the heart had a 
positive impact on reducing physical pain. Khut developed software which graphically 
mirrored an individual’s heart rate to help children going through painful and anxiety 
inducing procedures. As soon as the patient began to control their heart rate, the graphics 
on the screen would start to transform and become more elaborate and hypnotic, thereby 
encouraging the patient to focus on controlling their experience, distracting them from their 
pain. Unlike Teitelbaum and Rosenboom, Khut’s work deviates from biofeedback for pure 
artistic performance, instead using the biofeedback loop as a medicinal tool in the manner 
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outlined above (georgekhut.com). It is also in this respect that Khut’s work is exemplary of 
the theory of somaesthetics (Shusterman, 2012; Grammatikopoulou, 2016) which I will 
detail later. Spatially, Khut’s work transforms the traditional audience / artefact paradigm 
into a personal, scaled down, individual experience with one participant per artefact. 
 
 
Figure 19: Khut, G. (2012). Video portrait from ​Distillery: Waveforming​ (2012). Available at: 
https://vimeo.com/62140271​ (Accessed: 13th October 2019). 
 
Figure 20: Kaushal, V. (2019). The spatial arrangement of Khut’s ​Distillery: 
Waveforming​ (2012) as a variation on paradigm ‘1. Artefact a)’ with a participant. 
Between the participant and the artefact, the relationship is bidirectional reactive 
because the participant influences the graphic signature, but only to a limited degree. 
 
Offering an audience the ability to engage with real-time biometric data is a 
powerful way to experience the body, regardless of the form through which it 
is manifested—either as sound, image or another sensory object entirely. This 
is only made possible by the use of sensory instruments to mediate the 
bodies’ responses. This cybernetic system of audience, machine and the 
visualization / sonification of data creates a new synergy between the 





The artworks and practitioners listed above can be summarised in the following way. 
Gordon Pask introduces the concept of conversation to produce works which enable a 
level of interaction between the performer, the performance object, and the audience. This 
is later taken up and updated by Ruairi Glynn who evolves the concept of conversation by 
identifying a distinction between reactive and interactive artworks. Ascott’s focus on 
behaviour also provides an interesting point of departure to think about the levels and 
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depth of true interactivity by investing the aesthetic principles of cybernetics with a social 
dimension. Once we arrive at Lucier, Teitelbaum and Rosenboom, the focus shifts to the 
technologies of biofeedback as a way of connecting with ‘the self’—distinct from the 
previous practitioners who see their work as interfacing individuals with machines and vice 
versa. Mori and Lozano-Hemmer develop the focus on the environment and performative 
aspects of cybernetic aesthetics, continuing the interest in creating opportunities for 
interfacing with the self, but branching out to think about the sensory qualities of the 
environments in which such artworks take place. And finally, Khut’s work harnesses the 
power of biofeedback technology to develop objects which serve a dual function as both 
artworks and medicinal tools, maintaining an interest in psychology, neurology and 
self-awareness. 
The value of these works to my own project is twofold. On the one hand, Pask and 
Glynn’s works introduced me to the application of conversation theory and, specifically in 
Glynn’s case, the possibilities of developing complex coding to produce bespoke systems 
capable of modelling the questions I was interested in. The likes of Mori and 
Lozano-Hemmer, on the other hand, encouraged my interest in the more performance 
side of the production process, illustrating the importance of creating an atmosphere and 
environments in which such interactive processes would best be fulfilled. 
Going forward into the aesthetics of social practice, the emphasis shifts onto the 
dimension of the ‘performance’ and what happens when the concept of participation is 
added to the discussion. Moreover, in departing from cybernetic aesthetics into social 
practice, the artworks themselves shift increasingly from an object-focus to being 
process-oriented, which in turn allows for different kinds of interaction between the roles. 
 
 




I will now provide examples of key social practice works and practitioners from its 
development in the 1970s to present, identifying its point of contact with cybernetics and 
exposing their shared conceptual frameworks. Doing so will aid me in addressing the 
research question by bringing the dimension of ‘performance’ to the fore and focusing in 
greater depth on the roles of artist, artwork and audience in light of social practice’s 
concern with audience participation and interactive modes of artistic creation. To begin, I 
will situate the project in a longer history which includes practitioners not explicitly 
operating under the name ‘social practice’, such as Allan Kaprow and Joseph Beuys, 
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before going on to explore the community arts movement and the work of Francois 
Matarasso. The works considered here will serve as examples of, whilst building upon, the 
theories of social practice already outlined above in the work of Matarasso, Bourriaud, and 
Bishop. Running throughout each discussion is a continued interest in the words which 
comprise the aesthetic category itself: here, ‘social’ and ‘practice’ assume many forms and 
definitions, the heterogeneity of which contributing back to the sense in which the roles of 
‘artist’, ‘audience’ and ‘artwork’ are not cleanly divisible under certain conditions of artistic 
production and, in particular, performance. One change which is interesting to note is the 
way in which the different venues for the performances and artworks have an effect on the 
expectations of the audience. In many of the works detailed below, rather than the works 
themselves, it is their setting and context which challenge the roles involved. 
 
 
ii) 1910s - 1970s 
 
Any discussion on challenging the divisions between the roles of artist, audience and 
artwork is indebted, if only indirectly, to the work of Marcel Duchamp. Though such a 
challenge could be traced back further, it is the inauguration of the 20th century’s concern 
for these divisions which is symbolised in the work of Duchamp, whose concept of the 
‘readymade’ and found object sculptures are touchstones of contemporary art history. 
Perhaps the most succinct of Duchamp’s own statements on the subject can be found in 
his 1957 essay ‘The Creative Act’: 
 
All in all, the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; the spectator brings the work 
in contact with the external world by deciphering and interpreting its inner qualifications and 
thus adds his contribution to the creative act. This becomes even more obvious when 
posterity gives its final verdict and sometimes rehabilitates forgotten artists (Duchamp 
1975, p. 140). 
 
For Duchamp, the creative act is situated not just in the act of production, but in its 
reception by an audience who, in turn, participate in the production of the work by their 
very engagement in interpreting and evaluating its meaning and the aesthetic experience 
induced. 
Following Duchamp, another early innovator who challenged the divisions between 
artist, audience and artwork through performance was Allan Kaprow. Kaprow is famous 
for a genre and process of art production known as ‘Happenings’. These events were 
curated by him and involved working alongside others to produce staged performances of 
experiential, theatre-like artworks. However, rather than following a strict script, these 
works were improvisational, following cues and steering rather than being determined by a 
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set of strict roles. The earliest and one of the most famous examples of these 
experimental performances was the eponymously titled ​18 Happenings in 6 Parts​ (Kirby, 
1995). Hosted by the Reuben Gallery in New York, the work took place over the course of 
several days in 1959. Spread across multiple rooms, the audience were given cards on 
entry instructing them of the evening’s course of events; multiple performances took place 
simultaneously as the audience moved between rooms to view the next in the sequence. 
The ‘actors’ were credited on cards, handed out on arrival, along with reference to the 
audience themselves (credited as performers in their own right) for their presence and 
subsequent participation in various of the event’s activities. 
 
 
Figure 21: Kaprow, A. (1959). ​18 Happenings in 6 Parts ​(1959). Available at: 
http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/works/18-happenings-in-6-parts/images/3/​ (Accessed 14th October 
2019). 
 
Through these Happenings, Kaprow interrogated the hierarchy separating the 
artist from the audience, the artwork coming to function instead as simply a site of 
experience. Jeff Kelley attributes this belief of Kaprow’s to his inheritance of pragmatist 
philosophy from John Dewey. In an introduction to a collection of Kaprow’s writing, Kelley 
writes: 
 
If a central theme runs through Kaprow's essays, it is that art is a participatory experience. 
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In defining art as experience, Dewey attempted to locate the sources of aesthetics in 
everyday life. In defining experience as participation, Kaprow pushed Dewey's 
philosophy—and extended his own measures of meaningful experience—into the 
experimental context of social and psychological interaction, where outcomes are less than 
predictable (Kelley, 1993, p. xviii). 
 
 
Figure 22: Kaushal, V. (2019). The spatial arrangement of Kaprow’s ​18 Happenings in 6 Parts 
(1959) as a variation on paradigm ‘4. Hybrid’ with participants and multiple artists. Between the 
participants and the artefacts, the relationship is unidirectional reactive because the participants 
don’t have an influence on the artefacts. Between the 
participants and one another, the relationship is either 
bidirectionally reactive or interactive as they are able to 
engage with one another with varying degrees of agency 
Between the artists and the participants, the relationship is 
interactive because they are able to mutually influence one 
another. 
 
By reframing art as a stimulus and vehicle of 
experience rather than foregrounding its object status 
or its capacity for knowledge production, Kaprow 
intervened in the degree to which the border of its role 
can be clearly delimited. However, each Happening still 
abided by some steering; control and influence of a given work’s events were never totally 
relinquished, such that Kaprow’s work becomes an example of how the divisions between 
the roles of the artist, audience and artwork are made porous rather than disappear 
entirely. Within this history of social practice, the expectations of the audience as to their 
role and its relation to that of the artist and artwork begin to be most challenged by the 
setting of the performance and its grounding in participation. Spatially, Kaprow’s work is 
typical of early participatory artworks whereby the audience are interspersed throughout 
the work alongside the artist(s) and artefacts which serve as both props and part of the 
work in their own right (Figure 22). In this particular case, Kaprow’s work also harnessed 
the capacity of theatre to produce ‘performances’, hence the sense in which the work also 
takes place on a ‘stage’, much like in Glynn’s work some decades later. Due to the fact 
that the performance was steered but not entirely scripted, the qualitative nature of the 
relationships between the human roles would vary between being simply reactive and, in 
cases of greater ‘conversational’ depth, interactive. During the execution of the fourth 
experiment-performance, I extended this idea of the importance of participants being able 
to steer their own experience by introducing crib sheets which provided them with a set of 
instructions which by following them they would better understand how to influence the 
system. 
Joseph Beuys introduces a further dimension to the longer history of social 
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practice through his contributions to the theme and function of pedagogy within and by art 
production and performance. Beginning as a more traditional performance artist, Beuys’s 
career eventually comprises multiple threads each of which arguably fall under the same 
mantle of his artistic practice, but where their very heterogeneity challenges the definition 
of such a mantle. Beuys’s earlier work is typically framed in the tradition of performance 
and conceptual art movements of the 1960s and ‘70s and is associated with the late Dada 
and Fluxus movements. In ​How to Explain Pictures to a Dead Hare​ (1965), hosted by the 
Galerie Schmela in Dusseldorf, Beuys appeared in a glass container cradling a dead hare, 
pacing around and muttering to it. In ​I Like America and America Likes Me ​(1975), Beuys 
flew to America to spend a few days living in a room with a coyote, equipped with only a 
felt blanket and a shepherd’s crook. Emerging from the more explicitly conceptual 
performance art, among other ventures, Beuys would go on to be one of the founders of 
the Free International University for Creativity and Interdisciplinary Research (1974) and 




Figure 23: Staeck, K. and Steidl, G. (1974). Joseph Beuys’s lecture at SAIC in 1974. Available at: 
https://www.pinterest.com/pin/504966176944206539/​ (Accessed 13th October 2019). 
 
What is interesting and instructive in Beuys’s career is his own grappling with 
categories to describe his own artistic output. Across his practice and the multiple 
decades and geographies it occupied, Beuys elected to use terms ranging from ‘social 
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sculpture’ and ‘action’ to describe his earlier conceptual performance work to eventually 
stating that he believed his pedagogy was what he felt was his aesthetic contribution: 
 
To be a teacher is my greatest work of art. The rest is the waste product, a demonstration. 
If you want to express yourself you must present something tangible. But after a while this 
has only the function of a historic document. Objects aren't very important any more. I want 
to get to the origin of matter, to the thought behind it (Beuys, 1969). 
 
 
Figure 24: Kaushal, V. (2019). The spatial arrangement 
of Beuys’s lectures as a variation on paradigm ‘2. Stage 
a)’ with participants and spectators. Between the 
participants and the artist, the relationship is interactive 
as they engage through questions and answers in the 
manner of a conversation. Between the spectators and 
the artist, the relationship is reactive as they simply 
listen to the artist speak. 
 
Ultimately, Beuys contributes to the development 
of social practice by emphasising the contextual 
elements of participation and co-creatorship that eventually become its cornerstones. 
Notably, Beuys’ spatial organisation resembles that of a traditional performer on a stage, 
much like Lucier’s ​Music for Solo Performer ​(1965). The difference here being that, with 
Beuys, the lectures invite open-ended dialogue. Unlike Kaprow's work which, whilst 
harnessing participation and relinquishing a degree of control, still retains an element of 
predetermination guided by props, in Beuys’ lectures the participant can steer the direction 
of the work literally by engaging in conversation. Throughout the 
experiment-performances, I tried to model his expanded definition of the artist’s role to 
include the importance of pedagogy. This was especially the case in the final 
experiment-performance in which outside experts from the fields of neuroscience and 
psychology were involved in order to educate and support the participants through 
workshops which were devised to provide them with a deeper understanding of how to 
influence the system. 
 
 
iii) 1970s - Present 
 
Beginning in the 1960s-1970s, community arts is another contributor to the development 
of social practice and site at which the divisions between the roles of artist, artwork and 
audience are challenged. In Claire Bishop’s extended historical critique of participatory art, 
the community arts movement is included as one of the other key contributors to the 
development of the field (2012, 163-93). The work produced by any instance of 
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community arts has an inherently dispersed authorship. Bishop identifies The Artist 
Placement Group, which began in 1966 and was run principally by Barbara Steveni and 
John Latham, as one such example of a distributed practice. Its focus was on coordinating 
artists being placed into work settings, often in managerial offices in the industrial sector, 
where their presence could invite an exchange of knowledge between non-artists and 
artists. This was a unique take on the division of roles since, in Bishop’s words, ‘instead of 
pulling the audience into the work[…], APG operated on the inverse principle of pushing 
the artist ​out​ into society’ (Bishop, 2012, p. 166). 
 
 
Figure 25: Kaushal, V. (2019). The spatial arrangement of a 
typical community arts project as a variation on paradigm ‘3. 
Participatory’ with participants and multiple artists. Between all 
the roles, the kinds of relationships formed should be interactive 
as they should involve mutual learning, in-depth engagement 
and conversation. 
 
Two further examples Bishop offers are the organisations 
known as The Blackie (1966) and Inter-Action (1972). The 
Blackie, based in Liverpool, offered local residents the 
opportunity to participate in performances under an ‘open door’ policy, whereby all 
interested were welcome to join. In Bishop’s words, The Blackie was premised on a 
 
commitment to showing ‘high’ art alongside everyday productions of local people; early 
visitors included choreographer Meredith Monk and the jazz musician Jon Hendricks, while 
many of its workshops and social games have taken their initiative from avant-garde 
culture (John Cage, Merce Cunningham, Samuel Beckett, Liliane Lijn, John Latham) 
(Bishop, 2012, p. 179). 
 
The Blackie was neither itself an artist, nor an artwork, nor an audience but rather a space 
where all three could meet, emerge, and combine together. This was also the model of 
Inter-Action based in Kentish Town, North West London. Among its various creative 
projects, the space coordinated public performances whereby actors would dress up as 
historical figures, such as the playwright William Shakespeare, and spend time in public 
places, inviting curiosity from passers by with a view to sparking discussion and 
encouraging learning about the character’s historical context. Inter-Action and The Blackie 
also typify one feature of much community art in the form of the use and function of games 
and ‘play’ to invoke creativity, learning and participation (p. 182). As such, much of their 
activity was underscored by a commitment to cooperation and collaboration as key 
features of successful artistic endeavours, but also to the more therapeutic and political 
dimensions of their socially-facing work. Taken together, these three cases mark the start 
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of the period when participatory art begins to be regarded as a credible genre of art on its 
own terms. Spatially, this is the first time in which the arrangement of the roles is no longer 
organised around or in relation to a stage or artefact (Figure 25). Instead, participation 
becomes its own object of the work, and with the removal of any mediating objects, 
conversation becomes the principle medium of expression and communication, therein 
increasing the level of interactivity by investing each person involved with a greater degree 
of agency and open-ended possibilities for engagement. My approach to the project as a 
whole mirrors many aspects of these examples of community arts projects, particularly 
their principles of non-exclusivity and the value of bringing together professional and 
non-professional artists to collaborate together on each level of the design, 
implementation and performance. Testifying to this was the fact that each 
experiment-performance was billed as the work of the artist collective Logan and Wilcox, 
of which I am a founding member, rather than to me alone. More tangibly, this was 
apparent in the inclusion of the academics and commissioning bodies in the design of the 





Figure 26: Price, C. (1964). Diagram showing different interactions within the InterAction building. 
Available at: 
https://medium.com/@agrimgrg22/drawing-notation-influenced-by-fun-palace-of-cedric-price-6a086
76cba43​ (Accessed 13th October 2019). 
 
Bringing us into the more recent past of the 1980s and 1990s, Francois Matarasso is a 
key figure in social practice for his work both in facilitating and theorising works. 
Matarasso is also useful as someone who has attempted to define participatory art in 
general. For Matarasso, participatory art is distinct from community arts which instead 
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designates the organisations, groups and spaces which involve people in a given locality 
in the production of artworks. Participatory art, by contrast, is for Matarasso a ‘useful 
catchall term’ which includes a variety of subfields including but not limited to: community 
art, relational aesthetics, socially engaged practice, arts and health, applied theatre, and 
art activism. As such, Matarasso defines participatory art as simply ‘the creation of art by 
professional and nonprofessional artists’ (Matarasso, 2018). In turn, Matarasso also 
distinguishes between participatory art and art which simply involves participation; 
participatory art is distinct in that social change is central to its concerns, rather than 
artworks which position the social benefits as secondary (Matarasso, 2018). 
In a seminal study on the field and its various offshoots, ​Use or Ornament ​(1997), 
Matarasso details a series of attempts made by the research body Comedia to evaluate 
the ‘social benefits’ of arts initiatives in Britain. Broadly speaking, here Matarasso’s 
interest was thinking beyond assessing art in either purely aesthetic or economic terms, 
assessing instead its ability to produce both meaningful experiences through its form and, 
simultaneously, measurable social outcomes. Crucially, Matarasso attempts to set himself 
apart from those who seek ‘monetarist’ defences of the ‘creative industry’ (where art is 
instrumentalised as a palliative or replacement to a shrinking welfare state), nor does he 
advocate that ‘participation in the arts’ should be thought of as ‘a form of, still less an 
alternative to, social policy’ (Matarasso, 1997). Instead, Matarasso details a variety of both 
qualitative and quantitative methods of measuring the ‘work’ produced by artworks insofar 
as they are able to contribute to a community’s cohesion, empowerment, image, identity 
and well-being. In other words, whilst Matarasso maintains that ‘the intangible and magical 
aesthetic of art[…] is its greatest use’, in assessing the various case studies overseen by 
Comedia, he concludes that ‘usefulness can be beautiful, and beauty useful’ (Matarasso, 
1997). In other words, here, the roles of the artist, artwork and audience are not only 
expanded into an explicitly social realm of evaluation and influence, but are redefined 
precisely in their relation to being able to enter into this space. This expanded field of what 
we are referring to as ‘social practice’ allows for a clearer interrogation of how particular 






Social practice contributes a unique perspective on the ways in which the particular form 
assumed by an artistic performance has a consequence on how we think about the 
division between the roles of artist, audience and artwork. Cybernetics lacks this precise 
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focus. The two fields share the features of interactivity and non-object oriented thinking as 
well as an emphasis on participation. However, social practice uniquely contributes to the 
‘performance’ aspect of the research question. From its predecessors in the work of 
Duchamp, Kaprow and Beuys and to its earliest iterations in the community arts 
movement, right the way through its living practitioners such as Matarasso, social practice 
has continuously challenged the divisions between the roles in question if only by virtue of 
expanding the media and sites through which art making takes shape. This expanded field 
of artistic practice and the new mediums which come with it inevitably feed back into how 









This section describes the process by which the system was originally planned and 
iterated, detailing the various technologies which were tested and identifying how existing 
practitioner knowledge was deployed alongside the new practices and frameworks 
discovered while doing so. Throughout, it defines the key terms used in discussing the 
system and the subsequent public experiment-performances. The methodology draws 
together ideas and approaches from a diverse array of subjects and forms of cultural 
production, ranging from neuroscience to interactive systems theory. The result is a 
system of networked biofeedback loops between participant data and audiovisual outputs. 





Across each stage of the development of the system and subsequent iteration of the 
performances, in accordance with the epistemological model of practice as research I was 
guided by a commitment to playful experimentation. Once I began testing the devices, I 
adapted and changed the system in accordance with what I discovered. The different 
instruments varied greatly in flexibility and how they affected the mobility of the 
participants using them. Certain of them were less accurate and reliable when it came to 
collecting the biometric data. Certain sensors had been developed to be open-source, 
while others operated within a closed source system. Instruments and software developed 
under both protocols were examined in order to identify their advantages and 
disadvantages. The instruments and systems were tested for factors such as what data is 
collected, how it is distributed, wearability, their robustness and reliability, and their level of 
accuracy, including latency. 
 
a) Heart Rate: Devices and Data 
 
I first set out to measure heart rate. All heart rates are unique as the heart muscle varies 
in size and shape, as do the orientation of the valves and the influence of an individual’s 
general physiology. Measurements can be achieved in very simple, uncomplicated ways. 
For instance, doctors measure auscultation of the heart using a stethoscope to listen to 
the sounds of the heart caused by blood flow and closing valves or by pressing a finger 
against one of the major arteries on the wrist or the neck. There are other more accurate, 
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sophisticated clinical methods such as phonocardiograms (PCG), electrocardiograms 
(ECG), and pulse meters. However, these methods require expensive and large 
apparatuses which are difficult to obtain. Moreover, their physical characteristics are such 
that they would reduce the mobility of participants. As such, I decided I needed to develop 
my own version of a heart rate monitor based on other commercially available monitors, 
making adjustments where necessary. 
The Arduino Microprocessor is an open-source platform of user-friendly 
microcontrollers commonly used to prototype instruments and devices similar to the ones 
we were testing. Used extensively by both the 'maker' community and professionals, 
Arduino allows users to build digital devices which interact with their environment through 
plugins which control physical devices.  Arduino has an extensive community of users 
2
who share and support each other’s projects by offering advice, 'cookbooks', and libraries 
of code (Arduino Stack Exchange 2019).  These forums proved invaluable in the 
3
development of this project, especially during the creation of the heart rate monitor. 
Following extensive research into the various applications of the Microprocessor, I 
identified the best way to assemble the hardware with the use of a plug and play sensor. 
This pulse sensor, which consists of an infrared LED and a light detector mounted 
side-by-side, extracts the heart rate data through contact with the fingertips or earlobes by 
measuring the difference in the amount of light being reflected back from the blood under 
the skin. It does this by transforming the mechanical pulsing action of the heart into an 
electrical signal, such that when the heart pumps, the blood pressure rises and the 
respective amount of infrared light emitted increases, reflecting this back to the detector. 
Subsequently, the detector creates more current as it receives more light, causing the 
voltage entering the amplifier circuitry to drop. 
 
2 The term ‘maker’ was originally coined by Dale Dougherty (2012, p. 11) to refer to members of the 
internet generation interested in producing tangible objects as opposed to creating objects entirely 
in the digital realm. The maker community is characterised by its DIY values of sharing tools, skills 
and indeed sometimes computer code to design and make instruments and devices for personal 
and collective purposes, often publishing such information on blogs, forums or a number of 
publications which serve the community. 
3 According to the coding website DevDungeon (​Cookbook​, 2019), ‘a cookbook in the programming 
context is a collection of tiny programs that each demonstrate a particular programming concept. 
The Cookbook Method is the process of learning a programming language by building up a 




Figure 28: Ragan, S. M. (2013). Arduino heart rate sensor circuit diagram. Available at: 
https://makezine.com/projects/ir-pulse-sensor/​ (Accessed 13th October 2019). 
 
 
The sensor sends this data to the Arduino Pro which registers it in the Arduino’s software. 
From here, the data is passed to a connected computer running the Java-based 
programming environment Processing where it is visualised. 
 
 
Figure 29: Kaushal, V. (2015). This Processing sketch illustrates an example of the graphic 
signatures created by visualising the biometric data. 
 
 
The heart rate monitor required the participant to be physically connected to the computer 
which was undesirable as this limited their mobility. To overcome this, a Bluetooth module 
was implemented to allow the device to work wirelessly so the participant could move 
more freely. Having implemented this modification, the data was passed to the Arduino. 
From the Arduino it travelled via Bluetooth to the computer running the visualisation 
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software. This method was largely effective, but, whilst the system did not experience 
latency issues, implementation was not seamless. For instance, the hardware and 
software required to manage the data ended up needing to be custom built. Having tested 
the original hardware over the course of a number of days, it became apparent that it was 
insufficiently reliable for use in a live performance environment (detailed later) as the 
software intermittently crashed for no apparent reason, even after extensive debugging. 
Given the limited time scale of this research project, I was unable to adequately ensure 
the hardware was sufficiently robust for public use as we would have needed to have 
successfully tested the hardware for comfort, reliability and safety. My practitioner 
experience from previous installations had taught me that this kind of bespoke hardware 
would often fail after very little usage with issues typically arising from the quality of the 
assembled parts or low manufacturing standards. 
Despite these obvious limitations and obstacles, this approach provided me with a 
richer knowledge of the data being generated and the available hardware and software, 
including what to look for when selecting components. The process brought me into 
contact with a wealth of well documented commentaries on the variety of options available 
when undertaking this kind of project. Indeed, it drew attention to the pertinent issues in 
this particular workflow, such as the phenomenon of transforming mechanical functions 
into electrical signals. 
In contrast to the maker community’s methods and techniques of sharing and DIY 
making, there are a number of commercially developed 'off the shelf' systems which offer 
comprehensive and robust hardware and software. These fall into two methods of 
developing systems: the 'electrical' and the 'optical'. The 'electrical' method predominantly 
uses a wireless chest strap to measure electrical activity generated by the heart, sending 
the data to a monitor worn on the wrist or to a device loaded with the monitoring software. 
The 'optical' method uses light sensors and emitters similar to the devices developed by 
the maker community. Many of the heart rate monitors were identified as 'fitness trackers' 
and had accompanying software which allows users to monitor their physical 
activity—from the number of steps walked to body temperature, heart rate and blood 
pressure. 
As trackers like the MioLink and Fitbit are targeted at the fitness market, they 
tended to be ergonomically designed for usage during sport with greater emphasis on 
durability and wearability. On the whole, they were much more elegantly designed than 
the open-source devices. The hardware was largely constructed from durable materials 
and manufactured to a high standard. As commercial products, they were marked with the 
standard CE signatures, certifying the products conformed to safety standards required 
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within the EEA (European Economic Area). This expedited the process of developing a 
safe and reliable hardware to be used within the system as it presented the advantage of 
having been extensively and professionally tested for comfort and safety. 
There were nevertheless a number of barriers to accessing the data from the 
device. A number of these developers did however offer access to an Application Program 
Interface (API) which provided a limited set of functions allowing for the creation of 
additional applications within the device. Access to the APIs within each of these software 
applications was critical to harnessing the real time data. 
Once the data was in a format that could be understood by the audiovisual 
software, the aim was to use it to trigger audio and video information. Whilst 
closed-source software such as iHealth and Vitasigns were able to do this with greater 
legibility, they didn’t provide the desired response from the participants as the graphical 
format of the visualization led participants to try to ‘study’ the visuals, attempting to 
ascertain what the peaks and troughs meant. However, my intention was for participants 




b) Brainwave EEG: Devices and Data 
 
 
Figure 30: Jensen, Ole & Spaak, Eelke & Zumer, Johanna. (2014) EEG tracings by Hans Berger, in 
‘Human brain oscillations: from physiological mechanisms to analysis and cognition’. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/figure/An-early-EEG-recording-performed-by-Hans-Berger-Prior-to-th





Brain imaging has a relatively short history. Electroencephalography (EEG) was invented 
in the mid-1920s by German psychiatrist Hans Berger (Holmes, 2014, pp. 89-92). Berger 
invented a technique that revolutionized clinical neurology and psychological research and 
served as a catalyst to developing our understanding of psychology and the physiology of 
the brain (p. 97). EEG uses sensors to record the electrical signals produced during the 
brain’s messaging process (Niedermeyer and da Silva, 2005). By tracking and recording 
brain wave patterns, one is able to better understand neural oscillations in relation to other 
cognitive processes. At the outset, the majority of my research was focused on exploring 
neurobiological activity. It was only later that it became apparent there was a lack of 
knowledge, so a study was conducted on the psychological aspects of the system once 
the first experiment-performance had been carried out. 
As discussed, the use of DIY instruments was inappropriate for this particular 
research. Instead, I used a commercial device called a NeuroSky MindWave headset. 
This device monitors the brain’s electrical activity via a single electrode placed along the 
scalp. 
Alpha, Beta, Theta, and Delta brain waves are captured and monitored to 
ascertain the participant’s ‘Attention’ and ‘Meditation’ levels. The analysis of this was 
provided by the ​NeuroSky​ software and is represented in percentage levels of ‘Attention’ 
and ‘Meditation’ as seen below. 
 
 





The headset is connected to the computer via Bluetooth. Data is then received by 
Brainwave OSC which translates it into a format which Isadora can understand. Isadora is 
a graphical programming language. From Isadora, the data is sent to Modul8 which 
creates the graphic signature. No cables are required which allows for greater mobility and 
a good level of comfort and usability within the context of this research. 
The ‘Attention’ and ‘Meditation’ categories were of most interest as they provided a 
greater level of legibility insofar as one could readily identify how and what activity by the 
wearer affected the readings. From a participant’s perspective, it is crucial to the 
establishment of a truly interactive system that the effects of one’s actions are apparent. 
The ‘Attention Meter’ algorithm indicates the intensity of mental focus on a scale of 
0 to 100. The reading increases when a participant focuses on a single thought or external 
object and decreases when the participant is distracted. The ‘Meditation Meter’ algorithm 
indicates the level of calmness or relaxation also on a scale of 0 to 100. Here, the reading 
increases when a participant relaxes their mind and decreases when they are uneasy or 
stressed. These two attributes (‘Attention’ and ‘Meditation’) are what we assigned to the 
video channels. 
The use of Brainwave OSC allowed us to bypass the accompanying visualisation 
software which had proved too cumbersome for use during this experiment. Brainwave 
OSC allowed us to capture the real-time raw data and assign it as an output to video or 
audio channels. Brainwave OSC does not perform any filtering or analysis; its function is 
purely to transfer the data collected by the MindWave headset. Data within each of the 





Figure 32: Kaushal, V. (2015). Screen capture of Brainwave OSC. 
 
 
A piece of software called ​Isadora​ acted as the ‘mission control’ where all the data 
received from the headset via Brainwave OSC could be manipulated in order to make it 
usable. The attention or meditation data was then passed in real time to the motion 
graphic software Modul8. The graphics were then projected into the environment in real 
time, establishing a biofeedback loop between the participant and their biometric data. 
 
 
Figure 33: Kaushal, V. (2015). Studio setup of ​System ​(2015). See section on 
Experiment-performance #1 for diagram. 
 
 
In setting this all up, the first step was connecting the headset to the server via Bluetooth. 
This worked without issue for six hours (each of the upcoming performances would only 
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last for approximately five hours, so this was more than sufficient). However, whilst the 
headset was fairly comfortable to wear and did not reduce mobility, I experienced issues 
with the range of the Bluetooth connection which only extended to as little as 2-4 meters. 
This experiment was carried out in the Logan and Wilcox design studio. The 
participant was asked to wear the headset and focus on the screen which was projected 
on one of the walls. The data remained within a stable range and therefore so did the 
graphics it produced. The participant commented that they felt as if they were indeed 
directly affecting the content on the screen. However, this took a number of attempts. 
Overall, the test showed that, in order for the experiment to meet my intended goal, the 
participants required a basic level of knowledge of what the system was doing and their 




Figure 34: Kaushal, V. (2015). Screen capture of Modul8 processing brainwave data. 
 
 
c) Representing the Data: Sonification and Visualisation 
 
It is important to distinguish between the different uses of the data within the project. The 
primary use was to trigger the sonic and graphic signatures which correspond to the 
participant’s brain activity and heart rate, establishing a biofeedback loop. In order to 
advance from purely analysing the data to influencing it, there must be a possibility for 
interaction and goals must be agreed upon, whilst nevertheless allowing for play and 
serendipity. I envisioned the system’s interface as producing an opportunity for 
participants to communicate through their own biometric data. The decision as to how and 
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what connections would be made between datasets determined the design of the 
visualisation and sonification. 
At the outset, I had only intended to use visualisations, with sonifications only 
being considered afterwards. I had experience working with visual media, making it the 
natural choice when considering how to represent the data. Sonification and visualization 
share basic principles, except where visualizations employ elements such as lines, 
shapes, and colours to represent certain datasets and variations within them, sonification 
relies on sonic properties such as volume, pitch, and rhythm. Temporality is a defining 
feature of sound as all sound occurs in time, much as images / video occur in space. The 
decision to also sonify some of the data followed from the fact that sonification is well 
suited to representing temporal or sequential data, e.g. a heart rate, as it provides a sense 
of the way in which events unfold over time and in a format which would be familiar to 
participants. Participants’ experience of the different components contributing to the 
system is inherently multimodal and made up of the different sense organs. Rather than 
participants focussing on trying to understand the graphics, sonifying the heart rate 






The next section details how and why these changes were made to the system, 
elaborating on this original experiment and then proceeding through the following 
commissioned live performances. Across the entirety of its iterations, the system and its 
subsequent performances allowed me to address the research question and, in turn, 
identify how the frameworks in which I was operating (especially cybernetics and social 
practice) complement one another as different modes of ‘praxis’. In each of the following 
experiment-performances, a combination of Nelson’s conceptual foundations were 
deployed: the ‘know-how’ of the participants as they sensed the relationship between their 
embodied experience and the audio-visual signatures; the ‘outsider’ knowledge of experts 
in neuroscience and psychology; and my own critical knowledge gained through iterating 












Aim: To develop a system that gathers and represents biometric data both sonically and 
visually. 
 
Venue / location: Logan & Wilcox Design Studio 
 
Number of Participants: 1 
 
Number of Audience Members: N/A 
 
Hardware: Arduino pro, Mio Link heart rate monitor, MacBook pro, Iphone 6, NueroSky 
headset, screen and projector, speakers and amp 
 







As outlined in the methodology, the first experiment-performance was developed to test 
the hardware and software processes which would go on to facilitate the production of a 
system that could collect and represent biometric data sonically and visually. The 
experiment was conducted with a variety of both ‘off the shelf’ closed source systems and 
bespoke open-source systems such as DIY microprocessors and plug-in sensors. Each of 
these options were evaluated on the basis of their utility when creating the initial iteration 
of the system. This first stage was conceived of as the ‘base’ which underwent 
improvements and refinements as each proceeding experiment was carried out. As the 
first experiment in the series, the kinds of knowledge involved circulated around the choice 
of what technologies to test, the results of the testing and the subsequent decisions as to 











This experiment-performance was carried out in a controlled studio environment in order 
to test the robustness of its different iterations before being implemented in a performance 
environment. This was carried out over the course of two sessions. The first session 
involved using a custom-assembled version of the open source microcontroller board 
Arduino Pro in conjunction with a heart rate sensor. The Arduino presented various 
structural and engineering concerns regarding its build quality, encouraging us to attempt 
the process with other hardware. As such, in the second session I used a closed source 
system called a Mio Link heart rate monitor. I observed and recorded the movements and 
responses of the participants during the testing in order to gauge the participant’s 
experience. In turn, these observations were fed back into the system design process, 
forming a 'conversation' between the system and the participant’s experience. Allowing 
this feedback to inform and contribute to the design process helped us to refine and 
develop the system in accordance with the research aims. 
In both sessions, the data generated by the participants wearing each of the 
devices was subsequently mapped in real-time to responsive audio and visual channels 
using the software Modul8. The audio and video was then played back through video 
projection and synchronised audio into the environment, establishing a feedback loop 
between the participant and their biometric data. The collected biometric data was 
analysed through screen captures and recordings of the audio-visual outputs in order to 
evaluate the system’s limen and how it could be developed in general. This helped to 
establish the usability of each technology and possible ways of collecting and representing 
the data. I established two different possible ways of collecting heart rate. First, I used an 
electrocardiograph (ECG) which uses electrodes placed on the skin to measure the 
electrical activity of the heart over a period of time. Second, I tested out pulse oximetry 
which comprises: an LED to shine light through the wearer’s body tissue; a sensor which 
determines the pulse by measuring the light which passes through the tissue; and a 







i. Technical setup 
 
 
Figure 35: Kaushal, V. (2015). Diagram of ​System​ (2015) data-flow. 
 
 
The Mio Link heart rate monitor uses pulse oximeter technology. The data is able to be 
sent via Bluetooth to a receiving device, in this case Heart Rate OSC. Heart Rate OSC 
visualised the data and converted it into the protocol called Open Sound Control (OSC). In 
the developer’s own words, OSC ‘is an open, transport-independent, message-based 
protocol developed for communication among computers, sound synthesizers, and other 
multimedia devices’ (OSC, 2019). From Heart Rate OSC, the OSC data is sent to Isadora 
where it is curated and organised to be intelligible to the software used to visualise and 
sonify it (Modul8 and Garageband, respectively). 
My use of Isadora was limited to converting the numeric data to be more readily 
integrated into the video and audio software. However, Isadora is in its own right an 
interactive media playback platform with a visual programming environment and a video 
and audio processing engine—arguably, it could have managed most of the work done by 
each piece of software on its own. However, I was less familiar with it so opted to harness 
my expertise in what I already had experience using. Instead, I used Isadora simply to tidy 
and split the OSC data into two signals, one of which was sent to Modul8 and the other of 
which was sent to Garageband. Each of these pieces of software received their respective 
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OSC signals, triggering the corresponding visual and sonic signals. Modul8 is the software 
I was most familiar with, and its interface and performance options can be much more 
readily harnessed and implemented without having to design bespoke modules for 
processing and representing the data as the case would have been using Isadora. Finally, 
Garageband was used to simply slow down and speed up the tempo of an MP3 loaded 
into it (also corresponding to certain readings from Isadora) as this was the clearest and 
simplest way of ensuring the participant noticed the correlation with the speed of their 
heart rate. The respective visual and sonic information was then sent out into the room via 
a projector and monitor speakers. 
The process for the brainwaves signal path was almost identical but with minor 
differences. First, rather than reading heart rate with the Mio Link, I collected brainwave 
data using a NeuroSky Mindwave electroencephalogram (EEG) monitor which measures 
and outputs the EEG power spectra (alpha waves, beta waves, etc.)—what it refers to as 
‘NeuroSky eSense meters (attention and meditation)’—and eye blinks. Rather than Heart 
Rate OSC, the data is then sent to Brainwave OSC (also commissioned by George Khut) 
to be converted into OSC and processed in the same way as the heart rate data. The only 
oddity which arose from this was that both the branded NeuroSky software and George 
Khut’s software presented the brainwave data only in terms of values of three invented 
categories (‘Meditation’, ‘Focus’ and ‘Concentration’) without disclosing what each 
category’s scale corresponds to in terms of the original brainwave data. 
Spatially, the goal of the first experiment-performance was to ensure the 
participant was at the centre of the performance and the artist was at the periphery (Figure 
36). This way, the participant becomes the point of focus. Alongside this, it was essential 
that the layout still ensured the technical aspects (such as the connectivity range for the 
server) were working. At this early juncture during the testing phase, the result was that 
the experiment produced an individual rather than a collective experience. In a certain 
sense, it modelled Khut's work ​Distillery: Waveforming​, from which some of the software 
had been inherited. However, the layouts in subsequent experiment-performances quickly 







Figure 36: Kaushal, V. (2019). The spatial arrangement of ​System​ (2015) as a variation on 
paradigm ‘1. Artefact b)’ with one participant and one artist, as well as a key to the symbols in this 
and later diagrams. 
 
 
ii. What did it do? 
 
After iterating various potential devices to establish what would optimise the system, I 
eventually decided on the following setup. The MioLink heart rate monitor was connected 
to the participant to read their pulse. This data was then sent via Bluetooth to the software 
Heart Rate OSC which simply translated the data into an OSC format to be read by 
Isadora. The artist George Khut had commissioned this software to be made for a project 
he had developed involving the heart rate and brain wave data of medical patients. 
Isadora is a graphic programming environment which focuses on the real-time 
manipulation of digital video designed by Mark Coniglio (Troikatronix, 2019). Isadora then 
sent the data to Modul8, a programming language used to create experimental systems 
often involving audio and visual information. The visualisation of the data in Modul8 was 
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then projected into the room onto a screen, creating a feedback loop with the participant. 
In turn, the brainwave monitor received the alpha, beta and gamma waves. This data was 
then sent via Bluetooth to the software Brainwave OSC which, once again, translated it 
into an OSC format to be read by Isadora, sent to Modul8, and also projected into the 
room, forming a feedback loop. 
From the point of view of the participant’s experience, the effect was that they 
became conscious of their unconscious biological states as they felt they were able to 
effect change in their environments. In turn, they felt a certain level of frustration when 
they lost control as it takes time and practise to fully grasp the correlation between the 





 a. Theory & Practice Reflections 
 
i) On George Khut 
 
Comparisons can be drawn between our experiment-performance and George Khut’s 
Distillery: Wave Forming ​(2012) which formed the basis of the conceptual framework of 
this initial experiment. In Khut’s work, the heart rate of audience members was also 
rendered as audio-visual outputs to produce a feedback loop. 
A meeting on the 3rd March 2015 with Khut helped me to identify alternative routes 
to developing the system. Khut brought our attention to two pieces of open source 
software which he had been involved in developing: HeartRate OSC and BrainWave OSC. 
Each of these were developed in the Openframeworks programming language by the 
programmer Trent Brooks and are available to download from the website GitHub 
(Brooks, 2018). The HeartRate OSC software gathers data from any 'off the shelf' heart 
rate monitor (HRM) provided it conforms to the ‘Heart Rate Profile’ (HRP) specified in the 
Bluetooth GATT developer portal (Bluetooth, 2019). This presented the advantage of 
being able to use the 'off the shelf' HRMs which my equipment survey had indicated were 
more reliable and robust. 
In Khut’s interactive artwork ​Distillery: Waveforming​ (2012), data collected by 
monitoring the audience member’s breathing and heart rate was also used to produce 
graphic, morphing, geometric forms (see figure below). The work invited audiences to 
‘explore connections between mental, emotional and physiological phenomena’, by 
making the mind conscious of the individual's unconscious activity (georgekhut.com, 
2019). In this respect, my research focus deviated from Khut’s work; whereas Khut’s work 
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connected individuals to themselves exclusively via their own biometric data, my intention 
was to establish a connection between the bodies of participants, exploring new forms of 
collaborating and performing within a multi-modal approach. 
The philosophical context of Khut’s work intersects with that of my own. By making 
participants aware of their unconscious activity and thereby providing an experience of the 
embodied nature of the mind, Khut’s work gestures towards one of the most important 
dyads of Western philosophy: the (perceived) separation of mind and body. Cartesian 
mind-body dualism is the notion that the mind is non-physical, operating in conjunction 
with but ontologically distinct from the body and, specifically, the brain (Rozemond, 1998). 
Christina Grammatikopoulou’s article ‘Breathing Art – Art as an Encompassing and 
Participatory Experience’ (2016) makes a connection between these philosophical issues 
and Khut’s work. Grammatikopoulou develops this connection further to the biofeedback 
loops present in certain rituals or ceremonies which involve focussed breathing and 
meditation. She explains how 
 
the breathing practices that are present in different religious and medical traditions around 
the world are based on the easily observable fact that there is a correlation between our 
emotional state and our breathing rhythm. In these traditions, especially the ones 
originating in India, one can find detailed instructions on how to let the air enter the body 
and how to let it out. After following these practices for some time, one experiences the 
connection of body and mind and the connection of oneself to the world. This approach 
has certain similarities with phenomenology, but within a more practical frame. Expanding 
one’s consciousness through such practices means that the sense of the “lived body” is 
enhanced (Grammatikopoulou, 2016, pp. 45-6). 
 
Connecting such unconscious activity, for example the processes which determine the 
rate of our heartbeat and perspiration, provides a deeper awareness of one’s physicality 
and embodiment. George Khut’s work is directed to such an end, and I drew upon this in 
developing the system. 
Contrary to the perception of technology as ‘external’ to the human body, in both 
my own and George Khut’s work, the biofeedback loop creates an interface between the 
invisible, unconscious internal processes and explicitly surface technologies. As such, the 
work challenges this assumption by creating an awareness of the physical happening of 
our unconscious behaviours. This action of using technology to access these internal 
mechanisms to see how they affect us and how we can consciously affect them in turn 






ii) On ‘Collective Production’ & / vs. ‘Collective Authorship’ 
 
I anticipated to collaborate with a number of actors throughout the creative 
process—whether it be the commissioning institution or specialists I commissioned to 
assist with parts of the work. There was no univocal, master plan to adhere to; serendipity 
and cross-pollination were all welcomed features of the process. 
Collaboration and collective production operate on many levels and between 
different actors in the creative process. The concept of ‘commissioning’ illustrates this 
insofar as it can describe either the action undertaken by an individual or institution to 
solicit a work’s production or an artist outsourcing tasks / steps in the production of a work 
to individuals or institutions. In other words, commissioning is something that is done both 
to and by artists. The implications of this relationship have contributed to the ongoing 
debate over the concept of authorship. In their article, ‘Commissioning the (Art)Work: 
From Singular Authorship to Collective Creatorship’, (2016), Katerina Bantinaki argues 
that the question is essentially one of intention. They observe that, ‘in standard (if not all) 
cases of commissioning’, it could be argued that 
 
the intentions of collaborators (other than the artist) that guide their activities in the 
production process “substantively figure only as a proxy for the artist’s intentions”: that is, 
their intentions only derive from the original intentions of the artist, and their activities are 
geared toward materializing the artist’s conception. Although these collaborators are 
responsible for the production of the work, they bear indirect and not direct responsibility 
for the work as an [artwork of a particular nature], so they cannot be credited with 
authorship (Bantinaki, 2016, p. 19). 
 
Bantinaki delineates between being ‘responsible’ for a work and being its author. 
Bantinaki’s argument draws upon the philosophy of Christy Mag Uidhir, specifically their 
article ‘Minimal authorship (of sorts)’ (2011) which Bantinaki quotes above. According to 
Mag Uidhir’s logic, a participant can be creatively involved whilst only contributing to a 
very limited extent to the overarching intention of a given work. In this way, they outline a 
distinction between what they refer to as ‘collective production’ and ‘collective authorship’: 
 
prima facie, collective authorship entails collective production, and that to be collectively 
produced is to be the product of activities with multiple, distinct intentional sources. 
Collective production, however, should neither entail nor suggest collective authorship. 
Most films are collectively produced, and while I suppose that key grips fulfill crucial 
production roles, key grips are not thereby authors of films[…]. [W]e regard the activities in 
which key grips and print technicians engage, though complex and highly skilled, as being 
broadly directed by—or facilitating those activities directed by—the intentions of others 
(Mag Uidhir, 2011, p. 377). 
 
However, the distinction between individual and collective authorship is made ambiguous 
by the use of technologies. When I designed the system, each software option presented 
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varying levels of control and opportunities for modulation. As such, each piece of software 
shapes and determines the project to varying degrees, and therein could be thought of as 
channeling, in turn, the respective software developers’ authorship / creatorship to varying 
degrees. In theory, I could have used Isadora​ ​for much of the process, a piece of software 
which offers a much higher degree of control and modulation. However, we elected 
instead to use the software we were more familiar with, Modul8. By extension, we 
relinquished control, allowing our production to be influenced by the limitations and 
steering imposed by the more streamlined Modul8. Indeed, open source projects and 
software are very much rooted in the principle and practice of co-authorship. In theory, 
whoever contributes to an open source platform—founder or newcomer—can morph it to 
suit their intentions. However, the degree of flexibility or autonomy afforded by a given tool 
is determined by the parameters set up by previous developers. Furthermore, as the 
biometric data (including the ‘intentions’) of the participants influenced the graphic and 
sonic signatures, it could be argued that the participants became coauthors of the work 
insofar as they were given the ability to influence the work. 
 
 
b. Personal Observations 
 
i) Implementation of Cybernetics 
 
Included within the purview of cybernetics are certain questions regarding the binaries of 
human / technology, technology / nature, and self / world. Setting up the system during the 
first experiment-performance provided opportunities to experience the contingency of the 
borders between them since I was forced to reckon with the overlap between the 
participant, their environment, and the technologies involved. Christina Grammatikopoulou 
(2016) identifies this blurring in Khut’s work generally, and my project attempted to extend 
this logic, developing the social dimensions which had been left unconsidered by previous 
cybernetic artworks through attempting to connect a greater number of participants. 
Broadly speaking, the motivation behind framing the work in this way stems from 
the belief that cybernetic artworks which innovate upon such technologies have the 
potential of reimagining the ontological bifurcations between the categories of human, 
environment and technology. Indeed, in their article ‘Co-evolution, neo-cybernetic 
emergence and phenomenologies of ambiguity: Towards a framework for understanding 





artworks can go further and actually provoke or enable a bodily, felt sense of this 
co-emergent dynamic, and thus bring into greater consciousness what can be described as 
the co-evolutionary nature of our relationship with our technological environment 
(Castellanos, 2016, p. 160) 
 
Such concerns underlie much of the project and were attempted to be provided for in the 
initial design of the original system. Simon Penny’s article ‘Art and robotics: sixty years of 
situated machines’ discusses the historic roots of this bifurcation of mind and body, 
identifying it as the original cybernetic problem ​sine qua non​: 
 
the deep ontological bifurcation in the ideologies of robotics and computing extend a fault 
line leading back to Plato and Aristotle. We believe that either knowledge resides in 
abstraction, or that knowledge resides in the word. In other words, knowledge as derived or 
inferred from the world, or imposed upon and framing the world, based on non-material 
archetypes. This tension between regimes of abstraction, such as the mathematized 
sciences, and the realm of the senses or at least the sensorial, as exemplified by the arts, 
is a paradox at the core of robotics (Penny, 2013, p. 152). 
 
Cybernetics presents one possible framework for understanding and alleviating this 
tension. What it makes explicit is that the categories of human, nature and technology are 
each 'situated' (represented by the Venn diagram), 'integrated' (represented by concentric 
circles) and / or both, within / with one another (Figure 37). It highlights the continuum 
between the body and the mind, and then between these both and the environment and 
technology. As Castellanos has it, 
 
cybernetics offers us a different way of looking at the world, one where the sharp Cartesian 
divide between people and things does not exist; where humans and their environment 
exist in a constant co-emergent interplay (Castellanos, 2016, p. 162). 
 
 
Figure 37: Edmonds, O. and Kaushal, V. (2018). A diagram visualising the integration and 
situatedness of humans, technology and nature. It eventually became apparent that these 
relationships were best represented by embedding the diagrams inside one another as represented 





ii) Implementation of Social Practice  
 
Castellanos observes that artworks which integrate these principles into their process 
thereby provide opportunities for collaborative, emergent, and discursive processes of 
learning about our relationship to technology itself. In their words, 
 
certain forms of interactive art, what I call the ‘emergent arts’, facilitate or amplify a 
construction of a reality that is active, dynamic, collaborative and co-evolutionary with our 
increasingly technologized environment (Castellanos, 2016, p. 160). 
 
In the spirit of posthumanism, cybernetics examines how we have co-evolved within and 
alongside our technological environment; far from being distinct, humans have always 
existed in feedback loops with what we might otherwise perceive as mere 'objects' and 
'things' (Nayar 2014, 10). Castellanos invents the term ‘sybiogenic’ to account for this 
concept: 
 
Symbiogenic experiences are those that give rise to a sense that we are co-emergent, that 
is, that we exist in mutually influential relationships with our increasingly technological 
environment (Castellanos, 2016, p. 160). 
 
The first experiment presented an opportunity to reflect on how I would measure the 
success of the project in relation to the principles of social practice I deemed valuable. 
Broadly speaking, the variable I prioritised securing was the degree of interaction and 
‘symbiogenesis’ enabled by the system. Moreover, this extends beyond merely my own 
use of the system: I was interested in devising a mechanism of making it available to 
others, whether by incorporating people into the experiment-performance or through 





a. Reflections on Theory 
 
i. George Khut 
 
The work of George Khut was instrumental to this project. Following a meeting with him, 
Khut personally provided me with a link to the software on Github, handing off the baton 
for the next iteration of the loose collection of principles and practices which his own work 
had coalesced. What was striking about the particular nature of the technology, 
specifically the visualisation of biometric data, was that it invited the participant to think 
about their brain in an unusual way. There was something intrinsically difficult to pin down 
about the experience of wearing the technology and interacting with one’s own data in that 
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form, although it’s inherently ubiquitous. The human brain functions via a set of uniform 
processes. These processes are constantly operating, whether or not we are ‘aware’ of 
this in any explicit and direct manner. The first experiment-performance provided me with 
an opportunity to engage with this unconscious activity by rendering it visible and audible. 
 
 
ii. Collective production vs. collective authorship 
 
In turn, with respect to the discussion of commissioning, there is an interesting synergy 
between the notions of collective production / authorship and Matarasso’s distinction 
between participation in art and participatory art as detailed in the Literature Review 
(Matarasso, 2018). Authorship is a requirement for a work to be considered participatory 
art insofar as the latter is premised upon involving the participants in the decision making 
process and encouraging their direct influence on the fundamental nature of the work. 
Respectively, collective production describes something more akin to participation in the 
process of making the work but does not necessarily entail an explicit level of direct 
influence on its direction—at least, not to the extent that the individual producers’ 
contributions would be identifiable by someone engaging with the work. Through 
subsequent experiment-performances, these distinctions and pairings also bear 
resemblance to and inform the distinction between reactive art and interactive art. This 
synergy was something I was actively interested in exploring and directly impacted the 
steer of the following experiment-performances. 
 
 
b. Testing and development 
 
The first experiment-performance followed on from having already secured the 
commission to produce the work for a public audience. Its purpose was to design and test 
the system in a more controlled environment before introducing a live audience. It was my 
own personal decision to iterate the system across them (rather than produce discrete, 
separate works). This decision to iterate the system is what led me to think of it in terms of 
a set of experiments. However, this was then consolidated by the fact that the first 
commission’s theme was precisely that: ‘experiments’—giving me license to explore this 
more explicitly. During the first iteration, the work was more defined by the experimental 
aspect rather than the performative as the only people present were myself and one 
person to help me test the equipment. These sessions were more exploratory, whereas 
the first public experiment-performance required it to be more streamlined. One crucial 
detail I discovered in this first experiment which I took forward with me was that the 
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computer and the headsets had to be in close proximity in order to register a signal. This 
meant that the technology would have to be present in the performance space and therein 
became part of the visual aesthetic presentation of the work. 
With respect to the objectives in addressing the research question, I managed to 
achieve the first two of four: 
 
● Design a system capable of connecting audience biometric data with the 
audiovisual material 
 
● Implement a feedback loop between the data and the performance software 
 
As such, I was able to begin thinking through how the use of biometric devices in a live 
performance setting could invest the audience with an ability to influence the artwork, 
thereby challenging the traditional divisions between the roles of artist, audience and 
artwork. However, it was not until the first public performance that these roles would come 














Title: Neu-collective Consciousness 
 
Aim: to increase the number of participants and therefore the number of inputs to the 
audiovisual outputs of the system whilst introducing it into a live performance context, 
thereby also introducing an ‘audience’ into the work. 
 
Venue / location: Everyman Theatre, Liverpool 
 
Commissioning Bodies: openculture.org, the Arts Council, and Everyman Theatre, 
Liverpool 
 
Number of Participants: 3 
 
Number of Audience Members: 2,000 
 













Neu-collective Consciousness​ took place in May 2016 and was attended by over 2,000 
people. It was commissioned and funded by openculture.org, the Arts Council, and 
Everyman Theatre, Liverpool. It was performed as part of Light Night Liverpool, an annual 
event which takes place in multiple venues across the city. This was the first public 
performance where the system developed in the previous experiment was used in a 
real-world scenario. It had taken one year of technical development and refinement for the 
system to be ready. Its use in a live performance environment allowed me to explore 
different hierarchical relationships between the roles of artist, artwork and audience. In this 
sense it was also the first experiment which introduced further levels of ‘know-how’ in the 







The experiment aimed to provide a deeper understanding of how the system described 
above could be used in a live performance context to create a conversation between the 
conscious and unconscious activity of the participants, and between the participating 




The lights in the room which hosted the performance were turned off in order to 
allow participants and the audience to become fully immersed in the artwork. I also looped 
a piece of ambient music to help generate an atmosphere within the performance space. 
Spatially, the use of a transparent and translucent screen allowed both the participants 
and spectators to view each other in a conventional relationship between artist and 
audience (Figure 39). Doing so placed the participants at the centre of the performance, 
but by simultaneously having the stage be at ground level, they were not elevated ‘above’ 
the spectators. Instead, the only elevated element was the graphic signatures which, 
projected onto a translucent screen, acted as a distinguishing but connecting medium 
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through which the roles were intermingled as they were transposed onto one another from 
the perspective of each respective role. 
Those who volunteered to partake in the performance were given very simple 
instructions of what the system did. Participants were then left to their own devices to 
explore and interpret what they were doing. If they sought further information, I was happy 
to explain in more detail what data was being collected and how we were using it within 
the system. This allowed some participants to gain greater control over their digital 
signature. However, some participants managed to do this on their own without any 
additional information. A number of the participants described the act of controlling the 
graphical interface as ‘difficult’, particularly due to the fact of it taking place in a 
performance space with people talking and walking in and out. Nonetheless, whilst I had 
only intended for people to come and review the performance for 5-10 minutes, spectators 
ended up staying anywhere between 15-45 minutes, many of them sitting on the floor to 
observe the performance at length. Having conceived the work from the first experiment 
as merely testing the system, it was at this point that I became cognisant of it as an actual 
performance. 
As to the system, participants controlled their own 3D signature, and their data 
varied greatly between them. 12 full bands of data were able to be received from the 
headset, and the different data readings corresponded to different actions in the 3D 
graphic signature. The greater the focus, the less variation in data, and the slower and 
more consistently the floating 3D signature moved and changed. If the data became 
erratic, this indicated less focus, and the graphic would mirror this by moving more 
erratically in turn. The 3D graphic signature of each participant remained static until such 
time as data was received by the software, generating the 3D graphics. This proved to be 
an important part of making the participant actually feel involved in controlling the objects 






Figure 39: Kaushal, V. (2019). The spatial arrangement of ​Neu-Collective Consciousness​ (2016) as 











a. Theory and Practice Reflections 
 
i) On First-order versus Second-order Cybernetics 
 
This first live performance of the system modelled a midpoint between first order and 
second order cybernetics. Arguably this initial lack of second order principles (e.g. 
reflexivity and the inclusion of the observer) was due to the fact that the second 
experiment almost just served as a test of the system which had been designed in the first 
experiment. The reflexivity implied by second order cybernetics only entered into play 
once I had established the system could work in its most basic form within a social 
environment. It was only in hindsight, thinking back on the experiment-performance, that a 
degree of self reflection came into play. In this respect, in accordance with Nelson’s model 
of PaR, the second experiment-performance offered an opportunity for greater critical 
reflection. Moreover, this analysis section of the write-up provides a further degree of 
reflexive accounting of how the experiment is situated in certain conceptual frameworks 
and debates about terminology. 
This reflexivity is the key distinction. Referring to the pre-eminent cybernetician 
and cofounder of second-order cybernetics, Heinz von Foerster, Wolfram Lutterer 
observes in his article ‘Systemics: the social aspects of cybernetics’ that ‘it would probably 
indeed be better for Heinz von Foerster’s “second-order” if—as Scott suggests – this 
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“non-trivial” and “relativistic” cybernetics was described as reflexive cybernetics’ (Lutterer, 
2005, p. 499). Whilst cybernetics is already premised on an idea of a feedback loop, 
‘reflexive’ second order cybernetics constitutes a feedback loop in which the observer 
regards their own observation as part of the process. Second order cybernetics arises as 
the reflexive ability to converse with the process itself, as in Pask’s theory of conversation. 
Lutterer develops this distinction between cybernetics and its ‘reflexive’ counterpart 
through a linguistic analysis of the etymology of the words ‘pattern’ and ‘matrix’: 
 
For the pattern, which is inherent in our interactive world, von Foerster plays a queer kind 
of a gender-scientist: ​pattern ​is from the Latin ​pater​, father. Therefore, a rather masculine 
attitude toward these things would be associated by this term. He would rather like to think 
of a woman, and therefore, the ​pattern that connects ​becomes a ​matrix that embeds 
(​matrix – mater – mother​). There had to be some kind of bed, or context, in which the 
various ideas could be a pattern (von Foerster and Broecker, 2002, p. 314). 
 
If first-order cybernetics observes a pattern, second-order extends its observation 
outwards to encompass a wider matrix of processes. Where ‘pattern’ connotes linearity 
within a system or sequence of repetition and deviation, matrix expands upon this to 
connote a situated or embedded set of patterns within patterns, forming a dimensional 
network. In this respect, this experiment-performance exemplifies first order cybernetics 
insofar as it involved someone producing the graphic signature as and while they 
observed it changing. However, it could be said to be second order due to the fact that 
there were people present who influenced the environment purely by virtue of being 
present and thereby having an influence, however variable, on the participant, therein 
becoming more adaptive and situated within a wider network of influence. 
 
 
ii) On ‘Double Description’ 
 
This experiment-performance introduced the difficult question of having to assign a 
descriptor, either in the form of ‘experiment’ or ‘performance’. The employment of a 
double-description was based on the decision to iterate the system across multiple 
performances (as an experiment) and to do so in front of a live audience. 
Instead of settling for one term, I opted simply to hybridise them in the manner of 
cybernetician Gregory Bateson’s concept of ‘double description’. Double description 
challenges the idea of singular truths by refusing to reduce scenarios to binary 
oppositions. Another of the British branch of cyberneticians, Bateson’s work brought 
together anthropology with linguistics to support his study of living systems in both the 
biological and sociocultural spheres. In an introduction to the book ​A Legacy for Living 
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Systems: Gregory Bateson as Precursor to Biosemiotics​, Jesper Hoffmeyer outlines a 
particular facet of his notion of the double description: 
 
Bateson claimed that the product of double description belongs to a higher logical type 
than the phenomena that were abductively compared. The similarities reached by 
abduction are here seen as cases on which to build an inductive inference that brings us to 
a higher logical type (Hoffmeyer, 2008, p. 5). 
 
Whilst the action of abduction involves the identification of shared patterns across different 
forms, the notion of the higher logical type evokes a sense in which there is a relation that 
structures and precedes the complex, indeterminate, multiplicitous dynamics which extend 
from it, much like the relationship between a tree’s trunk and its rhizomatic root structure. 
Reflecting on this natural phenomenon as an example of the complex non-deterministic 
structure of systems was one of many reasons why I approached the experiment as I did, 
i.e. respectful of the complexity of social systems and non-deterministically. As 
unpredictable as the rhizome is, it nevertheless congregates around a single point. 
Though it is this endpoint which is readily visible, it is based in all these other strands. The 
experiment-performance operated in this way, and as such, it would have been reductive 
to form descriptions purely in terms of a single point. The concept of the rhizome was 
employed as a framework for my practice as it extends the sense of a natural form of 
knowledge generation. Rather than as an 'absolute' science, I conducted the process 
through qualitative observations. Double-description allows one to retain complexity and 
nuance by deploying multiple terms rather than reducing the object to a singular concept. 
To elucidate the thinking between the choice of terms, it is helpful to acknowledge 
each term’s variety of official definitions. The ​Oxford English Dictionary Online​ defines 
‘performance’ as follows: 
 
1.  
a. The accomplishment or carrying out of something commanded or undertaken; the 
doing of an action or operation. 
b. The quality of execution of such an action, operation, or process; the competence 
or effectiveness of a person or thing in performing an action; spec. the capabilities, 




a. The action of performing a play, piece of music, ceremony, etc.; execution, 
interpretation. 
b. A ceremony, rite, or ritual. 
c. An instance of performing a play, piece of music, etc., in front of an audience; an 
occasion on which such a work is presented; a public appearance by a performing 
artist or artists of any kind. Also: an individual performer's or group's rendering or 
interpretation of a work, part, role, etc. In extended use: a pretence, a sham 




Foremost, performance is defined as the carrying out of a task as well as a way of thinking 
about the 'success' of a task’s ‘performance’. Respectively, once we reach the fourth 
definition we encounter the notion of performance as entailing the observation by an 
‘audience’. What is also noteworthy is the introduction of the concept of experimentation 
with respect to performance as ‘an individual performer's or group's rendering or 
interpretation of a work’, and, beyond this, the notion of performance as deception as 
‘pretence’ or ‘sham’. 
The term ‘experiment’ suitably describes the methodological approach of 
developing the system across various iterations, though it ultimately lacked the explicit 
aspect of observation. This first definition immediately seemed reflective of how I 
envisioned the process we were undertaking, needing only to be supplemented by the 
implication in ‘performance’ of the audience’s presence: 
 
1.  
a. The action of trying anything, or putting it to proof; a test, trial; esp. in phrases, to 
make (an) experiment, †to take (an) experiment. Const. of. Now somewhat arch., 
and conveying some notion of sense. 
b. An expedient or remedy to be tried. 
 
The second also presented useful distinctions and qualifications: 
 
2. A tentative procedure; a method, system of things, or course of action, adopted in 
uncertainty whether it will answer the purpose. 
 
The suggestion of uncertainty invites a more radical interpretation of the word as it ceases 
to refer to a notion of an original truth which, as we have seen, was one of the potential 
pitfalls presented by the word ‘performance’. Experiment breaks from a conception of a 
strict teleology, therein differing from performance which can presuppose a stable origin, 
source or intention. 
The third definition expressed ‘experiment’ as attending to a radical unknown, 
evoking a sense of openness and reflexivity: 
 
3. An action or operation undertaken in order to discover something unknown, to test a 
hypothesis, or establish or illustrate some known truth. 
 
a. in science (​Oxford English Dictionary Online​, 2018) 
 
Once again, the crucial detail the word ‘experiment’ lacked was the idea of an audience 
and any sense of artistic entertainment. On the other hand, when we reflect on the 
category of 'experimental' art, the prefix indicates the possible lack experimentality in more 
traditional, isolated notions of performance arts, which might be overly prescriptive and 
organised, rather than open to the uncertainty of the unknown in the manner that the word 
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‘experiment’ seems to invite. At the outset, my intention was simply to tailor the description 
to the audience in question. For instance, in the context of a science festival I would have 
used ‘experiment’, whereas if I was commissioned to participate in a conventionally 
curated exhibition, I would have called it a ‘performance’. This approach would have been 
ultimately reductive but bears thinking about as an illustration of how the relevance of 
each term is contextual and relative. 
 
 
b. Personal Observations 
 
i) Implementation of Cybernetics 
 
For its ability to incorporate biological systems, social systems, mechanical and 
technological systems in its purview, cybernetics was the perfect framework from which to 
both execute the experiment-performance as it happened and analyse it after the fact. The 
project design as a whole modelled cybernetic principles: I began with a question, 
developed a system to investigate it, and then proceeded to reflect on what I had achieved 
through the framework of cybernetics, applying the knowledge gained back into the 
design. This approach illustrates certain aspects which designate this project as ‘practice 
based’: I decided on an approximate end goal, devised how to reach it, and eventually 
arrived at outcomes which came close to the envisioned ends. Rather than consciously 
deciding to employ cybernetic principles in a series of controlled experiments, I operated 
with a greater degree of openness, allowing me to adapt and respond to unexpected 
outcomes. This approach is supported by the research methodologies detailed in ​The 
Artistic Turn ​(2009), which identifies the 
 
hitherto unexpected strengths in employing situated, adapted criteria that derive from, and 
can be applied to, real-life situations—or at least do not detract from the complexity and 
richness of these situations — as opposed to universal, static criteria (Coessens, Krispin 
and Douglas, 2009, p. 64). 
 
Aware of the pitfalls of the modern scientific paradigm which separates fields of 
knowledge rather than recognising the feedback loops which exist between them, 
Coessens, Krispin and Douglas observe that ‘artistic research could experience the same 
problem of fragmentation as conventional science’. In view of this, they wonder if 
 
perhaps there is a way in which the artist-as-researcher may succeed in articulating the 
limits of a research project and narrative, clarify the research rules, open up his or her 
knowledge and expertise towards scientific and philosophical debate, and still not lose the 





Something of this sentiment structured my own ethos concerning the methodology, 
balancing the need to control variables sufficiently as to be able to measure the impact of 
certain changes but without limiting them to the extent that unexpected outcomes were 
precluded. 
Where the expectation had been that people would simply act as passive 
observers, instead their involvement grew exponentially throughout the event. People 
asked to be involved, performing in front of their peers and making enquiries as to how 
they could better manipulate the system, whilst many others sat and observed the process 
for much longer than I had anticipated. On reflection, the curators themselves also had an 
unexpected influence as a result of the way they treated us; as the commission winners, 
they approached my project in particular quite seriously, and this in turn influenced the 
audience to do the same, thereby changing the atmosphere of the environment. The 
commission format lends itself to a cybernetic framework in general. Commissioned 
projects often require certain specific criteria to be fulfilled, but as an artist or designer you 
are able to identify the gaps which can be exploited to diverge from the prescribed model 
and generate points of interest. Cybernetics allows for and encourages this, hence why 
we elected to consciously frame the process within its principles. 
Once the experiment-performance was completed, there was an opportunity for 
me to finally analyse my own participation—a certain distance was necessary to allow me 
to sufficiently reflect on my role in the process. 
 
 
ii) Implementation of Social Practice 
 
This particular commission granted me more artistic autonomy than those which followed 
as there were fewer restrictions. However, socially engaged practice places less 
importance on the traditional concept of artistic autonomy. In a certain respect, the ideal 
social practice is a system which runs itself, growing and evolving with minimal 
involvement of the artist. This experiment-performance diverged from this model as it 
became apparent that the artist actually could play a really interesting role—not only as 
the system designer but also as a participant and conductor. Where a wholly digital 
cybernetic system has the genetic coding already built into it to allow for its emergent 
properties to present themselves, here, the artist fulfilled this role as an analogue 
mechanism for re-inputting the feedback from the audience. In a conventional social 
practice model everyone is afforded the same opportunities to contribute. By contrast, in 
this instance the centrality of the artist was consolidated as their role was to reincorporate 
the participant feedback into the artwork. However, this was precisely in order to allow the 
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greatest number of people to have as much influence as possible. 
In this experiment-performance, what was planned for was the unexpected. It 
encouraged me to stop thinking of the process as a series of design projects but rather as 
cybernetic projects which could accommodate a social dimension. Whilst design does 
have a social aspect, my focus until this stage had principally been the technical details. 
By bringing together social practice and cybernetics, I was able to think about how each 
concept might apply to the objects and processes presented by the other disciplines. What 
transpired was that they are in fact already very closely related frameworks. Indeed, 
Lutterer is sensitive to this proximity when he writes that ‘both the ruling doctrine of 
causality and the delusion of objective truth prove to be hindering. Social cybernetics is 
second-order cybernetics, as it includes the observer into the system’ (Lutterer, 2005, p. 
501). Second order cybernetics is premised on the inclusion of the social context to the 
act of observation. 
I expected the first public experiment-performance simply to be an opportunity to 
test the system by turning it on and walking away. This wasn’t the case; audience 
members and participants were engaged and inquisitive, seeking far more than just 
entertainment or spectacle. This relates back to Gordon Pask’s dictum that “man seeks 
novelty in the environment.” We seek out that which is different and unfamiliar and reflect 
on it in conversation. The experiment-performance manifested this expansion outwards to 
encompass that which might otherwise, in a more traditional paradigm, be thought of as 
outside ​the forms in which people (the participants, in our case) meaningfully interact with 
their environment. Ultimately, the experiment-performance did indeed allow me to test the 
system, and I felt confident that I would be able to implement the knowledge gained from 





a. Reflections on Theory 
 
Once the audience was introduced into the equation, I considered to what extent the 
experiment-performance could be considered fully second-order cybernetics. The role of 
the audience as simple observer was of course challenged by the fact that they were 
invited to participate in the performance by wearing the headsets and having their data 
visualised and sonified in real time. This naturally introduced an awareness of the effect of 
observation on the system and, in turn, a reflexive awareness of the presence of the 
observer within the system itself. As such, I decided it is correct to regard the second 
experiment-performance as modelling second-order cybernetic principles to the extent 
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that the observer was not separate or apart from the object of their observation. In this 
respect, we can think of the experiment, in Von Foerster’s terms, as a ‘matrix’: the 
audience are integrated into the cycle of the system’s ‘pattern’ whilst also simultaneously 
situating the system within the dynamic of being observed by them. 
 
 
b. Testing and development 
 
Following the success of the first public commission, the commissioning body 
(openculture.org) invited me to take centre stage in the next funding round for their next 
project. This led me to the next experiment-performance and Liverpool Light Night. 
In terms of the research question and objectives, I decided to plug more 
participants into the system, thereby increasing the opportunity for a greater number of 
interactions between the roles. More precisely, I also resolved to develop the audio side of 
the performance as in this experiment-performance it wasn’t included in the feedback 
loop—so the simple goal for the next performance was to include it. In each case, the 
result would simply be to further integrate the roles of audience and artwork by presenting 




Three – ​Zugzwang​ (2017) 
 
Zugzwang: a situation [in chess] in which the obligation to make a move in one's turn is a 
serious, often decisive, disadvantage (​Lexico.com​, 2019). 
 
 








Aim: to provide participants greater control of the biometric devices and to combine their 
data to form a ‘conversation’, resulting in more interaction between the audience 
members. 
 
Venue / location: John Lennon Theatre, Liverpool John Moores University 
 
Commissioning Bodies: openculture.org, Arts Council, Liverpool Council, Liverpool John 
Moores University 
 
Number of Participants: 6 
 




Hardware: MacBook Pro, projector screens (x 3), speakers and amplifier, MioLink, 
NeuroSky Mindwave 
 







This experiment / performance took place at the John Lennon Theatre and once again 
involved projections, light, and sound generated through interactions between participants 
and their environment. A German word, ‘zugzwang’ loosely translates as ‘the compulsion 
to move’. It’s often used in chess when a player is forced to move when they would 
otherwise prefer to pass and are put at a disadvantage because of the decision. This idea 
of mutual influence grounded my attempt to introduce more points of contact between a 







The third experiment-performance reintroduced a more traditional role of the 
artwork as artefact but simultaneously steered the performance towards eroding the 
divisions between the audience and artist. An inverted pyramid was suspended in the 
centre of the performance space upon which were projected 3D signatures generated 
through combining the collective data of participants. By suspending the pyramid in the 
centre of the space, participants could move freely around and under it, creating a less 
clearly defined separation between artist, audience and artwork. Distinct from the previous 
experiment (where the participants and observers were on different sides of a 
semi-transparent screen), there wasn’t a clear separation or defined space between the 
roles. 
A number of volunteers were recruited from the Manchester School of Art to guide 
the participants and explain the process. This was particularly important due to the 
increased number of participants. The volunteers’ duties involved placing the brainwave 
headset and heart rate monitors onto participants, monitoring the door, and managing the 
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crowd in order to limit the number of people entering the performance space. Beyond this, 
the volunteers were given a brief description to relay to the audience as they entered. The 
experiment also involved collaborating with a musician and sound engineer who created 
the pre-recorded sounds and then played them live, increasing and decreasing the beats 
per minute (bpm) in correlation with the heart rate data. There was also a supporting 
tech-troubleshooter to ensure software ran smoothly during the performance. 
The movement from the second experiment-performance to the third involved a 
shift in the various types of knowledge involved and their position in relation to one other. 
What had previously existed as more explicit conceptual knowledge in the first public 
performance this time was internalised as ‘know-how’, both by the artists and the curators. 
In turn, the testimonies and feedback from the previous experiment-performance shaped 
the next one, expressed in the changes which were implemented. In this sense, 
‘know-what’ from the former experiment manifested itself as part of the new ‘conceptual 
framework’ of the latter. Indeed, this translation of knowledge-types characterises the 
modulation of knowledge between each experiment-performance as feedback continued 





The design of the space and position of the system within it built upon the previous 
experiment-performance, making some additions. Each side of the pyramid related to one 
pair of participants. Each participant provided a separate data stream of brainwave activity 
and heart rate, encouraging them to concentrate and meditate on what was happening. 
The inverted pyramid was fabricated out of a metal frame with a screen stretched over its 
three sides. The structure was designed to be demountable for storage and transportation 
purposes. As in the previous experiment / performance, brainwave data was used to 
generate and project 3D signatures. Specifically, EEG was recorded to provide data 
streams of participants’ alpha, gamma and beta waves. By isolating this data we could 
indicate the participants’ different states of mind (‘meditation’, ‘focus’ or ‘attention’). The 
participants’ heart rates were combined with those of the others in the room to create an 
average heart rate which was then sonified. The mean average was then used to speed 
up and slow down a pre-recorded soundtrack which was pumped back into the room in a 
sensory feedback loop. Those participants who became aware that their heart rate 
affected the speed of the soundtrack tried to manipulate them in order to affect the 
performance. When anyone decided to take off their brainwave headset, the volunteer 
peer practitioners took receipt of it to hand over to the next participant. Participants were 
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free to use the headsets for as long as they wanted, but the average amount of time 
participants chose to wear them was approximately seven minutes. Spatially, the third 
experiment-performance involved a return to the artefact paradigm. It also introduced the 
feature of positioning the participants side by side around the artefact in such a way as to 
elicit a sense of a dispersed hierarchy (Figure 42). In this respect, the 
experiment-performance could also be seen as modelling the paradigm of the stage in the 
round, only here the stage encompasses the whole room. 
The experience of those involved differed from the previous 
experiment-performance. During the experiment-performance, certain spectators 
concentrated on the object rather than the collective whole (i.e., the participants, 3D 
graphics, and the lighting, etc.). This may have been due to the less conventional 
arrangement of artist, artwork and audience as there was neither a stage nor clearly 
defined spaces for the audience and artist / performers. Video interviews were conducted 
with participants exiting the space. The majority commented that they felt they had 
influenced the performance but were unaware of how (this lack of awareness was one of 
the chief ongoing concerns and was addressed most thoroughly in the final 
experiment-performance). People entering the space were themselves influenced by the 
people leaving, creating a continuous stream of influence through each other in a 
feedback loop. Beyond this, the number of participants was limited in order to maintain the 
atmosphere and ambience of the space which had been specifically chosen for its ample 
room, allowing free movement. Had the space become crowded, the increased noise level 
would have disrupted the participants’ concentration, influencing the data and therefore 
producing an undesirable output, hindering the experience. 
One surprising outcome was that almost every set of participants held hands and 
began to work together. As Tiffany Field explains, ‘touch is our most social sense. Unlike 
seeing, hearing, smelling, and tasting, which can generally be done alone, touching 
typically implies an interaction with another person’ (Field, 2001, p. 19). This was 
unexpected as the pairs did not necessarily comprise people who arrived together but 
were paired together ad-hoc as spaces became available. The hand holding spread as a 
‘meme’ throughout the space (Blackmore, 1999, p. 4). Holding hands not only assumed a 
symbolic quality as an instance of interfacing the participants present (Shusterman, 2008, 
p. 214), but also would have had an affect on the level of oxytocin, the neurotransmitter 
responsible for producing the sensation of trust and compassion and reducing anxiety 
(Morhenn, Beavin and Zak, 2012). In this respect, this unexpected outcome was arguably 
one of the most explicit instances of how the experiment-performances induced a 
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profound level of interaction and participation: 
 
The cutaneous senses—especially touch—are crucial yet often-overlooked mediators of 
social interaction, | contributing not only to sensation but to emotion. […]Major functional 
roles for social touch include affiliative behavior and communication. Touch- and 
pain-related representations also provide a basis for intersubjective representations, 
influencing the understanding of others’ sensory, emotional, and mental states (Löken, 
Morrison and Olausson, 2009, p. 311-2). 
 
Due to the time limitations imposed by the scope of the PhD, this was a dimension of the 
experiment-performances which I did not explore further but which raised potential 
avenues for future research as I detail in the conclusion. 
 
 
Figure 42: Kaushal, V. (2019). The spatial arrangement of ​Zugzwang​ (2017) as a variation on 











a. Theory and Practice Reflections 
 
i) On Conversation Theory & Interaction of Actors Theory 
 
As discussed in the Literature Review, Gordon Pask’s conversation theory (1976) 
is a way of thinking about learning as the constellation of actions and reactions between 
human and / or nonhuman agents. A conversation comprises an array of emergent 
properties such that each participant in the conversation will go away having reconsidered 
and reconstituted their ideas about the given topic. As Paul Pangaro explains, ‘the 
difference between communication (including the technical, information-theory sense of 
Shannon) and Pask’s conversation is that for conversation to have occurred, something 
must have changed for one or more of the participants—understandings, concepts, intent, 
values’ (2016, p. 1581). In his article on conversation theory and educational technology, 
Bernard Scott demonstrates how the theory’s more radical features can be lost in the 
attempt to put them into practice. In Scott’s specific example, conversation theory as ‘a 
theory of learning and teaching, in which one participant (the teacher) wishes to expound 
a body of knowledge to a second participant (the learner) (2001, p. 25). However, in the 
process of trying to ‘apply’ conversation theory to an already existing system, especially 
one involving digital technology and machines, the model of didacticism re-enters the 
equation. Retaining the properties of continuous change, dynamism, and reciprocal 
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learning is difficult when dealing with structures that traditionally rest upon normative 
hierarchies. Efforts to integrate and apply conversation theory as a method seems often to 
engender a return to the paradigm of the master / slave relationship. 
This resistance faced when putting theory into practice relates to another paradox 
which arises out of the attempt to connect organic and mechanical systems (Pickering, 
2014). In an article entitled ‘Beyond Design – Cybernetics, Biological Computers and 
Hylozoism’, Andrew Pickering discusses how ‘the Modern detour through knowledge and 
away from the world can also be a ​block​,’ insofar as certain technologies which mediate 
natural processes can become ‘a trip that forecloses options that Beer and Pask’s work 
demonstrates lie actually already at hand’ (2009, p. 486). He goes on to observe: 
 
nature does not need to make any detours; it does not just exceed our computational 
abilities, in effect it surpasses them in unimaginable ways (Pangaro, 2016, p. 1581). 
 
 
As Pask and Beer attempted to integrate biological computing into factories, it became 
apparent that certain modern technologies diverged from the already existing natural 
processes which possessed the kinds of regulatory mechanisms they were trying to 
simulate artificially. Systems which had been otherwise perceived as forms of progress 
from primitive methods of organising labour actually entailed their own detours. The 
problem became one of trying to reintroduce what had otherwise been left behind and 
written off as unsophisticated in order to engineer, ironically, more efficient mechanical 
systems. The trouble, therein, lay in negotiating an interface between the natural and the 
artificial. 
Conversation theory eventually developed into the interaction of actors theory—a 
permutation that focuses on the interchangeable roles of the individuals in a given 
‘conversational’ scenario (Pask and de Zeeuw, 1992). Whilst conversation theory stands 
alone as a macro concept of how learning happens between individuals, interaction of 
actors theory emphasises the concept of what are called ‘p-’ and ‘m-individuals’. These 
are different ways of describing mechanical and biological individuals (m-) and 
psychological individuals (p-). A ‘psychological individual’ is an attitude or disposition 
towards a given subject; it is that which determines how one behaves or what ideas a 
person is likely to bring to a conversation (i.e., these might be different in different 
contexts). Scott explains, p- and m-individuals ‘are not necessarily in one to one 
correspondence. One m may house several p; one p may be housed by several m’s’ 
(Scott, 2001, p. 30). In other words, they are not interconnected in an exclusive and 
essential way. Were we to have explained the idea of our experiments to, say, an eleven 
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year old, we would have done so differently than if we were speaking to someone with a 
PhD. Different p-individuals can describe a particular constellation of ideas in motion, 
different ways of organising the same ideas, or even just different ways of communicating 
them. 
Thinking about these experiments in the context of interaction of actors theory 
helps to illuminate the interchangeability of artist, curator, purveyor, participant, and all the 
various roles housed within the bodies of those involved. Throughout the course of the 
conversations which took place during the experiment, these roles evolved. People 
recognised how their actions—or, indeed, their thinking—informed the conditions of the 
space, feeding back into the other participants and creating an evolving conversation. 
 
 
ii) On Cybernetic Theatre & Entertainment 
 
Pask deemed theatre a vehicle for exploring his concept of Aesthetically Potent 
Environments and therefore presenting a suitable site for cybernetic experimentation. 
However, as Liss Werner describes, Pask felt the conventional ‘top-down’ approach to 
theatre was not an efficient method for dramatic presentations. As such, he modified the 
model to create a cybernetic theatre, which was effectively 
 
a feedback system that interfaces audience and actors and thus lets both of them act as 
participants in and control the conversation. In a cybernetic system, audience and actors 
are equally control systems–identified through the degree of interaction. The system was 
based on principles akin to the ones used in his teaching machines and the task to include 
control from the audience over the players, whose reaction again fed back into the 
audience and so forth (Werner, 2018, p. 2). 
 
For all its radical aspirations, the theatre nevertheless remained a closed system; there 
were no other inputs besides the tools Pask used to control it. In this respect, whilst it was 
not technically a conversation, it exemplified some of the principles Pask was attempting 
to express. 
Central to these ideas is the principle of pleasure. Werner offers a sensitive 
description of such systems in their article on the cybernetic theatre: 
 
Paskian Artefacts​, as I observe them, are cognitive ​thinking machines​, artificial organisms 
for interaction, play, and education. In his theatre design, Gordon Pask extended the 
typology of theatre, traditionally, a place for entertainment and consumption of joy, to a 
participative performance setup, a ‘theatre 2.0’, an experimental living architecture (p. 4). 
 
Entertainment and pleasure were essential as without people’s attention the whole 
experiment would have been impossible. People already interested in AI, wellbeing and 
mindfulness might have attended, but it was important that it attracted a diversity of people 
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so as to ensure that a diversity of forms of knowledge were contributed to the system in 
keeping with Ashby’s principle of requisite variety. As such, the focus was on retaining 
people’s engagement such that they were present and contributing. By the same logic, as 
Werner explains, Pask was invested in cultivating a similar atmosphere: 
 
In a ​Cybernetic Theatre​ as a behavioural meta-system, a typology of togetherness, an 
actor becomes an extension of a participant in the social system and vice versa. The 
second notable point is that a ​Cybernetic Theatre​ presents a truly collective “Entailment 
Mesh”. In contemporary terms, it represents an organization where crowd behaviour plays 
the major role in the plot and acts as its main driver (p. 4). 
 
As someone who designs experiential artefacts, I was most interested in drawing upon 
what makes social experiences uniquely powerful as distinct from individual experiences. 
Whilst individual reflective appreciation of artworks is undeniably valuable, it was the 
shared aspect of the experience which I tried most to support. Indeed, two of the operative 
keywords during the planning stages were ‘shared’ and ‘entertainment’, and it was 
between these poles that the experiment followed in a tradition of attempts to unite 
conversation theory into art and performance, linking back to the original Paskian artefacts 
prior to ​Musicolour ​(1956). Whilst I was confident that the theories behind the experiments 
were more than suitable starting points, they are only as effective as the ability for the 
experiment-performances to be evocative and intuitive for the people involved. 
 
 
b. Personal observations 
 
i) Implementation of Cybernetics 
 
Different from the second experiment, participants were now able to see the object and 
each other by standing underneath the inverted pyramid. This allowed the participants to 
respond to each other in real time. I moved away from focussing on using the data for 
individual experiences towards creating something more collective. As a result, the 
participants were more conscious of their being connected and their influence on one 
another. In this respect, while the second experiment was situated somewhere on the 
spectrum just beyond first order cybernetics, the third experiment came just short of being 
fully second order. Participants were able to see, interact with, and adapt to the system 
more dynamically. 
Despite the fact that the second experiment was called ​Neu-collective 
Consciousness​, it was only by the third experiment that I explicitly used the data to 
generate a shared experience by intermingling the participants’ readings. The word 
zugzwang evokes a sense of a dynamic wherein the individual is aware of their position in 
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a system whose nature is changed irreversibly by whatever action they take. The third 
experiment attempted to make this explicit by introducing this idea in the name. Like 
playing a game, participants could observe one another’s actions and adapt their own 
accordingly, the result being something much more ‘conversational’. 
At this juncture, it is helpful to reflect back on Roy Ascott’s study of Telematics 
(1990), the contemporary branch of cybernetics which makes artworks using the data 
transfer capabilities of telecommunications. In his article ‘Is There Love in the Telematic 
Embrace?’, Roy Ascott writes against artistic models which see ‘the artist as sender and 
therefore originator of meaning’, in favour of those in which ‘the viewer actively negotiates 
for meaning’, i.e. wherein ‘meaning’ is 
 
the product of interaction between observed and the system, the content of which is in a 
state of flux, of endless change and transformation (Ascott, 1990, p. 241). 
 
This description elucidates the cybernetic principles of this experiment insofar as it 
involved the participants in the system in a way that even more explicitly positioned them 
as meaning 'creators' rather than just its 'readers'. Ascott’s idea of ‘a state of flux, of 
endless change and transformation’ neatly locates the way in which, by introducing more 
simultaneous active participants, I had invited greater ‘uncertainty and instability’. The 
outcome was something much more resembling a conversation than what previously had 
in the second experiment been more of a monologue. I had expanded the field of play, 
approaching my goal to implement a truly reflexive cybernetic system. 
 
 
ii) Implementation of Social Practice 
 
A further site of variation and complexity within the experiment arose out of its social 
aspects, specifically the way the different actors were organised in the space. When I 
designed the experiment, I conducted site visits to establish my options and any obstacles 
I might face. Straightaway, having seen that the space was essentially a lecture hall, the 
first and most obvious intervention I decided to make was to subvert the traditional 
audience / lecturer dynamic. The second experiment was the first step in creating a 
socially shared experience which could liberate people from their conventional roles as 
artist or audience. The third experiment took this further by eroding the stability of the 
stage, organising the participants into a circle around the pyramid and letting the audience 
walk freely underneath and around it. One of my principal motives for doing so was to test 
hierarchy, and in doing so, my sense of the word ended up changing from being 
something vertically organised to a more cyclic, structural process. 
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Claire Bishop’s concept of the art gallery can be used to expound a theory of how 
the space of exhibition and / or performance affects the content of what is being 
performed and the roles of those involved. She details how relational art is ‘entirely 
beholden to the contingencies of its environment and audience’, and that, 
 
moreover, this audience is envisaged as a community: rather than a one-to-one 
relationship between work of art and viewer, relational art sets up situations in which 
viewers are not just addressed as a collective, social entity, but are actually given the 
wherewithal to create a community, however temporary or utopian this may be (2004, p. 
54). 
 
Bishop goes on to compare what she sees as the overly-cozy relational aesthetics of Liam 
Gillick and Rirkrit Tiravanija to the more politically reflexive relational aesthetics of Thomas 
Hirschhorn and Santiago Sierra. The latter, she explains, produce better art as they rely 
not on the ‘fictitious whole subject of harmonious community, but a divided subject of 
partial identifications open to constant flux’. She explains how, 
 
if relational aesthetics requires a unified subject as a prerequisite for 
community-as-togetherness, then Hirschhorn and Sierra provide a mode of artistic 
experience more adequate to the divided and incomplete subject of today. This relational 
antagonism would be predicated not on social harmony, but on exposing that which is 
repressed in sustaining the semblance of this harmony. It would thereby provide a more 
concrete and polemical grounds for rethinking our relationship to the world and to one 
other (2004, p. 79). 
 
Whilst my experiment-performances did not foreground their social dimension in the 
manner of Hirschhorn and Sierra, they did nevertheless formally enact the idea of ‘the 
divided and incomplete subject of today’. As an attempt at grounding cybernetics in social 
practice, the experiments aimed to be an extension of the kinds of issues dealt with more 
explicitly in traditional social work, but operated on the level of form, illustrating how the 
human or mechanical subject is a contingent entity, subject to flux, fractured and 






a. Reflections on Theory 
 
The third experiment-performance introduced a larger number of participants, thereby 
affecting the number of possible interactions that could take place. By introducing more 
participants, by definition there were more of what Pask calls ‘m-individuals’, as discussed 
above (Pask and de Zeeuw, 1992). There was also an increased chance of more 
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p-individuals (as distinct psychologies rather than mechanical bodies) because, by 
averaging the data taken from the participants as a whole, this meant that each 
m-individual was required to produce more extraordinary data readings in order for their 
influence on the graphic signature to be perceivable. However, paradoxically, this meant 
there was simultaneously a lower correlation between participation and influence. 
The introduction of the pyramid explicitly encouraged the principles of cybernetic 
theatre and the importance of entertainment. As a non-traditional method of presenting 
visual media, more than just a vehicle for the visual data, the pyramid served as a 
theatrical prop around which the performance was oriented. Moreover, its placement just 
above eye level meant that the audience and participants could make eye contact whilst 
still facing the central performance piece. This allowed for ‘conversation’ between the 
audience and participants to continue uninterrupted by the presence of the spectacle in 
the centre—but nevertheless oriented around an artefact. 
 
 
b. Testing and development 
 
Moving into the final public performance I felt I needed to gain a better understanding of 
what the data correlated to in the brain. As such, I brought in a group of doctors and 
scientists who could help me to connect the dots between the abstract categories of 
‘meditation’ and ‘focus’ and the actual brain activity which produced readings in these 
categories. This was the point at which I attempted to establish with greater precision what 
constitutes social and meaningful experiences from a neurological and psychological 
perspective. 
What I learnt in ​Neu-Collective Consciousness​ was the importance and 
consequence of how the event was managed. Because there was no obvious ‘stage’, 
when people arrived at the space and during the experiment-performance, they chatted 
amongst themselves. Whilst this wasn’t a problem as such, it produced a different 
outcome in terms of atmosphere than what I had intended to create, and this was taken 










Aim: to host workshops with peer educators to provide participants with a deeper 
understanding of biofeedback, thereby increasing their level of authorship, and to make 




Venue / location: Talbot Mill 
 
Commissioning Bodies: Cornbrook Collective, Capital & Centric, and Manchester Science 
Festival 
 
Number of Participants: 8 
 
Number of Audience Members: >500 
 
Hardware: MacBook Pro, projector screens (x 4), speakers and amplifier, MioLink, 
NeuroSky Mindwave 
 













This work was commissioned by the Cornbrook Collective in conjunction with Capital & 
Centric and the Manchester Science Festival. It brought together all the other components 
conceived in the previous performances. It was also an audio-visual installation which 
made use of brainwave headsets and heart rate monitors to collect biometric data (EEG 
and ECG) from the participants, the collected data then acting as triggers for sonic and 







Workshops were carried out on three days over the course of three weeks in which peer 
practitioners were trained to help facilitate the running of the event, particularly in how to 
assist the audience participants attending on the day. Participants were recruited one 
month in advance of the performance days in order to account for the fact that there had 
been too large of a knowledge gap in previous experiment-performances. An extensive 
framework of training and workshops was deemed necessary in order for participants to 
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have a command of their unconscious behaviour. The workshops explored how the 
collaborative performance techniques could be used to practice mindfulness. I ran the 
workshops with the help of experts in neuroscience and psychology. Participants were 
provided with a basic theoretical knowledge for understanding biofeedback loops and the 
opportunity to gain hands on experience with the hardware and software. The work 
workshops all took place at Talbot Mill during an open studio session. 
The first workshop provided an introduction to mindfulness, EEG brainwave activity 
and the ideas surrounding the biofeedback loop. The second workshop used the 
mindfulness techniques and EEG training from the first workshop to help refine the 
biofeedback system. This allowed the participants to get hands on with the EEG 
equipment, learn more in-depth about the brainwave activity and how they could harness 
it in a performance context. The final workshop involved the participants taking their new 
skills into a live installation where they were given the chance to train new performers who 
wanted to take part in the experiment. These workshops were open to all ages regardless 
of physical or mental abilities. People interested in meditation, mindfulness and improving 
their wellbeing using non-pharmacologic treatments were encouraged. We aimed for our 
workshops to be a collaborative process between workshop leaders and participants to 
learn more about the techniques of mindfulness. In this way, the aim was to bring together 
the explicit conceptual and academic ‘know-that’ of the peer educators with the critical 





Figure 45: Kaushal, V. (2019). The spatial arrangement of ​Verrfast ​ (2017) as a variation on 











Peer practitioners were recruited from a network of volunteers and experts on the 
Manchester Museum of Science and Industry (MOSI) emailing list. The call for volunteers 
was targeted at participants who had already indicated an interest in these areas, 
particularly from the field of neuroscience. We were able to recruit neuroscientist Dr. 
Jason Taylor from Manchester University and Dr. Aspasia Paltoglou from the psychology 
department of Manchester Metropolitan University. It was intended that these two doctors 
would steer and guide the use and interpretation of the data. Their assistance also 
allowed me to focus on engaging with the participants, encouraging a dynamic 
atmosphere of collaboration. The inclusion of people from a variety of backgrounds 
accorded with the principles of cybernetics as a field which attempts to bring together 
different disciplines in the interest of increasing variety and, therein, opportunities for 
identifying previously imperceptible interfaces between what might otherwise be deemed 
disparate forms of knowledge. 
There were a number of practical differences in this experiment-performance. First, 
it lasted for longer than those previous as the event took place over the course of three 
weeks. During this time, it was visited by 1,000 people which was in fact the smallest 
number of people to have attended any of the three public experiments-performances. 
The trickling footfall allowed myself and the peer participants to engage more deeply with 
visitors. It also allowed for further experimentation by the visitors as they were afforded 
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more time plugged in to the system. In turn, participants independently began to find other 
ways of affecting the performance other than through their brain activity and heart rate. 
There was a greater number of trained volunteers facilitating and managing participants 
than in previous experiments. Interestingly, they also partook in the performance as well 
when brainwave headsets and heart rate monitors became available, therein steering and 
shaping it themselves. 
The academics and peer practitioners provided a number of innovations to the 
system and performance. Dr. Jason Taylor produced a crib sheet with a clear set of 
actions and outputs which participants could use to help focus their minds—e.g. ‘count 
back from ten to help you focus, and the graphic on the screen in front of you will rotate 
slower.’ As in previous experiments, we found that participants were most fulfilled by the 
experience when they felt in command / control of the sonic and visual channels. 
Participants wanted to know that they were actually controlling the 3D graphic signature. 
One of the peer educators suggested the idea of using blinking as a way for people to see 
that they were actually controlling the objects in front of them. Blinking causes the muscles 
in the face and the forehead to contract, generating a noticeable data spike and therein 
clearly demonstrating the participants’ effect on the performance. Dr. Jason also 
introduced participants to mindfulness techniques such as controlling the breath in order 
to take command over one's heart rate. 
The aesthetic and spatial arrangement followed the precedent of the second 
experiment-performance whereby a semi-translucent screen was used (Figure 45). 
However, this time the instruments were configured slightly differently as each two-person 
‘bay’ had an independent system in which one participant wore the neuro brainwave 
headset and one wore the heart rate monitor. There was no averaging or combining of 
data from individuals as in experiment 3. Participants worked in tandem, with one person 
standing on each side of the screen. With four respective screens, heart rate monitors and 
brainwave headsets in use, there was more interaction between participants and 
spectators as there were more nodes in the network. Participants’ heart rates were 
represented by a glowing orb, pulsating and increasing and decreasing in scale. Each 
participant’s heart rate was also amplified through its own speaker and sonified. Rotation 
and size were mapped to attention / focus and meditation, respectively. Scale was 
mapped to meditation. At different points throughout the three days, we switched these 
around in order to find out what effect this would have on the participants and the 




















a. Theory and Practice Reflections 
 
i) On Pedagogy 
 
Theories of pedagogy both shaped and retroactively illuminated my practice. To elucidate 
this, I will detail the pedagogic role of the artist within socially engaged practice and, in 
turn, the example of cybernetic pedagogy offered by Roy Ascott’s work. 
Within social practice there are a number of approaches to pedagogy. Whilst 
always oriented around principles of collectivity, social practice can exhibit varying 
degrees of reflexive awareness of its position in, and impact on, wider society. In a review 
of Claire Bishop’s ​The Politics of Participatory Art ​(2015), D. M. Bell observes that, for 
Bishop, this question of ‘critical pedagogy’ is 
 
built on increasing the agency of the student in relation to the educator, in order that the 
curriculum be opened up to explore the diverse experiences present in the classroom, and 
the intersecting oppressions that produce them (Bell, 2015, p. 8). 
 
Herein, we encounter an emphasis on the ‘bottom up’ paradigm, an approach generally 
considered to be preferable in the world of socially engaged practice. However, during the 
experiment-performances I discovered that, by contrast, having someone to organise the 
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project from the ‘top down’ was useful. It allowed me to better coordinate and cohere what 
was afterall a complex and multifaceted network of interrelated processes. I was able to 
free my attention to push boundaries artistically and technologically. Of course, here the 
question of the roles of the artist and audience are central, as Bishop acknowledges. What 
I discovered was that the benefit of their mutability was in fact limited. Preserving the 
original, didactic paradigm was useful when ensuring the experiment-performance was 
carried out to the full extent of its ambitions and, indeed, that it could exceed them. 
This was achieved by introducing the peer educators. During the earlier 
experiments, the participants didn’t understand the technologies so they had to narrate 
their own versions of what was forming the abstract 3D signatures. At this later stage, 
participants began to understand the import and consequence of the headsets and 
brainwave software. By explaining the system, the participants’ intentional agency, or what 
Kujawski might simply call ‘thinking’ as a process of ‘individuation’, was enhanced 
(Kujawski, 2018, p. 3). Rather than being a receptacle through which the atmosphere is 
channelled, the participants were invested with sovereignty, becoming active agents 
rather than simply passive nodes in the network. In this way, the ‘concepts’ formed in the 
minds of the participants refer less to static objects than to processes of understanding: 
 
concept​ here refers to a cognitive process that maintains itself through “agreements” 
between pure ideations without privileging linguistic significations and semantic contents 
(Kujawski 2018, 3).​[…] [T]​he notion of concept we are dealing with is distant from the 
philosophical common sense (e.g., Hegel’s Begriff) (Kujawski, 2018, p. 3). 
 
Concepts are produced by and as extensions of situations. As such, it made sense that 
the brain wave data changed as the participants’ understanding of the system changed. 
The network of processes was never static, but continuously evolved, dissipated and 
reemerged through agreement, disagreement, discussion and conversation. 
By merging the roles of audience and artist whilst nevertheless preserving certain 
aspects of the traditional artist’s role, a particular breed of pedagogy emerged. Bell offers 
the following description of what this looks like within social practice: 
 
The educator's role, then, is not to introduce dissensus, but to facilitate a participatory (or 
'collaborative') space, which leads to the emergence of dissensual experiences that 
already exist within the social fabric (Bell, 2015, p. 8). 
 
The emphasis on pedagogy steadily increased throughout the experiments as I gradually 
allowed myself and the peer educators to have more and more input. This was partially 
due to me learning more about the system as I went along and, respectively, 
implementing feedback from the previous experiment-performances. In brief, I realised 
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there needed to be some kind of organisational agency. Though I recognised the value of 
the hands-off, bottom-up approach, I realised that stabilisers are nevertheless important to 
ensure a project’s direction and momentum are maintained. 
Roy Ascott’s teaching career offers some interesting points of contact and contrast 
when thinking these ideas through. He understood from as early as the 1970s how 
emerging digital technologies could be used by artists and how they would change how 
we conceive of art. In a review of ​Telematic Embrace ​by Roy Ascott, Char Davies details 
how (2018, p. 1), ‘as head of Foundation Studies at the Ealing College of Art in London 
(1961-64),’ Ascott ‘created what might be called a cybernetic art pedagogy.’ There, Davies 
explains, 
 
the classroom became a cybernetic studio, in which the artist could experiment with 
behavioral interactions among his students, and in which his students could learn some of 
the most advanced aesthetic theories firsthand, by participating in them (2018, p. 1). 
 
Ascott’s interest in developing new systems of learning was radical in the art world at that 
time, especially within art school pedagogy. What Ascott developed and then proceeded 
to question in the roles of the artist and audience was eventually played out for producers 
and consumers by the logic of prosumption (Toffler, 1980) and the mass amateurization of 
online content production (Kjaffe, 2009). Whilst the other cyberneticians we have 
discussed were scientists with artistic leanings, Ascott is an artist with scientific leanings. 
Claire Bishop critiques pedagogy within social practice, whereas Ascott does so from the 
perspective of cybernetics. As such, despite surface-level differences, these two strands 
of thought actually have much in common. 
 
 
ii) On Scaffolding 
 
A further term which offers an alternative mode of analysing this experiment-performance 
is the principle of ‘scaffolding’. Similar to the concept of pedagogy, scaffolding describes 
how a system is assembled in such a way as to maximise participants’ understanding of 
their role and impact. It is a term often used in linguistics to describe the notion that, in 
order to have a conversation, you have to possess a certain level of prior contextual 
knowledge—whether, for example, in the form of frames of reference, or even just the 
base conventions of discourse. Whilst popularised as a linguistic concept (Davis, 2004), 
the term ‘scaffolding’ is also found in cybernetics. Memory, scaffolding, embodiment, and 
situatedness build on one another. Pedagogy is directed at understanding the processes 
which take place within each individual’s interaction with a system. In general, some 
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people learn better by way of certain metaphoric or analogistic mnemonic narratives. As 
such, pedagogical techniques must always be adapted to the particulars of a given 
scenario. These specific frameworks are called ‘scaffolding’. 
To get the most out of the project, the participants needed to understand the 
internal processes. Scaffolding is the means by which knowledge of the contextualising 
processes and apparatuses is transferred to the individuals involved. Previously, even 
though the experiments were aesthetically successful, fulfilled the commission criteria, 
and interested audiences, participants still wanted to know more about how they could 
more precisely control the system. Having command over it is what makes it an interesting 
and engaging process. For instance, when we blink, a sizable electrical impulse is 
generated to move the necessary muscles, noticeably changing the graphic signature. 
Due to the fact that blinking is readily perceptible, people immediately realise that they are 
actually having an effect. However, even more powerful is to feel oneself controlling the 
signatures by cognition processes invisible to the naked eye, such as concentrating or 
meditating. The participants’ brainwave data corresponds to a number of different 
cognitive processes and sensory perceptions. As such, a rigorous scaffolding was 
introduced to nurture the participants’ awareness of how their less apparent cognitive 
processes influenced the graphic signatures. 
When participants learn about how the system responds to certain inputs, this 
knowledge is internalised and stored as memory. In earlier cybernetic research and in 
later studies of AI, the computer was used as a metaphor to understand cognition and 
memory. However, recent studies and research have contributed to undermining the 
credibility of this metaphor, exposing it as over-simplifying and reductive. Instead, 
cognition is coming to be understood as ‘embodied’ and memory is increasingly regarded 
as a ‘process’ (Ziemke 2005). The conventional and traditional concept of memory is 
characterised as a site in the mind in which 'objects' are stored and from which they can 
be retrieved. However, in an article by Tom Ziemke concerning ‘the relevance of Heinz 
von Foerster’s work to modern embodied cognitive science and artificial intelligence 
research’ (2005, p. 118), what Ziemke refers to as the ‘traditional “fridge-theory of 
memory”’ is replaced by the concept of memory as a set of dynamic processes (p. 122). 
Giving the example of a robot, the term memory designates a system wherein certain 
reflexes are recalled to respond to particular actions and events. Scaffolding, the term we 
have been reflecting on, supports memory as a function of learning: 
 
what the memory does instead is to adjust the robot’s modus operandi to the situations it is 
about to encounter. […] [T]hey typically succeed by exploiting the environment as a 
“scaffold” guiding their behavior and by suitably adjusting their own ​modus operandi​ to deal 
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with future situations. That means, instead of remembering the past in the traditional 
sense, they are “remembering how to behave” (2005, p. 124). 
 
Ziemke argues memory is not a storage space but a set of processes. This description 
also takes us away from the aesthetic to re-align us with the concept of behaviour. We 
adjust our behaviour to the environment, and the environment is constituted by other 
agents doing exactly the same thing. 
 
 
b. Personal observations 
 
i) Implementation of Cybernetics 
 
When I began developing these experiments, my approach was experimental and 
'trial-and-error' based. By the end of the experiments, I returned to a more streamlined, 
top-down approach. I established that the system needed to be explained to people as 
soon as they came through the door. For example, participants in the previous 
experiments were very interested in the heart rate monitors and the brainwave data, so 
this time I explained those in advance to avoid having to repeat ourselves as we had done 
previously. In sum, it was a much more conventional mode of carrying out the process. 
As early as the 1960s, cybernetic practitioners were engaged in a holistic array of 
practices, ranging from traditional scientific pursuits to quasi-spiritual experiments, 
carrying out seances and discussing the possibility of a collective consciousness, all while 
researching machine learning. However, this union receded. Whilst they had understood 
that the study of consciousness, AI, conversation theory, and the body were all relatable 
under the mantle of cybernetics, such endeavours are now regarded as clearly distinct 
from one another. If cybernetics had secured itself as a credible mainstream mode of 
enquiry, we would be teaching young people that mindfulness was part of science. We 
would be teaching the theory of the sensorium, how knowledge is produced, and a more 
holistic framework of how the body functions in specific situations. These would have 
remained scientific concerns rather than being relegated to philosophy. Instead, these 
disciplines went through a process of atomisation. My project attempts to extend what 
past cyberticians had endeavoured to promote along these lines. Rather than ridiculing 
the practitioners for conducting seances, doing yoga and meditating, I see these as part of 
a holistic, situated practice. These principles align with Ziemke’s analysis of an alternative 
model of conceiving of memory. Respectively, against the atomic paradigm, Ziemke 





emphasize, in line with radical constructivist views such as Heinz von Foerster’s, the 
importance of embodiment and situatedness, […]as central to the emergence of cognitive 
processes (2015, p. 125). 
 
Cybernetics has greatly shaped my own theory and practice. Whilst I am educated 
in the arts, my knowledge and understanding of neuroscience is much more limited. 
However, I recognise the importance of placing them in dialogue with one another. During 
my time in formal art education, digital technologies were emerging as tools, techniques, 
and mediums and research which sought to bring studies of consciousness together with 
aesthetic concerns was limited. My experiment-performances reintroduced these 
disciplines to one another. 
 
 
ii) Implementation of Social Practice 
 
This section provides personal observations on the experiment’s implementation of social 
practice. Claire Bishop argues that social practice can often lack critical reflexivity. In this 
context, reflexivity means being able to recognise that one’s participation is always 
situated within a further context of wider feedback loops. Social practice is complicated 
insofar as it involves conversation and, as Pask and Pangaro explain, conversation isn’t 
merely linguistic; it’s also behavioural. That is what their experiments are concerned with 
and yet we are only beginning, fifty years later, to arrive at a place technologically where a 
machine can be involved in conversation in the way people like Ascott and Pask would 
have wished. Even so, human-machine conversations are still significantly behind the 
complexity and sophistication of human-human conversations. 
What Bishop critiques of social practice in the field of ‘relational aesthetics’, Ascott 
recognises in a different forum. However, his work falls short of illustrating a fully-formed 
reflexive stance insofar as it defaults to developing rudimentary machines with minimal 
inputs and outputs. Due to technological limitations, he has never been able to create a 
sufficiently sophisticated example of the principle of reflexivity. Whilst he is indeed aware 
of the complexity of the feedback loops between humans and machines, his work is either 
reduced of this dynamism or remains hypothetical. 
What Bishop perhaps fails to identify is that there are ways in which artworks 
which might seem unreflexive can nevertheless exhibit reflexivity on the level of form. 
Ascott argues that we have simply not yet developed sufficiently sophisticated AI to 
facilitate a truly dynamic UI. It is worth recalling that the work that people like Ascott and 
Pask did was outside the traditional route for research and funding meaning progress has 
inevitably been slow. However, the obstacles are being identified and recorded. Taking 
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stock of what technological advances have been made, Ascott believes the requisite 





a. Reflections on Theory 
 
In the final experiment-performance it was the introduction of the peer educators which 
developed the project furthest from its earlier iterations. From one angle, their presence 
reintroduced the model of the artist at the top of the hierarchy of roles as they steered the 
experience and interactions of the audience with the artwork. They brought their own 
pedagogical style (an example of one p-individual in operation) which differed from my 
own. Whilst I was interested in discovering what was going on in more depth as far as 
brain activity, the peer educators instead directed their attention to producing the greatest 
level of influence by the participants on the system, introducing crib sheets which gave 
suggestions to the participants on certain actions and thought processes which would be 
likely to produce the most noticeable results. In this sense, the traditional role of artist was 
subverted insofar as it became distributed between myself and the peer educators, and 
respectively between each of the different peer educators among themselves. 
The concept of scaffolding is close to pedagogy but instead describes the tools 
and infrastructure needed for learning to take place. Pedagogy, on the other hand, 
describes the system and decisions which determine the kind of scaffolding employed, 
depending on the context and end goal. In a sense, my pedagogy led me to introduce the 
peer educators as a form of scaffolding to enable greater learning about the system by the 
participants. The peer educators had their own pedagogy which led them to introduce crib 
sheets as another more discrete form of scaffolding. Whilst my background in social work 
was such that I introduced various tropes from the discipline (sitting in circles, 
workshopping the process, encouraging a relaxed, social atmosphere, for example), their 
scientific backgrounds provided the experience that counting down from ten would 




b. Testing and development 
 
The involvement of the doctors and scientists was a convenient way of beginning to think 
about the project within a more explicitly academic framework. Following their introduction 
to the process, it became clearer how to structure the ideas around various themes to do 
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with not only participation and interactivity but also problems of consciousness and 
mind-body dualism. Following a supervisory meeting to agree on the structure of this 
write-up, I went on to read more about these areas in order to better understand the 
current state of the discourse on AI, machine learning, and to gain a more philosophical 
understanding of these issues. 
A principal outcome was that I was able to see the project as a whole. More 
specifically to this experiment-performance, the artist resurfaced as a central role, and so I 
concluded that in fact this is not necessarily antithetical to challenging the divisions 
between the roles or artist, audience and artwork as it was only by taking more of an 
active part in the process that the audience participation was increased. In turn, this was 
offset by the fact that control was relinquished to the peer educators; their being able to 
introduce their own objectives inevitably dispersed responsibility and authorship, steering 








Having detailed the content of the experiment-performances in how they challenged the 
divisions between the roles of artist, audience and artwork, this section will return to the 
discourses of biofeedback, cybernetics, and social practice. It will show how my own 
project contributes to their respective questions and wider concerns. To do so, I will recap 
the stages of the project across each experiment-performance before critically reflecting 
on the key findings, shortcomings and obstacles faced during its course. I will then 
propose potential solutions which could be implemented and other conceptual frameworks 
which could be explored in future research. Before going into depth, a summary of the 
experiment-performances and their key findings are outlined in tables below which 




2. Summary and Key Findings Tables 
 
The following tables outline how each experiment-performance contributed to the 
objectives and their respective variables, equipment and outputs. It also overviews the key 






objectives in addressing 
research question 
 
Variables  Equipment  Outputs 
1. ​System Undertook technical 
research – tests of 
equipment, processes and 
methods which facilitated 
the production of a system 
that could collect and 
represent biometric data 
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used to create a 
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between the 









Increased the number of 
participants and therefore 
the number of inputs to 
the audiovisual outputs of 
the system. Also 
introduced the system into 
a live performance 
context, thereby 
introducing an ‘audience’ 





























devices whose data 
readings were 
visualised and 
sonified to form a 
biofeedback loop. 
As well as this, the 
work produced the 
outcome of a 
further commission 




3. ​Zugzwang Granted participants 
greater control of the 
biometric devices and 
combined their data to 
form a ‘conversation’, 
resulting in more 
















projector screens (x 












devices but this 
time combining 
their data to form a 
collective 
biofeedback loop. 
This also resulted 
in a further 
commission. 
4.​ Verrfast Hosted workshops with 
peer educators to provide 
the participants with a 
deeper understanding of 
the biometric devices, 
increasing their level of 
authorship. I also made 
participants work in pairs 
to explore the different 
kinds of interactions 
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devices but this 
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their data in pairs to 
form a collective 



















 Existing Knowledge 
Summary Details  
The implementation of 
biofeedback in audio-visual 
performances can 
challenge the traditional 
divisions between roles of 
artist, audience and 
artwork. 
This is achieved by bringing together 
the technologies of biofeedback with 
the cybernetic principles of 
interactivity and the social practices 
principles of participation. 
Builds upon Pask, Glynn and 
Matarasso, extending their 
work by combining the 
cybernetic principle of 
interactivity, the social 
practice principle of 
participation and the 
implementation of 
biofeedback 
 When successful, the work modelled 
something akin to Pask’s concept of 
‘Aesthetically Potent Environments’. 
Builds upon Pask and 
Ascott, developing their 
models by implementing 
biofeedback 
The frameworks of social 
practice and cybernetics 
strengthened the challenge 
to the divisions between the 
roles of artist, audience and 
artwork. 
The social practice principle of 
participation produces the opportunity 
for interdisciplinary conversation. 
Builds upon Bey, Moten and 
Harney by producing an 
artwork which models their 
theories 
 Cybernetics (interaction) combined 
with biofeedback produces the 
experience of integration, 
embodiment and situatedness. 
Builds upon Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty by producing 
an artwork which models 
their theories of 
phenomenology 
 Combining interdisciplinary 
conversation with the experience of 
embodiment, situatedness and 
integration challenges the even more 
fundamental divisions between the 
categories of human, technology, 
environment, and between the mind 
and body, and the individual and the 
collective (see figures 51 and 52). 
Builds upon phenomenology, 
posthumanism, social 
practice and cybernetics in 
general by producing an 
artwork which models their 
theories 
However, there is a limit to 
the degree to which 
cybernetics and social 
practice support challenging 
the divisions between the 
roles. 
Participation for its own sake distracts 
from the experience of integration, 
embodiment and situatedness. 
Builds upon Matarasso and 
Bishop by exposing the limits 
of participation when 
producing artworks 
 Interaction and biofeedback for their 
own sake devolve into 
technofetishism. 
Builds upon Glynn and Pask 
by exposing the limits of 
interaction when producing 
artworks 
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3. What I Did: 
 
Before detailing the discoveries made, I will first outline what took place across the course 
of the experiment-performances. 
The first step was to develop a system which allowed for the implementation of 
biofeedback in audio-visual performances. This was achieved using a combination of 
software and hardware which were tested for suitability. Having done so, I implemented 
the biofeedback system in a live performance context, inviting participants from the 
audience to take part in the system, forming a biofeedback loop with their biometric data 
and responding to the representations of this data in realtime. I aimed at producing a 
system which enabled interaction between the roles of artist, audience and artwork so as 
to challenge the traditional divisions between them. This was principally achieved through 
the use of biofeedback and was supported in the particular ways in which the system and 
the space were set up. 
By implementing biofeedback into an audiovisual performance, my impression 
from the feedback from participants and audience members in general was that this had 
been successful. The participants expressed that they felt they had been able to influence 
the performance and, alongside this, in many cases they described it as having provided 
them with a ‘meaningful experience’. In response to this feedback, I scaled the system 
and performance, allowing more participants to take part by introducing more headsets. 
By the final experiment-performance, I was inspired to introduce more scaffolding 
in the form of workshops to aid their understanding of how the system worked. Whilst 
many participants had said they felt able to influence the performance, this was 
accompanied by other feedback from some of the participants who described having 
nevertheless felt that it was sometimes unclear to what extent their participation had 
indeed had an effect on the performance, therefore suggesting that there was still greater 
room for further challenging the divisions between the roles of the artist and audience. 
Moreover, by introducing experts in psychology and neuroscience, I also had hoped to 
gain a greater understanding of what the participants were referring to when they 
described having a 'meaningful experience', or what was taking place psychologically and 
/ or neurologically that induced them to do so. Contrary to what I had expected, this 
introduction of workshops and peer practitioners to the process did not support the use of 
the system technologies to aid the performance but rather focussed attention away from it 





4. What I Found: 
 
a) The success of biofeedback 
 
The implementation of biofeedback in audio-visual performances can challenge the 
traditional divisions between roles of artist, audience and artwork. This is achieved by 
bringing together the technologies of biofeedback with the cybernetic principles of 
interactivity and the social practices principles of participation. When successful, the 
experiment-performances modelled something akin to Pask’s concept of Aesthetically 
Potent Environments. 
 
i) Interactivity and participation 
 
This is achieved by bringing together the technologies of biofeedback with the cybernetic 
principles of interactivity and the social practice principles of participation. By using 
biometric devices to create biofeedback loops and implementing these in a participatory 
performance, I was able to create new systems for interaction between the roles of artist, 
audience and artwork. The cybernetic principle of interaction and the social practice 
principle of participation supported this project. The two words have slightly different 
connotations, and by bringing them together I was able to address the different aspects of 
the research question to which they pertain. 
Rather than simply being involved in its production, Francois Matarsso (2018) 
contends that ‘participatory art’ involves the participants’ intentions steering the direction 
of the work in a dynamic relationship, whereby influence is reciprocally made and felt by 
all those involved. By contrast, interactive art allows for audience members to influence 
the work with which they are engaged. True interactivity, as opposed to mere reactivity, 
means ‘interaction as a conversational activity between participants’ (Glynn 2016, p. 1), 
wherein the system adapts and changes to the inputs from the audience, whose own 
inputs are in turn affected by the response from the system with which they are engaged. 
Where interaction describes a more tangible, immediate relationship to an object or 
technology, participation examines the individual themselves and their relationship to the 
system as a whole—both in terms of its internal properties and its contexts of reception 
and production. Interaction insists upon scrutinizing the nature of the role of the artwork, 
whereas participation looks at the context and makeup of the audience. Bringing them 
together in the performance, I was able to challenge division between the roles involved. 
This can also be thought of in relation to the distinction made by Christy Mag Uidhir 
between collective production and collective authorship. The greater the level of 
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interaction and participation, the more the audience were able to author their environment 
as artists in their own right. 
 
 
ii) Aesthetically Potent Environments 
 
Ultimately, what was discovered was that the kinds of artworks which seem to challenge 
the traditional divisions between the roles of artist, audience and artwork are those which 
model the principles of ‘Aesthetically Potent Environments’. As outlined by Pask in 1971, 
these are: 
 
I – It must offer sufficient ​variety ​ to provide the potentially ​controllable ​ variety [in Ashby’s 
terms] required by a man (however, it must not swamp him with variety—if it did, the  
environment would be merely ​unintelligible​). 
 
II – It must contain forms that a man can learn to interpret at various levels of ​abstraction​. 
 
III – It must provide ​cues​ or tacitly stated ​instructions​ to guide the ​learning ​ process. 
 
IV – It may, in addition, ​respond ​ to a man, engage him in ​conversation​ and adapt its 
characteristics to the ​prevailing mode of discourse​ [my italics] (Pask 1971, p. 76). 
 
Aesthetically potent environments are directed at producing the opportunity for 
‘conversation’ via participation and interactivity. Across each experiment-performance, 
their principles were addressed in the following ways. Throughout, ‘variety’ was pursued 
by first of all testing out different types of data: from heart rate to temperature and facial 
expression. These were then whittled down in order for the system to be sufficiently 
‘controllable’. From the second to the fourth experiment, the number of participants was 
also increased and decreased in view of balancing, respectively, variety and controllability. 
Avoiding unintelligibility was supported by the ‘instructions’ and ‘cues’ during the fourth 
experiment-performance in the shape of the crib sheets and the conversations I had with 
the participants throughout the entire process. These allowed the participants to ‘respond’ 
to the system in the manner of a ‘conversation’ as they sufficiently understood how it 
worked such that they could interact with it. Also in the fourth experiment-performance, the 
participants respective interests in meditation, mindfulness, consciousness and 
neuroscience, alongside the newness of the technologies used (such as the brainwave 
headsets), provided the points of contact with ‘prevailing mode[s] of discourse’, whilst also 
no doubt contributing to the degree to which the work invited engagement. 
In turn, this aligns with the behavioural model of art envisioned by Ascott, who 
compares the traditional modalities of ‘painting and sculpture’ for which ‘the channel of 
communication remains largely visual’ with a new kind of art whose modalities are ‘tactile, 
postural, aural[…] so that a more inclusive term than “visual” art must be found’ which he 
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proposes as ‘“behavioral”’ (Ascott R., 2008, p. 110). By employing biofeedback, I 
attempted to respond to the theories of Pask and Ascott, creating artworks which 
extended their ideas to become truly interactive and participatory systems, composed of 
images, sounds and behaviour. 
 
 
b) Social practice and cybernetics 
 
i) Interdisciplinary conversation 
 
The frameworks of social practice and cybernetics strengthened the challenge to the 
divisions between the roles of artist, audience and artwork. Social practice (participation) 
produces the opportunity for interdisciplinary conversation. In turn, cybernetics 
(interaction) combined with biofeedback produces the experience of integration, 
embodiment and situatedness. Combining these together challenges the even more 
fundamental divisions between the categories of human, technology, environment, and 
between the mind and body, and the individual and the collective. 
The social practice principle of participation produces the opportunity for 
interdisciplinary conversation. The participatory aspects of the project, such as the 
inclusion of different practitioners from different fields and inclusion of audience members, 
and the fact that those involved could have an influence on the work at all, produced an 
interdisciplinary conversation. In this respect, the experiment-performances produced the 
possibility for what Fred Moten and Stefano Harney call ‘study’. Moten and Harney subvert 
the traditional notion that ‘study’ is a solitary activity, repurposing it to describe what they 
believe it actually to be, which is a social event: 
 
When I think about the way we use the term ‘study,’ I think we are committed to the idea 
that study is what you do with other people. It’s talking and walking around with other 
people, working, dancing, suffering, some irreducible convergence of all three, held under 
the name of speculative practice. The notion of a rehearsal – being in a kind of workshop, 
playing in a band, in a jam session, or old men sitting on a porch, or people working 
together in a factory – there are these various modes of activity. The point of calling it 
‘study’ is to mark that the incessant and irreversible intellectuality of these activities is 
already present. These activities aren’t ennobled by the fact that we now say, “oh, if you 
did these things in a certain way, you could be said to be have been studying.” To do these 
things is to be involved in a kind of common intellectual practice. What’s important is to 
recognize that that has been the case – because that recognition allows you to access a 
whole, varied, alternative history of thought (Harney and Moten 2013, p. 110). 
 
Ultimately what the experiment-performances showed was that these social 
experiences produce the greatest possibility for conversation in every sense. Hakim Bey 





The essence of the party: face-to-face, a group of humans synergize their efforts to realize 
[sic] mutual desires, whether for good food and cheer, dance, conversation, the arts of life; 
perhaps even for erotic pleasure, or to create a communal artwork, or to attain the very 
transport of bliss—in short, a “union of egoists” (as Stirner put it) in its simplest form—or 
else, in Kropotkin’s terms, a basic biological drive to “mutual aid” (Bey 1994, p. 104). 
 
 
By modelling this kind of experience, the experiment-performances provided a framework 
to encourage interdisciplinary conversations. This project is situated somewhere between 
happenings and parties with which it shares the purpose of people coming together for a 
common goal. This was especially so by the final experiment-performance which brought 
together a number of collaborators in informal workshops to share ideas and collaborate. 
Much like the sites Moten, Harney and Bey identify, the experiment-performances brought 
together a wider variety of different people with their own diverse forms of knowledge into 
non-hierarchical organisational structures. In this way, the party presents a different way 
of organising an otherwise disparate set of people around a common pursuit of enjoyment 
and pleasure. There is a levelling effect produced by this equality of purpose, wherein 
each participant’s usual role outside the space is suspended in favour of a new, common 
role. In this respect, the social dimensions of the experiment-performances inadvertently 
produce the possibility for interdisciplinary conversations. 
Social practice describes a mode of artistic production which foregrounds process, 
participation and an emphasis on contextual considerations (ranging from audience to 
site), but it also rests upon an often unstated presupposition of what the ‘social’ aspect of 
its practice is. Harney and Moten (2013) outline a vision of social practice by repurposing 
the terms ‘planning’ and ‘study’. To ‘plan’, by their proposed redefinition, 
 
 
is to invent the means in a common experiment launched from any kitchen, any back 
porch, any basement, any hall, any park bench, any improvised party, every night. This 
ongoing experiment with the informal, carried out by and on the means of social 
reproduction, as the to come of the forms of life, is what we mean by planning; planning in 
the undercommons is not an activity, not fishing or dancing or teaching or loving, but the 
ceaseless experiment with the futurial presence of the forms of life that make such 
activities possible. It is these means that were eventually stolen by, in having been willingly 
given up to, state socialism whose perversion of planning was a crime second only to the 
deployment of policy in today’s command economy (2013, pp. 74-5). 
 
 
The often overlooked question of what is distinctly ‘social’ about a given form of art 
production applies as readily to the ‘social basis’ of cybernetics which we outlined earlier. 
‘Study’, as Moten puts it, locates such activity in already existing social life: ‘study is what 
you do with other people’ (2013, p. 110). By introducing the system I developed into a live 
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performance environment and inviting the audience to participate in it, the work 
immediately became invested with the dynamism and serendipity which becomes possible 
as unplanned interactions are able to take place. 
 
ii) Integration, embodiment and situatedness 
 
The cybernetic principle of interaction combined with biofeedback produces the 
experience of integration, embodiment and situatedness. My experiment-performances 
drew upon this heterogeneity of knowledge forms to explore how the roles involved in the 
performance of art could interact. The interactive aspects of the project were the feedback 
loop itself and how it captured and represented the data in such a way as to reintroduce 
the responses by the participants back into the system. Other interactive aspects include 
the scaffolding of the workshops, the explanations offered to the participants during each 
performance of how to use the technology, and the conversations between the audience 
and the artist. Participation describes the inclusion of other actors who have a role in its 
production and whose intentions are imprinted on the work. Interaction is the quality of the 
relationship between them such that this influence is rendered and then felt, thereby 
causing a feedback loop between the participant, the artefact, and the system itself. In the 
process, what was made felt and understood was the embodiment of the mind and, in 
turn, the situatedness of the mind and body in the social. 
This discovery hails back to the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In a chapter 
of ​Phenomenology of Perception​ (1945) entitled ‘The Synthesis of One’s Own Body’, he 
discusses the ways in which embodiment and spatiality exist as forms of experience 
beyond being empirical facts (2002, pp. 171-8). ‘To be a body, is to be tied to a certain 
world, as we have seen; our body is not primarily in space: it is of it’ writes Merleau-Ponty 
(p. 171), before going on to suggest that ‘the body is to be compared, not to a physical 
object, but rather to a work of art’ (p. 174) for ‘it is a nexus of living meanings’ (p. 175). 
The significance of this to the final experiment is two-fold: foremost, the system is invested 
in bringing awareness to this situatedness of the body as it is integrated with others in, 
and of, its environment. Following which, by making the participants aware of how the 
relationship between their embodied place in the performance system and the effect of 
this on their unconscious activity, they were brought into contact with the ‘meaning’ of this 
fact: that their individual role was in fact situated and integrated in a wider social whole. 
Consciousness of this then has a reciprocal impact on how the participants think about 
and perceive the technology itself. As Merleau-Ponty has it, ‘once the stick has become a 
familiar instrument, the world of feelable things recedes and now begins, not at the outer 
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skin of the hand, but at the end of the stick (175-6). Phenomenology addresses the body 
as a site of meaning, and my experiment-performances attempted to produce the kinds of 
experiences which make this felt. The reason and basis for this is that being made aware 
of one’s embodiment in turn produces consciousness of the situatedness and integration 
of one’s experience. The system coalesced a set of technologies which made it possible 
to comprehend how our bodies are situated in wider social networks, which are in turn 
simply an extended set of neural networks: complex systems nested in complex systems. 
 
 
Figure 51: A diagram illustrating the simultaneously integrated and situated relationships between 
humans, technologies and nature. 
 
By combining interdisciplinary conversation with the experience of embodiment, 
situatedness and integration, the experiment-performances provided the experience of 
challenging the divisions between the categories of human, technology, environment, and 
between the mind and body, and the individual and the collective. As the divisions 
between the roles of artist, audience and artwork rest upon these even more fundamental 





Figure 52: A diagram illustrating the simultaneously integrated and situated relationships between 
artists, audiences and artworks. 
 
Evolving from the original schema of the integrated and situated relationships between the 
roles, the process of carrying out the experiment performances revealed how both 
paradigms operate simultaneously. The extent to which they do rests upon the level of 
interaction and participation involved. 
 
 
c) The limits of cybernetics and social practice 
 
i) The pitfalls of participation 
 
However, there is a limit to the degree to which cybernetics and social practice support 
challenging the divisions between the roles. Participation for its own sake distracts from 
the experience of integration, embodiment and situatedness. In the first experiment, there 
was no performance, so no audience. In the first experiment-performance (and second 
experiment), the audience described having the experience of what I describe as 
integration, embodiment and situatedness. In the second experiment-performance, though 
there was an increased amount of technology which theoretically should have scaled up 
this experience, it in fact was lessened. By the final experiment-performance, in which 
there was the greatest degree of scaffolding to further increase participation, contrary to 




What this seemed to demonstrate was that participation on its own is not sufficient 
to produce what Bishop refers to as an ‘aesthetic’ experience. Further still, measurement 
of a work only in relation to its degree of participation—where the more participatory it is, 
the better it is considered—can actually hinder the work from achieving this (Bishop, 2012, 
pp. 11-40). If ‘the quality of the relationships’ produced by social practice artworks ‘are 
never examined or called into question’, then ‘all relations that permit “dialogue” are 
automatically assumed to be democratic and therefore good’ (Bishop, 2004, p. 65). This 
was shown not to be the case as on many occasions in the third and fourth 
experiment-performances, the quality of audience participation lacked interactivity; rather 
than engaging in the performance as a dynamic and reciprocal process (in keeping with 
Pask’s theory of conversation), the audience simply 'reacted' and became infatuated with 
the technology for its own sake. Even providing a deeper understanding of how the 
technology worked in the final experiment-performance was not sufficient to induce the 
experience of embodiment, integration and situatedness. For instance, in an effort to 
explain the system, the goal of the peer-educators was reduced to simply demonstrating 
to participants a clear correlation between their brainwaves and the audiovisual signatures 
(by blinking, for example). Despite securing their active engagement with the devices, the 
opportunities for the serendipitous, emergent properties of the performance as an 





This brings us to the final point which is that interaction and biofeedback for their own 
sake devolve into technofetishism. Among the main problems encountered across the 
entirety of the project, perhaps the most consistent was that participants were susceptible 
to being seduced by the technology. Instead of it being deployed as a means to providing 
a deeper understanding of the experiences I facilitated, participants often became 
preoccupied by the tools themselves. This applied both to the participants from the 
audience and the peer educators who helped with the final experiment performance. To a 
certain extent, this was due to the fact that the technologies were new to me and my 
understanding of them was limited to being able to use them, not how their internal 
mechanisms actually worked. As such, many of the participants were enthralled by the 
technologies themselves rather than being interested in putting them into use. With that 
said, the doctors who did understand the internal processes taking place still became 
distracted by their rudimentary uses. Therefore, it seemed that perhaps if I had allowed 
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participants, including the doctors, more time to become familiar with using them, we 
might have arrived eventually at thinking more deeply about what was taking place 
between the technologies, the brain, and the more profound experiences described to me 
by the participants. Participants took less of a serious interest in the implications behind 
the system, becoming enthralled by the technology rather than engaging deeply with the 
questions it raised about consciousness and the role of the audience in the production of 
art. To refer back to Merleau-Ponty, the point at which the stick stops being novel or alien 
is the point it becomes an extension of the arm. Indeed, in this respect, it was the second 
experiment-performance which came closest to galvanising this kind of response. As the 
performances became more regulated and controlled, the actual aspects of the work as a 




5. Shortcomings and Future Research 
 
The shortcomings and proposals for future research is divided into two sections: 
theoretical observations and practical suggestions. In the former, I detail how by the end 
of the experiment-performances I arrived at a fundamental question concerning the 
categorisation of the project as an artwork, followed by a discussion of a field of 
philosophy known as somaesthetics which might supplement future research on this topic. 
In the latter, I propose possible changes that could be implemented in similar projects and 




i) The category of art 
 
The emergence of the ‘meaningful experience’ which certain audience members 
described called into question the very categorisation of the project as art. By introducing 
this concept of a ‘meaningful experience’ as a criterion at all, it brought to my attention the 
fact that the work could be argued simply to consist of a designer, audience, and 
system—as opposed to an artist, audience and artwork. Without producing this 
experience of integration, embodiment and situatedness, there is no definitive reason to 
regard the system and its performance as an artwork. It could more simply be described 
as: a system, users, and observers. What actually transfigured the work into being 
something more akin to art was the more profound, evocative experience the participants 
described as ‘meaningful’—an experience I am attributing to the more precise experience 
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of integration with the other participants and the environment, the embodiment of the mind 
in a network of biological and technological apparatuses, and the situatedness of the 
individuals involved in a wider collective network. This experience could be understood in 
Bishop’s sense of the ‘aesthetic’ as the unique capacity of art to harness feelings to 
produce such cognisance of the contingencies underlying the divisions between these 
manmade categories. Overly focussing on the technology or emphasising the participation 
for its own sake distracted from this experience, which arguably was the difference 
between the work being a system and the system being transformed into the status of an 
artwork. 
This oversight can be attributed on one level to the absence of any criteria for 
defining art against any system which harnesses formal and stylistic qualities to 
produce entertainment or pleasure. Whilst no doubt a feature of many artworks, the 
experience of entertainment or pleasure alone seem insufficient to define artworks in the 
presence of this other experience which the participants seemed to have, and one which 
seemed to bear upon much deeper and more profound questions underlying the research 
question itself. To recall, my objectives to address the research question were as follows: 
 
a. Design a system capable of connecting audience biometric data with the 
audiovisual material 
b. Implement a feedback loop between the data and the performance 
software 
c. Iterate the design across multiple experiment-performances 
d. Implement changes based on knowledge gained in each 
experiment-performance 
 
Whilst the internal differences and multiple statuses of the roles of artist, audience and 
artwork were addressed (for instance, in the distinction between the performance and the 
experiment or between authorship and producership) in the Experiment-Performance 
section, at no point did I attempt to rigorously define what defines art in the first place. In a 
certain sense, this does not conflict with much of the knowledge produced in terms of how, 
taking the definition as given, the roles of the artist, audience and artwork intersect with 
each other when implementing biofeedback in live audiovisual performances. The 
relationships and their blurring remain. However, no doubt some further knowledge would 
be gained were I to have attempted to define art more precisely during this process as it 
would have been more able to be compared to and distinguished against the roles of, for 








As to developing the project further, somaesthetics is a field I did not explore in detail but 
which concerns many of the same issues as those discussed above. At its base, 
somaesthetics unites the study of aesthetics with the study of embodied experience. 
Originally introduced to me by way of George Khut’s work, somaesthetics is concerned 
with the study of the perception of the body. Named by philosopher Richard Shusterman 
and derived from the Greek words ​soma​, meaning body, and ​aesthesis​, meaning sensory 
perception, somaesthetics attempts to redress the ways in which the body has historically 
been perceived as subordinate to the mind and separate from it. This is approached from 
both theoretical and practical angles, bringing together different disciplines, from the arts 
to medicine, to reformat how we think about the embodied nature of consciousness and 
perception. Within somaesthetics, art is studied and proposed as a valuable way of 
producing experiences which expose the fallacy of this mind-body dualism. In an article 
entitled, ‘Body and the Arts: The Need for Somaesthetics’ (2012), Shusterman begins by 
stating the underlying premise of somaesthetics in general: 
 
the body is not only an essential dimension of our humanity (expressing all the ambiguities 
that humanity entails); it is also the basic medium through which we live and the 
fundamental instrument for all performance, our tool of tools, a necessity for all our 
perception, action, and even thought. My project of somaesthetics – aimed at improving 
the understanding and cultivation of the body as a central site of perception, performance, 
and creative self-expression – is based on that premise (p. 7). 
 
Shusterman proposes art can be a site at which such understanding is cultivated. Indeed, 
our experiment-performances united mind and body through the system of biofeedback, 
exposing the mind’s embodiment and, respectively, the situatedness of the body within 
wider networks of social relations. For Shusterman, 
 
the arts can help us escape the wrongheaded limitations of the sharp dualism between 
means and ends. The means or instrumentalities used to achieve something are not 
necessarily outside the ends they serve; they can be an essential part of them (p. 18). 
 
By literally placing the participants in a biofeedback loop where their unconscious activity 
was rendered as physical, visible information, the dualism was dissolved. Its fallacy is 
simply obscured by our limited faculties of perception, and this was overcome through the 
use of biometric devices and audiovisual renderings of the data. 
In his book ​Body Consciousness​ (2008), Shusterman elaborates upon the ways in 
which these perceived bifurcations are normalised. Quoting the work of the philosopher 
John Dewey in ​John Dewey: The Later Works: 1925–1953​, he explores the ways in which 




Our bodies (like our thoughts) are thus paradoxically always more and less than our own. 
As Dewey pithily puts it, we “live...as much in processes across and ‘through’ skins as in 
processes ‘within’ skins”[…]. The semipermeable boundary of our skin is a natural somatic 
symbol for the merely semi-autonomous status of our selfhood. Being constituted by its 
environmental relations, the self is ultimately defined by Dewey as “transactional.” He 
preferred this term to “interactional,” which he thought implied greater separation and 
independence[…]. Though such terms as “transactional self” and “transactional body” 
suffer from unseemly mercantile associations[…], they do convey the sense of a dynamic, 
symbiotic individual that is essentially engaging with and relating to others and is in turn 
essentially reliant on and constituted by such relations (p. 214) 
 
What my project discovered was something akin to this concept of the transactional self, 
but might be duly supplemented by way of double description: at the centre of this project 
was a concept of the trans-interactional self, whereby the body was a site of exchange 
both ‘across’ and ‘among’ other selves and, simultaneously, an even broader network of 





i) The relationship between raw data and the software categories 
 
One definite gap in the process of building and iterating the system was the fact that I was 
unable to establish what precise brainwave data corresponded to the categories provided 
by the OSC software (i.e. ‘Concentration’, ‘Meditation’ and ‘Focus’) developed by George 
Khut. The algorithm linking them together remained a black box. Knowing this data would 
have potentially allowed for me to better understand the relationship between the 
participants’ neurological and psychological states and the likelihood of them experiencing 
the sense of integration, embodiment and situatedness they described having felt. Going 
forward, developing a bespoke copy of the OSC software would be one path to develop 
the system further. However, whilst there would not be consensus on how to map the data 
to usable categories for the audiovisual parameters (for instance, undoubtedly the 
neuroscientists would focus on different data sets than the psychologists, as likely would 
I), it would nevertheless present the option of having more control over the system design. 
 
 
ii) Consistent participants as an experimental control 
 
One further opportunity for increased understanding of the effects of each iteration would 
have been to have invited certain participants to take part in all of the 
experiment-performances as an experimental control. Their feedback could have offered 
an understanding of the experience of someone who’d experienced each successive 
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experiment-performance without compromising or preventing gathering feedback from all 
the remaining participants unaffected by the previous experiment-performances. 
 
 
iii) Developing a universal language 
 
Finally, notable throughout the entire process was the practical difficulties presented by 
the fact that different terminology was used by different actors in the commissions 
depending on their background and field. For instance, to the scientists, doctors and 
coders, it was relevant to use the word ‘user’. However, when speaking with the galleries 
and other artists the word ‘participant’ was more appropriate. The very novelty of the 
system and the diversity of tools involved, as well as the fact I brought together a number 
of different disciplines, resulted in a varied and oftentimes divergent vocabulary to 
describe the processes. This often meant communication was inefficient and energy 
intensive as extra explanation had to be offered on multiple occasions in order to reduce 
the risk of misunderstanding. When writing up the project here, the use of 
double-description presented one interesting solution to this issue, but it was insufficient to 
address the practical issues which appeared throughout. Different people had different 
understandings of the terms, often which existed but denoted different things within each 




6. Summing Up 
 
The paradox at the core of this project was that the more I set up limits and parameters to 
control each experiment-performance, the more unlikely it became that they would provide 
the experience of embodiment, integration and situatedness. In other words, the more the 
work adopted the modern paradigm of striving towards certainty and knowability, the less 
the results were actually worth knowing. A certain level of uncertainty was required for the 
works to accommodate the serendipity required to produce the experience of 
embodiment, integration and situatedness. However, it’s difficult to measure chaos, and 
yet, without a certain amount of it, what made the work valuable was sapped out of it. 
A too clear a definition of roles and the limits on the participants’ activity precluded 
particular unexpected outcomes and results. For instance, when the participants 
spontaneously started holding hands, this was unplanned for. Its significance was only 
understood in hindsight once I had researched its physiological and psychological effects. 
Certain of these effects and behaviours, such as when the participants would become 
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overly infatuated with the technology for its own sake, could nonetheless be frustrating 
insofar as attention was diverted from the project’s goals of challenging the divisions 
between the roles. For example, by overemphasizing the participatory and cerebral 
aspects of the work (by introducing crib sheets and workshops) in the final 
experiment-performance, the participants’ experience was steered away from the more 
profound effects of feeling situated and integrated with one another and the technology, 
positioning them ‘in’ the space rather than ‘of’ it, in Merleau-Ponty’s terms (1962, p. 171). 
However, relinquishing control was eventually proven necessary for the project to 
reach any meaningful level of success. This harks back to the principles outlined in ​The 
Artistic Turn​ (2009, p. 64) of ‘employing situated, adapted criteria’, as opposed to 
‘universal, static criteria’ when attempting to stake out the limits and bounds of a given 
praxis or practice-as-research project in order to retain the ‘singularity of a specific artistic 
trajectory’ (p. 63). Biofeedback is a phenomenon which is capable of challenging the 
divisions between the roles of artist, audience and artwork during live audiovisual 
performances. The use of biometric devices facilitates this, but their technical nature can 
also distract from the aesthetic experience of embodiment, integration and situatedness. 
Cybernetics and social practice are both fields which support this process, and certain 
levels of interaction and participation produce varying degrees and intensities of this 
experience. What was discovered in the course of the project was that one of the principal 
effects of challenging the roles involved in the production of art was the foregrounding of 
neglected forms of knowledge production and, more importantly, ways of imagining the 







Appendix I – Initial Planning 
 
a) Experiments Outline 
 
Originally, the experiments were designed to different specifications and, though the 
fundamental aspects remained the same, the nature of working to commissions meant 
certain details changed. Below are the details of how I originally expected to pursue the 
different themes and technological concerns of the project step-by-step. 
 
 
1. Feedback systems 
 
Venue / location​: Digital innovation shed, John Dalton West, Manchester Metropolitan 
University (MMU) 
Number of Participants​: one 
Hardware​: Jawbone 24 activity tracker, MacBook Pro, smartphone, projector screen and 
projector, speakers and amp. 
Software​: OSC, Modul8, OSX, Biosync, Quartz Composer, Processing 
 
This experiment was designed to create a system in which the biometric information of 
one participant is collected, visualized and sonified. The design replicated George Khut’s 
Distillery: Wave Forming ​(2012) in which the heart rate of a participant is incorporated into 
a feedback loop to produce audio-visual outputs. In his experiment, Khut explored how 
participants take control of their own heart rate. Following similar principles, I designed the 
system such that heart rate data would be recorded using a Jawbone UP24​ ​activity 
tracker​ ​and subsequently mapped to real-time responsive audiovisual channels using the 
software Modul8.  The audio and video was then projected back into the environment to 
4
establish a feedback loop between the participant and their own biometric data (see 
diagram 1). 
In order to evaluate the system’s performance and how it could be developed, the 
biometric data was to be analysed through screen captures and sound recordings of the 
audiovisual output. In addition to this, a practitioner’s journal would be used to provide 
thorough notes detailing all the amendments and adaptations undertaken throughout the 
experiment as well as the activity of the participant. 
 
 
4 UP24 health tracker has the ability to sync wirelessly via Bluetooth to the updated companion app 
with collected biometric data. Modul8 is a software for live visual performance developed by 




2. Multiple data sources 
 
Venue / location​: Digital innovation shed, MMU 
Number of Participants​: Two  
Hardware​: Jawbone health tracker, MacBook Pro, a smartphone and BioSync 
Software​: OSC, Modul8, OSX and our bespoke multimodal biometric software 
 
Building on the first experiment, the original design for the second experiment explored 
the implications of having multiple data sources by introducing the heart rate of a second 
participant. The purpose of this experiment was twofold: first, both participants would 
independently experience the audiovisual representations of their heart rates (see 
diagram 2a); second, the datasets generated from each individual’s heart rate would be 
coupled and integrated into the system in order to gauge the effect of this on the level of 
interaction between them as coauthors of the work. This experiment was informed by 
Mariko Mori’s ​Wave UFO​ (1999) and David Rosenboom’s ​Ecology of the Skin ​(1978). In 
both of these installations, the output is generated by varying degrees of audience-artist 






Venue / location​: Digital innovation shed (MMU) 
Number of Participants​: 3 
Hardware​: Jawbone, MacBook Pro, and a smartphone 
Software​: Open OSC, modul8, OSX and the multimodal biometric software 
 
The third experiment was originally designed simply to introduce a third participant who 
would have the ability to act as a ‘conductor’, manipulating the biometric data generated 
by the other participants in the system. From there, the level of authority would be 
adjusted between the artist (conductor) and the audience (observer / listener) by varying 
their respective control over the audiovisual output generated by both the individual and 








Venue / location​: The Roadhouse (Manchester, UK) 
Number of Participants​: 3+ 
Hardware​: Jawbone, MacBook Pro, smartphone,  
Software​:  Open OSC, Modul8, OSX and the Multimodal biometric software, Microsoft 
Kinect V2. 
 
The fourth and final experiment was designed to combine all the previous experiments, 
introducing further participants and increasing the variables in the system by adding 
motion capture and temperature monitoring. Six audience members would participate in 
the co-creation of the performance. It was also intended that this experiment would be 
conducted in a live performance environment. 
Participants’ movement was to be captured by a Microsoft Kinect V2, creating 
another data stream to be combined with the heart rate previously established in 
experiments one and two. Temperature data was also to be generated using the Jawbone 
UP24 activity tracker which would already have been used to monitor heart rate. In 
addition to curating a live performance, my aim was to publish the software so other 
practitioners would be able to utilise it to enhance their own performances, including 






b) Summary Table 
 
In summary, the following table overviews how I had originally intended to structure and 
carry out the experiments. 
 
Table 3: Summary of original experiment-performance designs 
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Experiments  Focus and contribution 
to objectives  
Variables  Equipment  Recordings and data 
collected 
1. ​System To undertake technical 
research – tests of 
equipment, processes 
and methods which will 
facilitate the production 
of a system that will 
collect and represent 
biometric data sonically 
and visually 
Heart rate Jawbone 
UP24 
● Participant activity to be 
recorded by camera 
● Biometric data 
● Audio and visuals 
generated by the 
participant to be recorded 
● The recorded information 
is intended to be read as 
a combined data set 
2. ​Multiple 
Inputs 
Increasing the number of 
participants and number 
of inputs from the body 
and audio / visual 
outputs from the system 
 
Heart rate Jawbone 
UP24 
● Participant activity to be 
recorded by camera 
● Biometric data 
● Audio and visuals 
generated by the 
participant to be recorded 
● The recorded information 
is intended to be read as 
a combined data set 
3. ​Hierarchy To devise a method of 
allowing participants to 
have all / equal / or 
partial control and, by 













● Participant activity to be 
recorded by camera 
● Biometric data 
● Audio and visuals 
generated by the 
participant to be recorded 
● The recorded information 
is intended to be read as 
a combined data set 
4. 
Performance 
Exhibition of installation: 
part of a peer-review  
evaluation, the analytical 
criteria for which relates 
to the degree of 














● Participant activity to be 
recorded by camera 
● Biometric data 
● Audio and visuals 
generated to be recorded 
● The recorded information 
is intended to be read as 
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